The determinants of corporate financial policy in Zimbabwe: empirical evidence from company panel data by Enard Mutenheri (7195781)
 
 
 
This item is held in Loughborough University’s Institutional Repository 
(https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/) and was harvested from the British Library’s 
EThOS service (http://www.ethos.bl.uk/). It is made available under the 
following Creative Commons Licence conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the full text of this licence, please go to: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
 
The Determinants of Corporate Financial Policy in Zimbabwe; 
Empirical evidence from company panel data 
By 
Enard Mutenheri 
Doctoral Thesis 
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Department of Economics Loughborough University 
June 2003 
ýK. ý, ý .. 
.ý 
© Enard Mutenheri 2003 
1TT I 
Abstract 
This thesis examines the patterns and determinants of corporate financial policy 
(capital structure and dividend policy) in Zimbabwe. In particular it investigates 
various aspects of corporate financial behaviour in an emerging market; the evolution 
of corporate financial structure and dividend payout ratio over the past 25 years 
(1975-1999), the impact of the reform programme (introduced in 1992) on firm 
characteristics, the corporate financing patterns during the period 1990-1999, the 
determinants of corporate capital structures and dividend policy and the interaction 
between corporate financing and dividend policy decisions. 
The main results that emerge from the analysis suggest that (i) the debt ratio for the 
Zimbabwean corporate sector significantly increased after the reform (ii) the 
Zimbabwean corporate sector mainly depends on external finance (75 % of total 
financing) especially short-term finance, which contributes 52 % of total financing. 
Furthermore, the results support the following hypotheses (i) the pecking order 
hypothesis that firms prefer internal financing to external financing, (ii) the trade-off 
hypothesis that non-debt tax shields reduce the expected gains from leverage, (iii) 
firms use liquid assets to finance investments, (iv) the agency cost hypothesis that 
increasing managerial ownership helps to align the interests of managers and 
shareholders and therefore reduces the role of debt as an agency-conflict mitigating 
factor, (v) large firms have lower bankruptcy costs and therefore can support more 
debt than smaller firms, (vi) debt service limits the amount of cash paid out as 
dividends, and (vii) high growth firms rely on external finance more than low growth 
firms (viii) high growth and firms have low payout ratios (iv) Cash flows and 
institutional investors increase the likelihood that firms will pay dividends (v) capital 
structure and dividend policy decisions are interdependent and highly leveraged firms 
have low payout ratios 
KEY words, Zimbabwe, financial policy, capital structure, dividend policy, firm 
characteristics, Corporate. 
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Chapter 1-Introduction and macroeconomic overview 
The fear of the Lord is the beginning of 
wisdom. Proverbs 9: 10 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis examines the pattern and determinants of corporate financial policy 
(capital structure and dividend policy decisions) made by Zimbabwean non-financial 
firms listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange. 
The determinants of corporate financial policy have long been the focus of controvesy 
in the finance literature. Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Miller and Modigliani 
(1961), under restrictive assumptions, have demonstrated that the value of the firm is 
independent of its capital structure and dividend policy. However, the recent 
theoretical literature tends to suggest that once the assumption of perfect market 
conditions is relaxed, taxation, agency costs and asymmetric information play 
important roles in determining corporate financial policy. 
There have been many studies that have sought to empirically identify the major 
determinants of corporate financial policy. However, most of our understanding of 
corporate financial policy decisions is based on evidence from practices of firms 
operating in developed markets (see, Harris and Raviv, 1991 and Michaely and Allen, 
1995). However, in general, the institutional environment in which these firms operate 
is different from that of emerging markets. For example, the capital markets in 
developed countries are characterised by large stock markets which are efficient, and 
to a large extent provide the main market for corporate control. The banking sector is 
large and well developed. Furthermore, the fiscal policies of developed countries do 
not significantly change over a relatively short period of time and more importantly 
the firms in developed countries are large and well diversified. 
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On the other hand, the emerging capital markets, particularily in the Sub-Sahara 
region are small, thin and inefficient. Therefore the factors that have been suggested 
in the literature to shape corporate financial policy decisions in developed countries 
may not have explanatory power in emerging markets. Therefore, a study that 
examines corporate financial practices of firms in emerging markets may help to 
validate the relevance of the variables suggested in the theoretical literature. Since less 
is known about the basics of financial practices of corporations in emerging markets, 
the present study, by examining corporate financial policy in Zimbabwe, is an attempt 
to fill this gap in our research knowledge. 
Zimbabwe is of interest for several reasons. First and most basic, Zimbabwe is one 
of relatively few sub-Saharan African countries with an established corporate sector 
and a company accounts database which is long-established and of good quality. 
Second, Zimbabwe was included in the sample of countries originally considered by 
Singh and Hamid (1992) and by Booth et al (2001), and further results for Zimbabwe 
therefore offer an interesting perspective on and development of previous research. 
Third, the Zimbabwean corporate sector has evolved through three major and 
dramatically-different economic regimes: the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
(UDI) period (1965-1979), the first decade of independence (1980-1990) and the 
Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) period that started in December 
1991. During the UDI period, international sanctions were imposed on Zimbabwe, 
forcing the government to adopt an import substitution industrialisation policy. At 
that time, the only source of external finance for the corporate sector was the domestic 
financial system. During the first decade of independence the economy was heavily 
controlled and by the late 1980s there were serious problems of high unemployment 
levels, inflation rates and a growing budget deficit. As an attempt to address these 
economic problems, the government adopted an economic reform programme in 1991 
with the aim of raising savings, investment and economic growth. Thus Zimbabwe 
has evolved through three very different economic policy regimes and it offers a 
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particularly interesting setting within which to examine questions about economic 
policy, financial sector growth and company financial behaviour. 
The thesis is empirical and is divided into eight chapters. The second section of 
chapter one briefly describes the macroeconomic environment in Zimbabwe from 
1965 to 1999. In the same section we also explore the development of the banking 
sector and stock market. We argue that the corporate financial policies of the 
Zimbabwe corporate sector must have been shaped by the changes in the institutional 
environment. Some of the hypotheses that will be tested in the later empirical chapters 
are drawn from the discussion in this section. 
In chapter two we survey the theoretical and empirical literature on corporate 
financial policy. The first section of the chapter focuses on four conditions under 
which capital structure decisions matter, namely; the trade-off (taxation and 
bankruptcy costs), agency costs, asymmetric information and corporate strategy 
hypotheses. The second section reviews the literature on the determinants of dividend 
policy while the third section surveys the literature on the interaction of capital 
structure and dividend policy decisions. From the literature survey, we will draw 
hypotheses about corporate financial policy, which will be tested in the empirical 
chapters of the thesis. 
Chapter three describes the data set, variables and the methodology employed to 
empirically examine financial practices of the Zimbabwean corporate sector. The first 
section of the chapter describes the characteristics of the sample of firms. The second 
section presents the definitions of the variables selected for the empirical applications 
and the third section introduces and justifies the methodology employed in the 
subsequent empirical chapters. 
Chapter four explores the characteristics of non-financial firms listed on the 
Zimbabwe Stock exchange and is divided into four sections. The first section 
discusses the pattern of corporate boards, share ownership structure and ownership 
concentration. Due to data unavailability, this analysis is restricted to the period 1990 
to 1999. Using descriptive statistics methodology (paired t-test and Wilcoxon test), 
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the second section of the chapter compares capital structure ratios and firm 
performance across the three regimes. The third section examines financing patterns 
of the Zimbabwean corporate sector. This analysis is also restricted to the period 1990 
to 1999 due to data unavailability prior to 1990. The last section of the chapter 
summarises the main findings. 
In chapter five we look at the empirical determinants of corporate capital structure 
decisions. The empirical analysis is carried out in a three-step procedure. In the first 
section we examine the capital structure decisions of 32 firms over the period 1975 to 
1999. Using the F-test (Chow test), we investigate whether there is a structural shift in 
parameters (intercept and slope coefficients) of the capital structure equation as a 
result of changes in government policy regimes. We use the regime interaction 
dummies to detect, which individual parameters have changed. This methodology 
allows for differential intercepts and slope parameters. Furthermore, we use recent 
developments in the econometric literature about panel data estimation to model the 
capital structures of firms over the period 1975 to 1999. The second section examines 
the influence of agency factors on capital structures of 51 firms over a short period of 
time (1995-1999). Both static and dynamic models are estimated. We also attempt to 
address the issue of different definitions of leverage. The third section disaggregates 
the data into holding and non-holding firms and compares the financial performances 
and capital structures of these two groups of firms. Finally the fourth section 
summaries the main findings of the empirical analysis. 
Chapter 6 examines the dividend practices of the Zimbabwean corporate sector. The 
first section of the chapter documents the historical pattern and evolution of dividends 
for the Zimbabwean corporate sector over the period 1975 to 1999. Section two 
presents econometric evidence on dividend behaviour and is done in four steps. First, 
in order to test for dividend stability, the Lintner (1956) model of corporate dividend 
behaviour is estimated using recent developments in the econometric literature about 
dynamic panel data estimation. Second, we investigate the major determinants of the 
payout ratio, drawing the variables from the previous empirical literature. Third, we 
investigate the determinants of the decision to pay and omit dividends. Fourth, we 
investigate the determinants of the decision to increase, maintain and reduce 
dividends. The fourth section of the chapter presents the main findings and concludes. 
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In chapter seven we look at the interaction between capital structure and dividend 
policy decisions. The first section of the chapter empirically investigates the extent to 
which capital structure and dividend policy decisions are interdependent and the 
second section summaries the main findings. 
Finally, chapter eight summaries the main findings of the thesis, highlights the 
shortcomings of the study and suggests potential future research in corporate financial 
policy decisions. 
1.2 Macroeconomic Environment 
Prior to the UDI in 1965, Zimbabwe had a strong trade link with Britain and therefore 
the main objective of the economic sanctions was to cut off this relationship. This 
would deprive the government of the foreign currency on which much of the economy 
has heavily dependent. The impact of the sanctions on the economy was significantly 
felt in 1966 when GDP growth rate dropped to -4 % as compared to 7.1 % in 1965. 
However, this low growth rate did not persist because the government intervened. 
There was a shift from external market oriented policy to import-substitution 
industrialisation strategy. Firms were forced to reinvest profits, diversify their product 
lines and lend their surpluses to other local firms whose productions and activities 
were in line with the regime's import substitution guidelines. Loans, through the state 
owned bank (Rhobank) and subsidies were also provided to these firms. Commercial 
Banks were also forced to increase domestic assets and re-invest in the country. This 
further developed the commercial banks' interests in secondary financial institutions 
such as Finance Houses. In time, alternative routes for the country's exports and 
imports were found through Mozambique and South Africa. Therefore, although the 
aim of the sanctions was to ruin the Zimbabwean economy (and corporate sector), it 
actually "brought about a restructuring of the country's foreign trade, caused a 
broadening of the economic base, and led to a large degree of local autonomy and 
independence for local financial and commercial institutions", Price Waterhouse p. 8. 
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After attaining independence in 1980, the new government had a major task of 
redressing the historical inequalities in terms of education, land, wages and salaries. 
The main aim of the new regime was poverty reduction and it therefore introduced 
free education and health for the poor. Basic commodities were heavily subsidised in 
order for them to be affordable by the poor. Wages and salaries, foreign exchange, 
dividend repatriation and new investments were also heavily controlled. The highly 
regulated economy saw the annual GDP growth rate drop to 2.7 % during the 1980-89 
period. By 1989, total public sector debt was 90 % of GDP, of which 36 % was 
external. Inflation and nominal interest rates averaged 15 % and 12 % respectively 
and hence real interest rates were negative. Unemployment rate reached a record level 
of 26% in 1989. The main cause of the low growth rate was the low level of private 
investment (which was less than 8% of GDP in 1987) in the productive sectors of the 
economy. In turn, the decline in investment was attributable to a heavily regulated 
business environment through price controls, labour market restrictions, investment 
control procedures and the high costs associated with the foreign exchange allocation 
system. 
In order to address these problems, the government in 1991 introduced the Economic 
Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), with the aim of transforming the economy 
by moving away from a highly regulated economy to a free market one. 
The key areas of the reform programme were the following. First, trade liberalisation, 
especially moving away from the system of foreign exchange allocation to a market 
based one. Second, prices, wages and salaries were decontrolled in order to allow 
more flexibility in price and wage setting. In addition, regulations on investments and 
production were also relaxed in order to facilitate new entry and exit of enterprises. 
Third, the fiscal deficit at 13.1 % of GDP in the 1988/89 fiscal year was to be reduced 
to 5% by 1994/95. Fourth, interest rates were left to be determined by the market and 
restrictions on entry and exit of new banks and other financial institutions, both 
domestic and foreign, were also relaxed. This approach was meant to promote the 
efficiency of the financial sector and consequently stimulate the growth of the 
corporate sector. 
Did the corporate sector welcome the proposed reform? Although this question might 
be beyond the present study, it is interesting to know whether the intentions of the 
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reform programme were meant to benefit the corporate sector. A survey of chairman's 
statements soon after the implementation of the reform shows that the corporate sector 
welcomed the relaxation of both trade and foreign exchange controls (see Box 1 
below). 
Box 1. Chairpersons' statements about Economic structural 
1. "The recently announced import liberalisation and restructuring programme has created an 
atmosphere of cautious optimism and against this background, your group is committed to its 
expansion plans, in line with the government's stated objectives, " Truworths 1991. 
2. " ESAP will alleviate some of the constraints....... this initiative which should ensure an 
improvement in the country's economic performance, promotion of trade, increased 
competition, and employment opportunities, " PG, 1991 
3. "In the last few months, the economic environment has changed dramatically and with the 
welcome decision by the Zimbabwean Government to introduce ESAP, " APEX, 1992. 
4. "Although one of ESAP's central philosophies is for companies to export more...... we 
now have the ability to finance our exports on an offshore basis, i. e., interest charged on 
exports will be considerably reduced, " SPINNERS, 1992. 
5. 'The deregulation and relaxing of exchange control regulation are very encouraging........ 
I believe our structural adjustment programme has arguably worked better and more swiftly 
than in any other country in Africa, " TSL, 1993. 
6. "The relaxing of trading constraints under the recently announced economic measures will 
encourage a more open and competitive market........ company has to face these challenges 
and develop brands accordingly. ESAP has provided an environment which is conducive for 
the exports of Mazoe products, " Schweepes, 1993. 
7. "The relaxation in exchange control regulation, announced on 1 January 1994 has had a 
major impact on our ability to conduct business efficiently with far less time being wasted on 
bureaucracy. This is most welcome...., " ZirAlloys, 1994. 
1.2.1 An Overview of the Financial System in Zimbabwe. 
In this section the development of the financial system, from 1975 to 1999, is 
explored using indicators of banking system and stock market development as 
suggested by Prowse (1995) and Levine and Zervos (1996), among others. As 
discussed above this period covers the three episodes of major policy changes 
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The role of the financial system as a source of external corporate finance cannot be 
overemphasised. In theory, a well-developed financial system is expected to be 
capable of meeting most of the short-term, medium-term and long-term financial 
needs of corporations. However, financial sectors in most developing countries are 
underdeveloped such that corporate financing choice is limited. In an effort to boost 
savings and investments, governments of such economies have recently embarked on 
financial liberalisation programmes and this change in policy is expected to have an 
important impact on corporate financial behaviour. 
In this section, we fist examine the evolution of the Zimbabwean financial system. 
The evolution of the political economy of Zimbabwe has an important influence on 
the banking structure and the role the financial sector plays in financing industry. 
During the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) period, foreign-owned 
banks and multinational corporations played a major role in transforming the 
Zimbabwean financial system into what has been considered to be a sophisticated 
financial system, by African standards. During the UDI era, the financial system 
comprised the central bank, 4 commercial banks, 4 merchant banks, 2 Discount 
houses, 5 Finance Houses, 3 Building societies and a stock exchange. The government 
also set up a Post Office Savings Bank and an Agriculture Finance Corporation to 
cater for the small savers and financial needs of the agricultural sector, respectively. A 
stock market had long been established in 1946 to cater for the mining sector's 
activities. During UDI, foreign capital inflow was inhibited because of the economic 
sanctions. In this case, domestic institutional investors played a major role in the 
buying and selling of securities on the stock exchange. It is important to note that, this 
banking sector was serving a small corporate sector dominated by multinationals. 
After all, the level of investment was low since it depended on the availability of 
foreign currency. Therefore, it could be argued that, the financial sector was capable 
of meeting the financing requirements of the corporate sector. This banking structure, 
characterised by lack of competition and innovation, was inherited by the current 
government, which came into power in 1980. In 1980, the new government helped to 
establish the fifth commercial bank with a 47 % shareholding. Another discount house 
and two more merchant banks were also established. Several specialised institutions 
were also established to direct funds to specific sectors such as agriculture, industry 
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and mining'. Development banking institutions were set up to meet the medium and 
long term financial needs of the corporate sector. Of great importance, was the 
establishment of the Zimbabwe Development Bank in 1983. The bank offers a 
comprehensive package of financial services, which include long term loans, equity 
finance, lease finance, hire purchase factoring, trade finance and working capital. A 
similar institution (Small Scale Development Corporation) was also established in 
1984 to cater for the historically neglected small-scale enterprise sector. However, 
from 1980 to 1990, the financial sector was heavily regulated. The monetary 
authorities made use of interest rate and credit ceilings to control and direct spending. 
There were also restrictions on entry of new banks and participation of foreigners on 
the stock market. Financial repression resulted in negative real interest rates, which 
discouraged savings. The other shortcoming of the Zimbabwean financial sector was 
the collusive behaviour of commercial banks. Credit was only given to well- 
established corporations with good track record and assets to use as collateral. 
Restrictions on participation of foreigners on the stock market also limited foreign 
capital inflows. 
As mentioned above, in 1991, the government implemented the economic structural 
adjustment program, which included a financial reform package. The main elements 
of the financial reform included deregulation of the interest rates, moving towards 
market operations and opening up of the financial sector to new entrants, both local 
and foreign. The current banking structure, (post reform period) comprises a central 
bank, 9 commercial banks, 7 discount houses, 8 Merchant banks 5 building societies, 
7 finance houses, 5 development institutions and a stock exchange. There are 
thousands of registered pension funds and several insurance, assurance and asset 
management companies. Most recently, unit trusts have flooded the market. These 
unit trusts are important in the sense that they enable small investors to participate on 
the securities market. In Zimbabwe, the unit trusts can generally be classified into 
either equity funds or income funds. General equity funds can further be classified as 
general equity funds, specialist equity funds or balanced funds. General equity funds 
invest in a wide range of sectors and securities listed on the Zimbabwe Stock 
Exchange. On the other hand, specialist equity funds invest in particular shares of 
1 These were, Agricultural finance Corporation, Industrial Development Corporation and Mining 
Development Corporation. 
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companies listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, which implies that they are less 
diversified. Balanced funds invest in a broader spectrum of assets, such as shares, 
listed property, gilts and fixed interest securities. To safeguard the interests of 
investors, the Collective Investment Scheme Act governs the unit trusts and an 
association was formed in June 1995 in an attempt to co-ordinate and develop the 
operations. These developments should, therefore, increase the amount of external 
finance available to corporations. 
The other objective of the financial reform program was to improve financial 
intermediation, savings and investments by allowing competition among banks. The 
Zimbabwean financial system is slowly moving towards the UK system, whereby 
banks offer an increasing range of financial services. In this case, financial 
liberalisation is expected to improve the amount of credit available to the corporate 
sector as crowding out, often associated with financial repression, is eliminated. 
However, it is necessary at this juncture to assess the impact of the financial 
liberalisation program on the development of the financial system. In this case, we 
focus on the development of the banking system and the stock market. We make use 
of the ratio of bank's liquid liabilities to GDP and ratio of bank assets to GDP, as 
suggested by Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996), to explore the banking 
system's response to the implementation of the financial reform program. The first 
ratio measures the size of the formal financial system relative to the economy as a 
whole. We also use a third indicator, the value of loans and advances to the private 
sector by financial institutions as a percentage of total value of their assets. This ratio 
measures the importance of the deposit taking institutions in financing industry. 
On the other hand, the most commonly used measures of stock market development 
are: the ratio of gross issuance of public equity to GDP, (Prowse, 1995), new share 
issues as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation, (see, Kitchen, 1987), the ratio 
of market capitalisation to GDP and the value of trades as a percentage of GDP? We 
used data obtained from Quarterly Economic and Statistical Review (various years) 
published by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, to compute these ratios 
2 Levine and Zervos discuss indicators of banking system and stock market development in detail. 
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1.2.1.1 Developments in the banking system 
The indicators of banking sector development are shown in figures 1.1 and 1.2 below. 
Figure 1.1 shows the evolution of the banking sector development ratios from 1975- 
1999, while figure 1.2 shows the averages of each of these ratios during each regime. 
The ratio of the bank's liquid liabilities to GDP for mature banking systems is often 
greater than one. For the Zimbabwean case, the ratio of m2 to GDP is less than 0,30 
from 1975 to 1999. The m2/GDP ratio was slightly above 20 % from 1975 to 1980 
and rose again in the post reform period to a maximum of 28 % in 1998. This is 
partially explained by emergence of a host of new financial institutions. The bank 
assets/GDP and the claims on private sector/GDP ratios also show similar patterns. 
The lowest levels for these ratios were recorded in the 1980s. The most remarkable 
feature of the results is the movement of the bank assets/GDP ratio. In the 1970s it 
averaged 39 %, dropped to an average of 33 % in the 1980s and then rose to an 
average of 88% in the late 1990s. The results also show that the value of loans and 
advances to the private sector provided by financial institutions as a percentage of 
their total assets, has been declining for the past 20 years. This might be due to the 
fact that the banking sector is increasingly channelling financial resources to the 
public sector. We also computed the relative shares of the different financial 
institutions in providing loans to the corporate sector. The major observation is that 
commercial banks contributed the most (20 %) to the financing of the corporate 
sector. The second observation is that there was a sharp drop in the contribution of 
Building societies from 19 % in 1975 to 6% in 1999. We can therefore, conclude that 
the Zimbabwean banking sector is narrowly based and dominated by commercial 
banks, which by their nature are reluctant to engage in long term lending to the 
corporate sector. 
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Figure 1.2 
Indicators of banking sector development 
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Notes: Average banking sector development ratios during UDI (1975-1979), 
Independence (1980-1991) and Reform (19992-1999) 
Source: Own calculations, using data from Quarterly Economic and Statistical Review Reserve bank of 
Zimbabwe 
1.2.1.2 Zimbabwe Stock Market 
In theory, one of the major sources of corporate finance is the stock market. In 
Zimbabwe there is only one stock market with a long history. The first stock exchange 
in Zimbabwe was established in Bulawayo (the second largest city) in 1896. Later in 
the same year two other exchanges started operating in Gwelo (third city) and Umtali 
(fourth city). The amain purpose of these exchanges was to facilitate the exchange of 
ownership of mining claims. Although Zimbabwe is endowed with significant 
quantities of mineral deposits, mining activity declined after 6 years. As a result of 
this, all the three exchanges were closed by 1924. 
A new exchange was established in Bulawayo, where dealing started on 2nd January 
1946. Another floor was opened in Salisbury (now Harare) in 1951. The exchange 
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was named Rhodesia Stock Exchange3. The trading between the two centres was done 
through the telephone. The activities of the exchange expanded in the 1960s, a period 
of Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This was a period of the union of three 
states, namely South Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), North Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland 
(Malawi). During that period Salisbury was the main centre of economic activity. It 
therefore became necessary for the Rhodesia Stock Exchange activities (trading floor, 
secretaries and administration) to move to Salisbury. It was also felt that it was 
necessary to have legislation to govern the rights and obligations both of members of 
the exchange and the general investing public. The Rhodesia stock exchange Act was 
passed by the House of Assembly in 1974. Most of the operations of the exchange 
today are based on the 1974 Act. 
In 1980, the name of the exchange changed to `Zimbabwe stock exchange'. Although 
the exchange has been in operation for more than 50 years, it is still small in global 
terms, although it is the second largest exchange in Southern Africa. Only seventy- 
three companies are listed on the exchange. The trading system is call over. Business 
days are Monday from 08: 00 to Friday 16: 30. Trading hours are 09: 00am to 09: 30 am 
and then 11: 45am to 12: 15 pm. There are three main roles of the Exchange in the 
economy. It plays an intermediary role between companies in need of funds to expand 
and people with funds to invest. The second function is the provision of a market for 
trading of existing shares at market-determined prices. Finally, it provides a regulated 
environment for the fair-trading of shares. There are five types of shares listed on The 
Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE). They are ordinary shares, preference shares, bonus 
issue, rights issue and debentures. A committee made up of stockbrokers and 
government representatives runs the ZSE. Trading of stocks is done through stock 
broking firms, which are members of the ZSE. There are ten stockbrokers. They do 
not, however, offer the same services. Some offer investment and financial planning 
services, while others offer trading services only. Kingdom securities Pvt Ltd and 
Bard stockbrokers have more extensive research departments than the rest. In general, 
stock broking firms offer advice on investments such as shares, debentures, 
government bonds, new company share floats and rights issues. All transactions must 
3 Rhodesia is the former name of Zimbabwe. 
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be completed within the ZSE. Disputes may arise due to unfair trading and such 
disputes must be referred to the committee. 
Transaction costs 
Costs incurred by traders are in the form of charges (commission) and taxes. There is 
a basic charge of Z$20.00 on both buy and sell transactions. In addition to this basic 
charge, a stamp duty of Z$0.45 per Z$100.00 of shares purchased or sold is also 
charged. Transfer fee, on purchase, is Z$20.00. Brokerage rates are as shown in table 
1.1 below 
Table 1.1 
Brokerage rates: Ordinary and Preference shares 
Consideration (Z$) Rate % 
On the first 1 50 000 2.0 
On the next 1 50 000 1.5 
Over -1 100 000 1.0 
Source: ZSE handbook (2000) 
Dividends and capital gains are taxed in Zimbabwe. Withholding tax on dividends is 
15% and capital gains greater than Z$5 000 attract a tax of 10 %, but there is a 15 % 
inflation allowance. 
The exchange has been open to foreign investments since 1 June 1993. A foreigner 
can now participate on the Zimbabwe stock exchange without first seeking the 
approval of the Exchange Control authority. However, participation of foreign 
investors is restricted to 10 % of total shareholding per individual and 40 % 
collectively of each company. Repatriation of income and capital is free and foreign 
investors qualify for a 100% after - tax dividend remittance. There is also freedom for 
foreign investors to register shares in either their names or names of nominee 
companies. 
The opening of the exchange has witnessed an increase in capital inflows as shown in 
table 1.2 below. The highest net foreign capital inflow was witnessed in 1995. The net 
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outflow recorded in 1999 is partially explained by the political instability in the 
country, which started at the end of 1998. 
Table 1.2 Monthly foreign deal analysis on the ZSE 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Shares bought (Z$m) 696 766 817 1809 1320 1019 
Shares sold (Z$m) 241 223 771 1398 896 1454 
Net inflow (Z$m) 455 543 46 411 424 (435) 
Source: ZSE handbook (2000) 
The Zimbabwe Stock exchange publishes two indices, one for the industrial 
companies and the other for mining companies. The industrial index measures the 
performance of all industrial shares while the mining index is a representative of 
mining shares. The term " industrial " is misleading in this case, since other shares not 
in the industrial sector are also represented by this index. Nine mining companies are 
listed on the exchange. The movement in these two indices are shown in figure 1.3. 
The base year for each index is 1967. It is evident from the diagram that the financial 
reform programme had an impact on the performance of the Zimbabwe stock 
Exchange. The management of the ZSE also made an effort in making the public 
aware of the existence of the stock exchange and benefits of investing. Besides, the 
massive advertising through the media, they also printed brochures in the other two 
languages commonly used in Zimbabwe. The increase in the demand for shares 
pushed up stock prices of most companies and we would expect such increases in 
stock prices to influence the financial behaviour of listed companies. In particular, this 
might influence firms to use more equity financing. However, the movement in stock 
prices was not smooth. For example, in 1983/84 and 1992/93 the market performed 
poorly due to severe droughts during those periods. 
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Figure 1.3 
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Source; own calculations, using data from Zimbabwe Stock Exchange 
Indicators of Stock Market development 
Apart from the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in South Africa, most stock markets in 
Africa, are small in relation to the size of their economies. Kitchen (1987), argues that 
low percentage turnover to market capitalisation is an indication that market activity 
is low and also that shares are tightly held. The market capitalisation/GDP, new 
issues/GDP and value traded/GDP ratios, shown in figure 1.4, also confirm that the 
Zimbabwe Stock Exchange is very small. 
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Figure 1.4 
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However, what is interesting is that these ratios show a significant improvement in the 
late 1990s. But the rate at which companies go public is not as rapid as in other 
developing countries, especially from East Asia. However, in the case of Zimbabwe, 
some companies are not listed on the ZSE simply because they cannot meet the 
requirements. The listing requirements are too high for `indigenous companies', 
which are very small. It becomes necessary for the Exchange to come up with listing 
requirements, which are in line with these companies. Such a need was realised 
worldwide. For example, in Europe, Easdaq (European Association of Securities 
Dealers Automation) caters for the needs of young entrepreneurial firm. A similar 
market, Nasdaq, in US has raised finance for small companies. It can therefore, be 
concluded that though, the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange has shown some substantial 
improvements in the recent past, only large firms are listed. 
1.3 Summary and Conclusions 
The discussion from this chapter suggests that the evolution of the political economy 
of Zimbabwe might have an important impact on corporate financial behaviour. The 
evolution of the financial system, as shown by the indicators of banking and stock 
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market development, also suggests that the political economy of Zimbabwe had a 
significant effect on the development of the financial structure, which plays an 
important role in the financing of the corporate sector. Thus, in modelling the 
financial policy of the Zimbabwean corporate sector, it is important to consider the 
effect of regime change on company characteristics suggested in the finance literature 
to be the major determinants of company financial policy. The next chapter reviews 
the literature on corporate financial policy. 
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Chapter 2- Literature Review on corporate financial policy 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will provide a brief literature review about corporate financial policies. 
The first section begins with a survey of the literature on corporate capital structures. 
This is then followed by a survey of the literature that has examined the determinants 
of cross-sectional variations in corporate dividend payout ratios. The third part of the 
chapter summarises the literature that argues that capital structure and dividend 
policies are interdependent and section four concludes. 
2.2 Literature review on capital structure 
2.2.1 The Theoretical determinants of capital structures 
Controversy abounds in the literature on the importance of capital structure decisions. 
The revolution in modem corporate finance began when Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
demonstrated that under perfect market conditions, the capital structure decision was 
irrelevant to firm value. Such a conclusion, however, motivated finance researchers to 
re-examine the whole issue of corporate capital structures, such that over the past 
three decades theoretical models of capital structure have been added to the finance 
literature. However, some of the theoretical models suggested in the literature are very 
complicated and of little use since they can hardly be put to empirical verification. 
The most successful critiques of the Modigliani and Miller (1958) model have 
proposed factors based on imperfect market conditions such as agency costs, 
asymmetry information and corporate tax to be the major determinants of corporate 
capital structure. Most recently, corporate strategic behaviour has also been added to 
the list. The emphasis is on the impact of debt policy on firm value. The main result 
drawn from these studies is that, the corporate capital structure decision is not just a 
choice between debt and equity financing based on their relative costs and benefits as 
was believed in the 1960s. The more recent theories have emphasised the relative 
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importance of private and public instruments together with the degree of 
concentration, ownership and the homogeneity of holdings of these instruments. The 
corporate governance issue has also been incorporated into the capital structure 
theory. There is no doubt that these theoretical models have increased our 
understanding of capital structure choice. Harris and Raviv (1991, p. 299) point out 
that the theoretical models "have identified a large number of potential determinants 
of capital structure. The empirical work so far has not, however, sorted which of these 
are important in various context". This is an important observation, given that market 
imperfections are more pronounced in some countries than others. In particular, the 
financial systems in industrialised countries are well developed such that firm access 
to both financial and capital markets is easier than in developing countries. In this 
case, empirical evidence from different countries will enhance our understanding of 
corporate capital structure decisions. The following subsection presents a summary of 
theoretical models based on taxation and bankruptcy costs, agency costs, asymmetric 
information and corporate strategy assumptions. 
2.2.1.1 Theories based on Taxation and Bankruptcy costs 
Some of the crucial elements of reality that have been incorporated into the Modigliani 
and Miller (1958) irrelevance model are corporate tax, (Modigliani and Miller, 1963) 
personal income taxes (Miller, 1977), bankruptcy costs (e. g., Baxter, 1967; Kraus and 
Litzenberger, 1973), and non-debt tax credits, (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). Using 
different theoretical models, the firm's capital structure decision was found to be 
either relevant (Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973; DeAngelo 
and Masulis 1980, among others) or irrelevant, (Miller, 1977). Those who have found 
the firm's capital structure to be relevant argue that a unique internal optimal capital 
structure does exist. 
In a world of corporate tax, Modigliani and Miller (1963) consider two firms with 
identical operating cash flows, but with different capital structures. The first firm uses 
equity finance exclusively to fund its investment projects (unlevered firm), while the 
second one uses a mixture of debt and equity (levered firm). In this framework they 
demonstrate that the market value of the levered firm is equal to the market value of 
the all equity firm plus the present value of the debt premium and thus implying that 
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debt has an impact on cash flows. The explanation for this is that interest payment on 
debt is tax deductible, which means that the tax liability of the levered firm is lower 
than that of an all equity firm. This tax saving (which is a product of the corporate tax 
rate and debt obligation) advantage of debt financing has two paramount implications 
in the theory of capital structure. Firstly, the more the amount of debt in the capital 
structure, the greater the market value of the firm. Secondly, an increase in the 
corporate tax rate will in turn increase the market value of the firm. However, finance 
researchers have argued that it is the increase in corporate tax rate that leads to a 
higher corporate debt level (see, Kale and Noe, 1992). In the Modigliani and Miller 
model, the maximum market value of the firm is reached when it approaches one 
hundred percent debt financed. Such a conclusion, however, does not conform to what 
is observed in practice. In the real world firms do not finance their investment projects 
exclusively by debt. In this respect, an important question is; if there is an advantage 
of debt over equity financing, why is it that most firms have very low debt ratios? 
Modigliani and Miller suggest that under certain circumstances other forms of 
financing might be cheaper than debt, lenders may also put a limit to the amount of 
debt that a company can borrow and other costs related to the debt financing (i. e. 
implicit costs of debt, which are positively related to the debt ratio) may explain the 
low levels of corporate debt observed in practice. 
The debt related costs, namely direct and indirect bankruptcy costs, were explored by 
Baxter (1967). The direct costs of bankruptcy are the various administrative expenses 
like legal fees and trustee's fees, which are incurred when a corporation goes 
bankrupt4 (is liquidated or reorganized). However of greater importance are the 
indirect costs of bankruptcy. These "include reduction in future sales due to 
customers' doubts of the reliability of the bankrupt firm as a supplier; difficulty in 
obtaining trade credit; higher production costs due to dislocations within the company 
and renegotiations of contracts for employees; and the time lost by executives in the 
reorganization procedure", Kim (1978), p 47. Unfortunately these indirect costs of 
bankruptcy are difficult to measure in practice. 
4 Bankruptcy occurs when cash flows from the firm's assets are insufficient to cover the cash expenses- 
including the cash flows owed to the firm's debtholders, Chambers and Lacey, 1999, p. 375. 
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According to Baxter (1967), there are two main reasons why corporations maintain 
low debt levels: firstly, the interest rate on debt is positively related to the debt-equity 
ratio, that is to say, high debt levels attract higher interest rates and thus increasing the 
cost of borrowing. Secondly, a succession of bad years might cause a highly levered 
firm to default on its debt payments, resulting in an increase in the probability of 
bankruptcy. This means that there is a trade-off between the tax saving and bankruptcy 
costs. Theoretically, the advantages of debt financing are greater than the 
corresponding bankruptcy costs at lower levels of debt, but for higher levels of debt, 
bankruptcy costs offset tax savings and therefore resulting in a U-shaped cost of 
capital function for the firm. The corresponding firm value function is therefore 
inverted U-shaped. The amount of debt at which the slope of the firm value function is 
zero gives the optimum capital structure. This conclusion, however, inspired other 
researchers to search for the existence of firm optimal capital structure (e. g. Kraus and 
Litzenberger, 1973; Brennan and Schwartz, 1978; Scott, 1976; Myers, 1984) 
Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) formerly incorporate corporate tax and bankruptcy 
costs in a state-preference model. The model shows that the market value of the 
levered firm is equal to the value of the unlevered firm plus the market value of debt 
obligation minus the product of the complement of the corporate tax rate and the 
present value of bankruptcy costs. Thus, the presence of bankruptcy costs, though 
limiting the advantages of debt financing, ensures the existence of a unique optimal 
capital structure. Scott (1976), using a multi-period model of firm valuation, reaches 
the same conclusion. 
Brennan and Schwartz (1978) have argued that tax savings make sense only when the 
firm is doing well (i. e. not bankrupt) because the tax shield is lost when the 
corporation goes through bankruptcy, reorganization or liquidation. Moreover, a 
higher debt level reduces the probability that the firm will survive in the near future 
and thus increasing the uncertainty of tax shields. Brennan and Schwartz also 
demonstrate that this uncertainty of tax shields is sufficient to bring about an optimal 
capital structure without necessarily incorporating bankruptcy costs in their 
differential equation. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that higher probability of 
bankruptcy, associated with higher business risk, leads to lower optimal leverage ratio. 
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In addition, Kim (1978) argues that it is necessary to search for an optimal capital 
structure in conjunction with debt capacity. He defines debt capacity as the maximum 
amount of debt that a firm can borrow in a perfect capital market. The argument is 
that, optimal capital structure is irrelevant if debt capacity occurs first, since a firm 
cannot borrow beyond its debt capacity level. If, however, debt capacity and optimal 
capital structure occur simultaneously, the value of the firm will be maximized by 
financing the investment projects exclusively by debt. Lastly, an optimal debt less than 
debt capacity, ensures the existence of a unique optimal capital structure in the 
presence of bankruptcy costs. 
Miller (1977), building on the empirical findings of Warner (1977) argues that 
bankruptcy costs are relatively small in relation to the tax savings. Miller observes that 
the level of debt for U. S corporations remained stable over a period of 30 years, 
despite a substantial rise in corporate tax rates. This implies that debt ratios for these 
corporations were not responding to the changes in corporate tax rates as the theory 
predicts. In this respect, corporate tax and bankruptcy costs seem to be deficient in 
explaining the observed capital structure. Miller introduces differential personal 
income taxes on equity and debt incomes into his equilibrium model. He made an 
assumption that the personal income tax system favours equity income. This makes 
sense since capital gains, which are a component of equity income, are taxed at a 
lower rate than ordinary income. In the Miller equilibrium, there are no bankruptcy 
costs such that corporations can use either debt or equity financing exclusively, 
depending on which is cheaper. In this case, the supply curve for debt is horizontal. 
The demand curve can be analysed in two parts; the first part of the demand curve, 
which is below the supply curve, is horizontal. For this part of the demand curve, tax- 
paying investors shun holding debt since the rate of return is lower than that of equity 
(due to tax on debt income). Only tax-exempt investors have the incentive to hold 
debt, but once the funds from tax-exempt investors are exhausted, the return on debt 
must be high enough to induce taxable investors to hold debt and at this point the 
demand curve begins to slope upwards continuously. The point of intersection of the 
two curves is where taxable investors are indifferent between holding debt and equity. 
The market equilibrium that is obtained is for the aggregate debt ratio for the corporate 
sector and therefore capital structure is irrelevant at the firm level, since corporate tax 
advantages are offset by personal tax disadvantage. 
24 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) and Kale and Noe (1992) extend the Miller equilibrium 
model in other important ways. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) extend the Miller model 
by incorporating non-debt tax shields such as depreciation allowances and investment 
tax credits. The non-debt tax shields are found to have a significant impact on the debt 
ratios, since they are substitutes for tax savings. The presence of such non-debt tax 
shelters reduce the benefits of using debt financing since they reduce the income 
shielded from debt. Importantly, their state-preference model shows that the corporate 
debt level is negatively related to non-debt tax shields and bankruptcy costs, but 
positively related to corporate tax rate. 
In addition, Kale and Noe (1992) have demonstrated that the observed capital structure 
of U. S corporations is consistent with what the theory of capital structure, based on 
corporate tax and bankruptcy costs, actually predicts. They first define financial 
distress as a period prior to bankruptcy. During this period the firm's cash flows fall 
below the debt premium and the firm adjusts to a lower optimal debt level in order to 
be able to meet the coupon payments on debt. On the other hand, they demonstrate 
that in the extreme case whereby the costs of financial distress are zero, a change in 
corporate tax rate has no effect on the optimal debt level because the benefits and costs 
induced by a change in taxes offset each other. In general, the change in optimal debt 
level with respect to a change in corporate tax depends on the magnitude of the 
proportion of direct cost to the total cost of financial distress. This magnitude was, 
however, found to be very small. Thus, in this model low debt levels are associated 
with low bankruptcy costs, which is consistent with what is observed in the U. S 
corporate capital structures. 
2.2.1.2 Theories based on Agency costs 
The modem corporation is characterised by separation of ownership and control. 
Usually a large number of small owners delegate the day to day running of the firm to 
management. However, it is most likely that managers may pursue their own interests 
at the expense of the shareholders; therefore a monitoring device is required. 
Designing an appropriate capital structure mitigates this agency problem by 
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constraining managerial behaviour and thus affecting the performance of the firm. The 
following subsection argues that debt, as well as its substitutes, play an important role 
in capital structure decision. However, some of the agency costs are magnified by 
using debt financing and it is therefore necessary to note that there are agency costs 
that encourage the use of debt financing while others discourage its use (Chambers 
and Lacey, 1999). 
A separation between corporate ownership and control has an important impact on 
corporate decisions. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that conflict of interests 
between managers and shareholders or between shareholders and bondholders may 
arise. This conflict of interests creates agency costs which in turn lead to sub optimal 
business decisions (Barnea et al, 1981). However, it has been argued in the literature 
that the financial policy of a corporation can be designed in such a way as to mitigate 
this agency problems. This line of argument started with Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
whose model shows that debt in the capital structure reduce the conflict between 
managers and outside equity holders. The fundamental assumption is that both agents 
(managers) and principals (shareholders) seek to maximise their own self-interests. 
The managers derive utility from the consumption of perquisites (empire building), 
which uses corporate resources that could have been used to increase firm value. This 
behaviour is not in the best interest of shareholders and thus calls for a monitoring 
device. In the Jensen and Meckling model, consumption of perquisites is the major 
source of conflict between management and outside equity holders. In order to show 
the nature of the conflict they consider a situation whereby the owner manager owns 
one hundred percent shares of the firm. In this case the owner-manager, by consuming 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits, bears all the benefits and costs of his behaviour 
and therefore, has an incentive to cut down on the consumption of perquisites. If the 
manager were to issue shares such that he owns a fraction, a, of the firm, he will have 
a greater incentive to increase consumption of perquisites since he now bears only a 
fraction of the costs. This implies that as the fraction of managerial ownership 
declines, more perquisites are consumed and thus calls for the need for shareholders to 
monitor management behaviour. However this is not possible because of the free rider 
problem. Jensen and Meckling argue that under perfect market conditions the rational 
S See for example, Jensen and Meckling (1976), Grossman and Hart (1980), Stultz (1990) and Harris 
and Raviv (1990). 
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investors expect this behaviour and react by paying low share prices. In other words, 
the capital market makes the owner-manager bear all the agency costs of outside 
equity. In this sense agency costs reduce firm value. One way to avoid this loss of firm 
value is to hold the managers' absolute investment in the company constant and then 
finance the required investments by debt. 
However, increasing the amount of debt in capital structure is not costless, bankruptcy 
costs and other agency costs of debt increase as the debt level rises. In certain 
circumstances the use of debt finance may lead to another conflict between 
stockholders and debt holders. Two different types of agency costs, namely asset 
substitution and under-investment have been discussed in the literature. The asset 
substitution problem occurs when bondholder wealth is transferred to equity holders. 
Bondholders lend money to the firm with the belief that investment projects 
undertaken will have a certain risk level and they charge an interest rate on bonds 
accordingly. The bondholders are concerned with receiving the interest and principal 
payments. But once the stockholders get the money, there is no guarantee that they 
will act in the best interest of bondholders ex post. In fact debt provides an incentive 
for owner-managers to substitute riskier investments for less risky ones. Jensen and 
Meckling have demonstrated that such behaviour redistributes wealth from 
bondholders to stockholders. In order to protect their interests, bondholders resort to a 
variety of contracts such bond covenants and collateral. Such contracts are costly to 
the owner managers and therefore limit the use of debt financing. Myers(1977) also 
argues that debt financing may lead to under-investment problems. He asserts that 
stockholders may pass up value-increasing projects if the firm is in financial distress, 
because investing in such projects implies that bondholders will reap most of the 
profits. 
Debt financing can also reduce the conflict in a way suggested by Grossman and Hart 
(1982). Their model differs from the Jensen and Meckling in the sense that 
management share ownership is assumed to be close to zero, implying that managers 
have even higher incentives to consume perquisites. However, if debt is issued, 
management has an obligation to meet debt repayment otherwise the firm will be 
taken into bankruptcy court. On the other hand bankruptcy has a negative impact on 
management welfare since it means loss of jobs and perquisites. It follows that the 
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threat of bankruptcy motivates managers to maximise profits. Higher debt ratios, 
therefore, convey to investors the information that management is pre-committed to 
undertake decisions that maximise the market value of the firm. Therefore, the debt 
level is positively related to market value of the firm. 
Jensen (1986) argues that debt mitigates the over-investment problem by considering 
free cash flow as the source of conflict. Managers are concerned with the growth of 
the company, because it means greater reputation and more perquisites. This 
management behaviour leads to investing in projects with negative net present values 
(i. e. over-investment). On the other hand shareholders pressurise for higher dividend 
payout. Thus, free cash flow can be wasted by both shareholders and managers. 
However, debt creation reduces the cash flow available for such wasteful behaviour 
since the firm is under an obligation to repay debt when it is due. In this case debt is a 
better substitute for dividend and also serves as a pre-commitment to maximise share 
value. Thus the benefit of debt in resolving the over-investment problem is through 
reducing free cash flow. It should be noted that the Jensen (1986) thesis does not apply 
to firms with highly profitable investments, since large amounts of funds are required 
to finance such projects. In fact, the free cash flow problem is more pronounced in 
firms, which are mature with few growth opportunities. 
Harris and Raviv (1990) argue that debt financing helps the liquidation decision. In 
their model, the quality of the firm depends on management effort and ability. Since 
investors cannot directly observe management behaviour, debt provides information 
about the quality of the firm in that the ability to repay debt conveys good news about 
the firm while the inability to meet debt obligation signals bad news. The ability to 
repay debt is an indication that cash flows exceed coupon payments therefore the firm 
is in a healthy state. On the other hand, default leads to costly investigations (e. g. 
auditing) about the true operations of the firm. Basing on the results of the audit report 
investors can decide to liquidate or continue with the firm's current operations. It 
should be noted that the liquidation decision is not acceptable to management, whose 
interest is to always continue with the firm's operation. In such a situation debt has an 
advantage over equity financing in the sense that debt holders can force firm 
liquidation by taking the firm into a bankruptcy court. On the other hand Suitz (1990) 
28 
argue that it is in the best interest of management to always want to invest even if 
paying out dividends is preferred by shareholders. 
Large shareholders and institutional investors are the two substitutes for debt that have 
received a great deal of attention in the literature. It has been argued above that in 
situations where there is a single owner agency costs are very low. This implies that 
agency costs are very high when ownership is highly diffused. The problem with 
dispersed shareholders is that monitoring is costly for individuals. The individual 
shareholder owns a very small fraction of the company shares and if monitoring ends 
up in better company performance all shareholders will benefit. Such a free rider 
problem discourages small shareholders from engaging in monitoring activities. 
However, the free rider problem is less severe when ownership is concentrated 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). The actions of holders of blocks of shares towards 
problem companies can be in the form of voice or by exit. Action by exit is facilitated 
in highly liquid capital markets. In contrast, bank based systems promote action by 
voice. The implication is that the existence of large shareholders mitigates the agency 
problem and therefore substituting the role of debt. 
In the real world, large shareholders are normally financial institutions (institutional 
investors). The benefits of having firms as large shareholders is that they are active 
investors, which closely monitor the behaviour of management to the extent that they 
even ask for a seat on the board (Givazzi 1999, Bathala, 1999). This reduces the role 
of debt as a governance device. Short (1997), however, argues that debt financing by a 
single bank enhances commitment to the firm such that in the event of default the 
parties may consider internal solution rather than going to the bankruptcy court. The 
implication is that concentrated ownership structure reduces agency costs of debt and 
risk of bankruptcy which in turn encourages higher debt levels. 
However there are costs associated with institutional investors. The most obvious is 
that bank monitoring activities are delegated to a bank manager and this introduces a 
new principal-agent problem. The other drawbacks as noted by Bathala, are that 
institutional ownership leads to short termism and also increases stock price volatility. 
This implies that there is a trade off between benefits and costs of large stakeholder 
ownership. 
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2.2.1.3 Theories based on asymmetric information. 
The asymmetric information theory of capital structure is based on the assumption 
that the firm owner or managers (insiders) know better about their firm's prospects, 
risk and values than do outside investors. Pioneers in this strand of literature are Ross 
(1977) and Leland and Pyle (1977). These models have demonstrated that the capital 
structure signals private insider information to outsiders. In the Ross model, managers 
are the insiders. In contrast, the Leland and Pyle model hypothesizes that 
entrepreneurs (owner-managers) are the insiders who convey firm quality information 
to the outsiders through the medium of capital structure. 
Ross's model hypothesizes that management compensation depends on firm value 
which is adversely affected by bankruptcy. Managers can then use the level of debt to 
signal quality of the firm. In this regard, managers of good quality firms can 
harmlessly take up more debt and those of poor quality firms cannot imitate them 
because of the threat of bankruptcy. 
In the Leland and Pyle (1977) model the risk averse owner-manager is assumed to 
hold a fraction, a, of the firm's equity. In the case where owner-managers have good 
information about their firm, they will have an incentive to hold a larger proportion of 
the firm share ownership. On the other hand owner-managers with bad information 
about their firm will not imitate them. This implies that the size of the inside share 
holding signals the insiders' private information and outside investors respond 
accordingly. It is demonstrated that a rise in the owner-manager's share, a, leads to an 
increase in both the riskness of his portfolio and firm quality. In this respect, lenders 
perceive the true value of the firm to positively depend on the fraction of the share 
ownership retained by the entrepreneur. However, in order to increase the proportion 
of inside share ownership, new projects must then be financed by debt. Therefore, in 
an effort to retain a larger ownership of shares, good information about firm quality is 
signalled to outsiders and consequently good firms end up highly levered than bad 
ones. 
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The Pecking order theory 
Myers (1984), Myers and Majluf (1984) present a theoretical argument for the old 
pecking order explanation for the corporate capital structure choice. In the model, 
issuing debt is less costly than equity because the later involves (incurs) underwriting 
costs. Managers are also assumed to act in the interest of existing shareholders. 
Because of asymmetric information the market will either over price or under price 
shares. It is , 
however, costly to educate investors and sell shares at the fair price. 
Since management is assumed to act in the interest of old shareholders they will 
always want to issue shares when they are over priced. However rational new 
shareholders expect this management behaviour such that the decision to issue shares 
is always perceived by the market as signalling bad information about firm quality. 
Consequently issuing shares will force the stock price to fall down. Under pricing the 
firm's equity in some situations is so severe that owner-managers choose to pass up 
projects even if they have positive net present values. 
In order to demonstrate the conditions under which a firm issues shares and how firm 
value is affected, Myers presents the following model. Assume that the firm needs to 
raise N pounds in order to finance the new investment project, let P represent the 
opportunity's net present value and Q takes the firm value if the opportunity is 
forgone. Management is assumed to know the values of P and Q but potential 
investors only observe the joint distribution of possible values (P', Q' ). Define N' as 
the real value of shares and AN=N'-N. Since potential investors do not know the real 
value of shares, they may over or under value the shares. Shares are under valued if 
N>N' and over valued if N<N'. Management acting in the interest will issue shares 
and invest only if P>_ AN. This implies that firms will raise equity finance only if 
shares are overvalued by the market i. e. AN< 0 and may forgo valuable investments 
if the market undervalues shares. This behaviour will lead rational investors, both old 
and new shareholders, to interpret the decision to issue as a signal of bad news. 
Defining V as the market value of the firm if it does not issue and V' if it does, Myers 
demonstrates that the conditions for equilibrium are: 
V=E(Q'/no issue)= E(Q'/P<AN) 
V'=E(Q'+P'+N/issue) =E (Q'+P'+N/p:?: AN) 
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Myers argues that in this framework issuing shares creates an additional cost of 
passing up valuable investments if the market undervalues the firm's shares. He also 
argues that AN in absolute terms is always less for debt than for equity. 
Therefore, information asymmetry about new investment projects and assets in place 
lead to under-investment problem. Raising funds internally or issuing alternative 
securities that are less under-priced by the market (e. g. convertibles) mitigates the 
under-investment problem. This implies that the firm will have a pecking order of 
financing choice. At the top of the pecking order is internally generated funds (i. e. 
retained earnings). If internal funds are not enough, the firm will seek external funds 
by considering the safest first. Thus debt is issued first, followed by hybrid securities 
and then new equity as a last resort. It is interesting to note that equity when it is in 
the form of private source (retained earnings) is at the top of the pecking order but is 
at the bottom if it is in public form (new equity). The implication is that firms do care 
about the providers of funds (i. e. private or public). Informational asymmetry between 
managers and shareholders provides a rationale for the existence of financial 
intermediaries. Banks with their monitoring role can be part of the insiders by having 
access to the private information about firm quality, for example financial statements 
and financial plans. Therefore financial intermediaries mitigate the asymmetric 
information problem. This implies that firms that keep a close relationship with 
financial intermediaries have higher market valuation than those that rely on capital 
markets for external financing. In contrast to the static trade-off theory, the pecking 
order hypothesis does not postulate the existence of an optimal debt ratio. 
2.2.1.4 Theories based on corporate strategy 
A good starting point is the work of Barton and Gordon (1987) who argue that capital 
structure decision is determined by managerial choice and that, "choice is based on 
the values and goals of management as complemented or constrained by relevant 
external threats and opportunities and internal strengths and weaknesses, p. 45". On 
the basis of these assumptions they come up with five propositions. 
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Proposition 1: Top management attitude towards risk will affect the firm's capital 
structure choice. Barton and Gordon argue that since financial risk is a major 
determinant of the firm's debt/equity choice, the amount of risk that top management 
regard as bearable will influence the amount of debt in the firm's capital structure. 
Proposition 2: Top management goals will affect the firm's capital structure choice. 
In this case, management is assumed to have different goals for the firm, for example, 
they might have a target firm growth rate. In order to achieve these goals management 
adopt certain strategic decisions such as acquiring other firms through borrowing, or 
having a target debt ratio. This implies that there is a direct relationship between sales 
growth and debt ratio and actual firm growth may be a sign that top management is 
concerned with a growth strategy. 
Proposition 3: Top management would prefer to finance a firm's needs from internal 
funds rather than from external funds. Outside finance may affect top management's 
flexibility on decision-making. For example, discipline from the capital market and 
bank monitoring activities may restrict management discretion. In that case 
management would prefer internally generated funds rather than from outside sources. 
The implication is that profit is inversely related to debt levels. 
Proposition 4: Top management's degree of risk aversion and financial characteristics 
of the firms determine the probability of defaulting. This proposition implies that 
external investor may limit the amount they lend to firms with high probabilities of 
defaulting and this in turn will determine the firm's capital structure. 
Proposition 5: The firm's financial position relating to risk, managerial control has an 
important impact on managerial choice of debt ratio. Propositions 4 and 5 suggest an 
inverse relationship between risk to the firm (e. g. earnings variability) and debt levels. 
Asset Specificity: In a transaction costs framework, Williamson (1988), argues that 
debt and equity finance should be seen as alternative governance structures. In this 
case, the choice between debt and equity will primarily depend on the characteristics 
of the assets being financed, in particular their redeployability to alternative uses. 
Investing in firm specific assets enhances the firm's uniqueness and competitive 
advantage (Balakrishnan and Fox, 1993). Financing specialised investments is 
problematic because most of the firm specific assets such as know-how, research and 
development, reputation are intangible and cannot be used as collateral for borrowing. 
Since these assets cannot be costlessly redeployed to other uses, lenders will recover 
33 
only a fraction of their investments if a firm defaults and is liquidated. In this case, 
debt-holders are unwilling to provide finance for such investments. In other words, 
specialised investments are so risky such that lenders demand higher rates of return. 
Furthermore, Williamson argues that debt finance is not suitable for specialised 
investments since it is unforgiving when the firm defaults. In order to avoid the 
problems associated with debt finance, firms might respond by passing up some of the 
specialised investments. Williamson further argues that equity finance, which is more 
forgiving than debt, mitigates this under-investment problem in the sense that it gives 
more confidence to the financiers since their interests will be safeguarded by the 
board of directors. The board of directors allow more management discretion and at 
the same time intervene in the day-to-day operations of the firm. In this case, equity 
finance is regarded as having a stronger governance abilities than debt. Williamson 
observes that, although the costs of both debt and equity finance increase as the 
degree of asset specificity increases, debt finance costs rise at a faster rate. This 
implies that debt finance is suitable for highly deployable assets while equity is 
suitable for highly firm specific assets. He illustrates this point as follows; define k as 
an index of asset specificity, and let E(k) and D(k) be the respective cost functions of 
equity and debt. If k* is the value of k obtained when E(k) = D(k), then for k<k* debt 
will be used to finance all the projects and equity will be used when k>k*. In this 
case, the transaction cost economics, just like the perking order theory, views equity 
as the natural financial instrument of last resort. 
Diversification: Kochhar and Hitt (1998) argue that diversification is a costly 
strategy, which requires a significant amount of resources. In this case a firm's 
internal funds may not be enough to meet such a substantial amount such that firms 
have to seek external financing. An important distinction is made between related 
diversification and unrelated diversification. Kochhar and Hitt argue that related 
diversification is regarded as a strategy of adding more to firm-specific assets of 
which monitoring, negotiating and enforcement of the contract between outside 
investors and managers is very complex. Therefore, entry into related diversification 
or unrelated diversification has an important impact on transaction costs between 
managers and investors such that the later cannot effectively monitor the behaviour of 
the former. Selecting the appropriate type of financing however, mitigates this moral 
hazard problem. The implication of the analysis is that debt financing is positively 
related to unrelated diversification while negatively related to related diversification. 
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Kochhar and Hitt further argue that diversification by direct entry increases the 
asymmetric information problem between managers and potential investors because 
there is no historical record on which to base the assessment of profitability of the 
firm and management capabilities to successfully run the new business. This implies 
that direct entry diversification will limit the ability of potential investors to 
accurately access the risk and value of the new investment. The end result is either 
under investment or a higher cost of capital. As argued above, turning to the private 
financing source such as banks mitigates this adverse section problem and thus a 
direct entry diversification strategy is associated with a high proportion of external 
private funds. 
2.2.1.5 Summary of theoretical results 
In summary, debt financing is mainly attractive because of the tax advantage of 
interest deductibility. In this respect, an increase in corporate tax rates should lead to 
an increase in debt levels. On the other hand, since the corporation must make regular 
interest payments on debt, a succession of bad years (where cash flow is less than 
interest payment) may force a firm into bankruptcy. Therefore, profitability of the 
corporation is a pre-requisite for a tax shield. In addition, personal income taxes may 
offset the benefits of tax savings. In the Miller equilibrium model, an increase in 
corporate tax rates leaves corporate debt levels unaffected if followed by a parallel 
movement in personal tax rates (Taggart, 1985). Personal taxes also limit the 
flexibility of an unlevered company in changing its financial structure because of the 
existence of share repurchase costs (Stiglitz, 1988). The existence of non-debt tax 
shields also makes debt less attractive. This is very important in the context of 
developing countries where investment incentives such as depreciation allowances and 
investment tax credits are common in order to lure foreign direct investors. Therefore, 
the debt levels for such corporations are expected to be very low. More important is 
the fact that most of these models are developed in the U. S tax system context where 
there is double taxation of income. The impact of taxation on corporate debt levels 
might be found to be neutral for other tax systems different from the US, for example, 
the UK imputation tax system (Rutterford, 1988). This calls for empirical testing of 
35 
the models, especially using data from developing countries that have tax systems 
different from their industrialized counterparts. 
Debt financing is also attractive if ownership is dispersed because it mitigates the 
manager-shareholder and shareholder-bondholder conflicts. In the case where firms 
are profitable and have few growth opportunities debt financing reduces free cash 
follow which often a source of conflict between shareholders and managers. Debt 
financing also act as a monitoring device since managers whose firms are highly 
leveraged have an obligation to repay the debt and the interest. Thus the role of debt 
as a governance device is reduced where alternative forms of firm monitoring exist. 
The implication is that alternative monitoring devices such as ownership 
concentration and institutional ownership reduce the need for debt financing as a 
device of reducing manager-shareholder conflict. Higher debt ratios also convey 
information to investors that management is pre-committed to undertake discussions 
that maximise firm value. Thus in other words the ability to repay debt conveys good 
news to the public that the firm is of good quality. 
The asymmetric information capital structure models are based on the assumption that 
the firm owners and managers have superior knowledge about the firm's prospects, 
risk and value than the outside investors. Therefore in the case where owner-managers 
have good information their firm, they will have an incentive to hold a larger 
proportion of the firm share ownership. In this respect, new projects are financed by 
debt in order to avoid share dilution. Thus suggesting that insider ownership is 
directly related to leverage. The pecking order hypothesis, however, suggests that the 
firm will finance its investments by cheaper sources first, internal finance, and will 
consider external equity finance as the last resort. 
The corporate strategy literature suggests that asset specificity plays an important role 
in determining the corporate capital structures. Finns that have invested in tangible 
assets have lower bankruptcy costs than firms that have invested in intangible assets 
and the former can therefore support higher debt levels. The strategy to diversify also 
plays an important role in determining the level of firm leverage. Diversification is a 
costly strategy that requires external financing and depending on the nature of 
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diversification a firm might get the additional funding in the form of equity or debt. 
Thus the level of diversification may be directly or inversely related to leverage. 
An important conclusion from this survey is that; market imperfections based on 
taxation, information asymmetry, agency problems and corporate strategy determine 
debt policy. In this regard, the relationship of debt policy to explanatory variables 
from competing theories is hypothesized to impact firm value, therefore making 
capital structure decisions relevant. Table 2.1 below presents testable theoretical 
results from the survey, in particular, the determinants of corporate leverage as 
suggested by different theories. 
Table 2.1. Theoretical Determinants of Debt Ratios. 
Firm Factor Impact on Reason Model Reference 
Leverage 
Profitability Positive Pecking order hypothesis Asymmetric Myers (1984) 
information 
Negative Enhances firm's ability to 
borrow 
Size Positive Less vulnerable to Asymmetric Myers (1984) 
bankruptcy information 
Free Cash Flow Positive Pre-commitment Agency Jensen(1986) 
Growth Negative Under-investment Agency Myers (1977) 
opportunities problem 
Asset Positive Collaterals Agency Jensen and Meckling 
Tangibility (1976) 
Positive Reduces bankruptcy costs Transaction costs Williamson (1988) 
Risk Negative Bankruptcy costs Transaction costs Myers (1977) 
Corporate tax Positive Reduces corporate tax Taxation Modgliani & Miller 
rate burden (1963) 
Non-debt tax Negative Shields firm tax Taxation DeAngelo & Masulis 
shields (1980) 
Asset Positive Reduces risk 
diversification 
The different theoretical determinants of leverage are shown in the first column. The 
second column shows the hypothesized impact of each variable on leverage. Column 
three indicates the reason for the effect (positive/negative) as suggested by different 
theories. The fourth and fifth columns contain some of the references to the theories 
and models respectively. It is interesting to note that profitability, managerial stock 
ownership, firm regulation and ownership concentration are hypothesized to have 
different impacts by different theories. In this case we suggest that empirical testing 
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could be useful in solving the contradictions, since some of the theoretical arguments 
are less important in other economic environments. The following subsection 
discusses the empirical work on determinants of capital structure in different 
countries. 
2.2.2 Empirical Research on Corporate capital Structure 
2.2.2.1 Introduction 
There is a large volume of empirical work on capital structures of firms found within 
industrialised economies and few studies have empirically examined corporate capital 
structures in developing countries. Some of the empirical studies have focused on 
inter-country comparisons of corporate capital structures while others have mainly 
examined the determinants of capital structures of firms within one particular country. 
As observed by Prasad et al (2001), the two main methodologies which have been 
used to investigate corporate capital structures are; ratio analysis and econometric 
analysis. Of course, each approach has its merits and demerits. The ratio (univariate) 
analysis approach has mainly been used to analyse corporate financing patterns in 
different countries. It seeks to find out how investment growth is financed in different 
countries. In other words, given that investment growth could be financed from 
internal or external (debt or equity) sources, which source of finance has been a 
dominant one over a given period of time? The results from such studies can be used 
to assess whether the financial system of a particular country is market or bank based. 
Consequently, firms operating in bank-based economies are naturally expected to be 
highly leveraged and that is one aspect of the determinants of firms' debt policies. 
However, such empirical studies on their own, do not add much knowledge to the 
capital structure literature since other potential determinants are not addressed. In the 
broadest sense, the determinants of corporate capital structures within a country or 
across countries are classified under micro and macro factors. McClure et al (1999) 
has narrowly defined them as international environment, local country environment 
and firm-specific factors. The econometric approach is an attempt to investigate these 
factors 
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In this study the empirical literature on corporate capital structures is divided into two 
categories. First, we discuss the empirical research on corporate finance patterns in 
both developed and developing economies and then present the empirical studies that 
have analysed cross sectional variations in corporate capital structures. The former 
literature has relied on ratio analysis while the latter has mainly relied on econometric 
methodology. 
2.2.2.2 Corporate financing patterns 
Studies on corporate financing patterns are mainly concerned with finding persistent 
and common features of firms in their funding of real investments (Hackethal and 
Schmidt, 1999). The study of financing patterns is crucial in the sense that it gives a 
basis on which to evaluate the perfomance of the financial system in a given country 
in funding industry (Hackethal and Schmidt, 1999). It also provides a basis on which 
to empirically test the theories of corporate finance (Mayer, 1988 and Corbett and 
Jenkinson, 1997), in particular, the relative importance of different financial markets 
in funding the corporate sector. Policy makers also need this information when they 
look for ways to improve the functioning of a given country's financial system. This 
is important, especially, in developing countries where financial repression and 
market imperfections have limited the growth of corporations and as a result 
policymakers have been trying for the past decade to address this problem. 
The net asset sources methodology (variously defined), using either balance sheet or 
flow of funds data, has been mostly used in this line of research. 6 Although, balance 
sheet (company accounts) data is the most reliable, there are, however, two major 
drawbacks. Firstly, the data (for research purposes) is only accessible for public 
companies. Secondly, inter-country comparison is seriously hindered by accounting 
standard differences across countries. On the other hand, flow of funds data cover the 
6 See Corbett and Jenkison (1998) and Hackethal and Schmidt (1999) for a discussion of the net 
sources methodology and Green (1994) for a discussion of flow of funds methodology. 
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whole corporate sector but are not as reliable as company accounts data because they 
are drawn from different sources and are therefore prone to measurement errors. 
However, regardless of the sources of data most of the studies have employed either 
the Mayer(1988,1990) or the Singh and Hammid (1992) methodology. The Mayer 
net sources methodology treats depreciation as a source of finance. In this case, the 
net contribution from each source of finance is first computed before being expressed 
as a proportion of physical investment. Thus, net bank finance is the difference 
between bank loans and cash plus bank deposits, net equity finance is the difference 
between new equity issues and equity purchases and net bond finance is bond issues 
less bond purchases, net trade credit (trade credit received less trade credit given) all 
expressed as a fraction of total physical investments. On the other hand, the Singh and 
Hammid methodology measures internal finance as retained profits net of 
depreciation. In this case, there are three sources of finance; net internal finance 
(retained profits less depreciation), external debt (bank loans plus bonds) and external 
equity (1 - internal finance - external debt). Each net source of finance is then 
expressed as a proportion of net assets (total assets less current liabilities). This 
implies that there is a significant methodological difference in computing net sources 
of finance (Cobham and Subramaniam, 1998). In particular, Cobham and 
Subramaniam argue that the use of gross equity in the Singh-Hammid approach 
exaggerates the role of equity finance and thus giving misleading results. They further 
argue that the Singh-Hammid methodology is inappropriate to an investigation of how 
physical investment has been financed, since it was designed to assess the growth of 
individual firms. 
One strand of literature has examined patterns of finance in developed countries 
(Mayer, 1988,1990; Corbett and Jenkinson, 1997 and Edwards and Fischer, 1994, 
among others) and another in developing countries (e. g. Singh and Hammid, 1992; 
Singh, 1995 and Samuel, 1996). However, in some cases, the corporate financing 
patterns in developing economies have been compared with those of their developed 
counterparts. 7 
7 See, Singh (1995), Cho (1995), Sammuel (1996) and Cobham and Subramaniam (1998). 
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The Financing of the corporate sector in developed countries. 
The first notable feature is a strong reliance on internal finance for firms operating in 
developed countries. Mayer (1988), using flow-of-funds data, has investigated 
corporate investment financing in the UK, USA, Germany, France and Japan. It is 
interesting to note that traditionally the UK and USA have been believed to have 
market based financial systems while the rest have been classified as bank based. A 
prior, the UK and USA should rely more heavily on equity finance than the other 
three. However, Mayer's results show that for the period 1970-1986, UK investment 
was universally self-financed. For the same period, internal finance was found to have 
funded 90 %, 73 %, 65 % and 62 % of total investment in USA, Germany, Japan and 
France, respectively. 
The second notable feature is that loans are also a significant source of finance, 
especially in- Japan where they contribute 42 % to corporate financing. Although 
Germany is traditionally believed to have a bank based economy, bank finance has 
contributed only 12 % which is lower that that of the USA (26 %). This small 
contribution of bank finance in Germany is supported by Mayer (1990) and Edwards 
and Fischer (1994). 
The third observation is that securities markets are an insignificant source of finance. 
Although stock markets are well developed in UK and USA, Mayer's findings 
indicate that they have made negative contributions to corporate financing. In this 
case, it implies that the corporate sectors in these countries have been net purchasers 
of equity. 
Mayer (1990) extends this study by including Canada, Finland and Italy to the sample. 
Bank finance is more important in Japan, France and Italy, while bond finance 
represents a significant proportion of finance in Canada (6 %) and USA (10 %). The 
results of Mayer are also supported by Corbett and Jenkinson (1998) who have 
investigated the patterns of finance in UK, USA, Germany and Japan. Internal finance 
is found to be the dominant source of funds. For the period 1970-1994,93 % of UK 
corporate financing came from retained profits while it was 96 % for USA. However, 
these retention ratios were relatively low in Germany (79 %) and Japan (70%). The 
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contribution of bank finance in German (12%) is less than in Japan (27%) and UK 
(15%) but almost similar to USA. 
Corbett and Jenkinson (1998) also analyse how the financing in different countries 
has evolved over time. The most notable features are that internal finance has slowly 
risen in Japan and the United States, but cyclical trends are observed in Germany and 
UK. In the UK, the corporate sector relied heavily on internal finance during periods 
of recessions than during boom times. Bank finance has been a significant source of 
finance in all countries especially in the 1970s. For example, in the period 1970-1974, 
bank finance contributed about 43% to Japanese corporate financing, but has steadily 
declined to 19,5% for the period 1990-1994. This fall in the role of bank finance 
seems to have been compensated by retention ratio, which has risen from 59% to 
71%. 
Financing Patterns in developing countries 
As a starting point, it is useful to note that results from studies of financing patterns in 
developed countries which have been reviewed, are based on only one approach; the 
Mayer (1988) methodology. In the context of developing countries both the Mayer 
(e. g Cho, 1995; Cobhan and Subramaniam, 1998) and the Singh-Hammid (e. g. Singh 
and Hammid, 1992; Singh, 1995) approaches have been employed. In this case, the 
results can then be compared to see the merits of each approach. 
The first notable feature is that corporate financial patterns differ across developing 
countries. This observation is based on the findings of Singh and Hammid (1992), 
Singh (1995) and Cobham and Subramaniam (1998), who have found that retention, 
equity and gearing ratios vary from country to country. Singh and Hammid (1992) 
have analysed corporate financing patterns in developing countries using individual 
company accounts data from 1980-1988. Their sample includes the 50 largest 
manufacturing companies listed on the stock markets of India, South Korea, Pakistan, 
Jordan, Thailand, Mexico, Malaysia, Turkey and Zimbabwe. Their results show that 
Zimbabwe and Pakistan with retentions of 58,5% and 58,3% respectively, use more 
internal finance than the rest. For most companies, retention ratios are below 20% for 
example Jordan, Korea and Thailand respectively financed 15,8%, 12,8% and 17,3% 
of their investments internally over the period 1980- 1988. 
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Singh (1995) reaches the same conclusion in an extension of the Singh and Hammid 
(1992) study. Singh (1995) assesses the robustness of the Singh and Hammid(1992) 
results by considering 100 largest manufacturing firms (where applicable) and also 
adding a tenth country, Brazil. Brazilian firms are found to finance their investments 
almost entirely from internal finance. 
The results from Singh and Hammid (1992) also show that although the proportion of 
equity finance differs across countries, it is a significant source of finance in most 
developing countries. In Jordan equity finance contributes about 84% in funding the 
corporate sector, while it is as low as 12% in Pakistan. This is also in line with Singh 
(1995) who finds that on average equity finance contributes more than 40% of 
investment financing in developing countries. 
With regard to gearing, Singh and Hammid find that South Korea, India and Thailand 
have relatively high leverages. Corporations in Thailand are the most highly geared at 
62% followed by Korean firms at 53%. The least geared firms are found within 
Malaysia (8%) and Zimbabwe (9%). 
A Comparison of Corporate financing Patterns in Developed and Developing 
Countries 
A major drawback in comparing patterns of corporate finance in developed and 
developing countries is the lack of appropriate data in most developing countries. For 
example, the available data do not give separate figures for bank loans, bonds and 
equity finance. Asa result Singh and Hammid (1992) and Singh (1995) studies report 8 
three sources of finance; internal finance, external equity finance and external debt 
finance. In this case, bank finance and bond finance are bundled together under 
external debt finance. However, Cho's (1995) study, being an exception, shows that 
bank and bond finance contributes 26% and 13% respectively for Korea. Samuel 
(1996) also reports that about 33% of investment in India is bank financed. This 
shows that the use of bank finance in developing countries is comparable to those of 
bank based developed countries (e. g. Japan with 27%). 
8 Cho (1995) and Samuel are exceptions. 
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A more noticeable feature is that, in general, developing countries rely on internal 
finance to a lesser extent than developed countries. The other observation is that 
equity finance is a significant source of finance in developing countries but plays a 
limited role in those developed countries, which rely heavily on internal finance. 
Singh (1995) has offered an explanation for why developing countries seem to rely 
more on equity finance. He argues that government in developing countries have 
played an important role in the development of stock markets as part of the financial 
deregulation programme and also as a way to enhance the privatisation process. The 
end result was a substantial rise in stock market prices and thus implying lower cost of 
capital to all listed companies. The Samuel's (1996) study support this argument. 
Equity finance became more important in India after the Indian stock market boom in 
1988. For example, equity finance for large firms in 1988 was 18,5 % but was as low 
as 2,3% and 3,2% in 1986 and 1987 respectively. This empirical finding is contrary to 
what has been observed in developed countries where the most developed stock 
markets have been negative contributors to investment finance. 
2.2.2.3 Empirical Evidence on Factors influencing Capital Structure 
Introduction 
There is a huge literature on the empirical determinants of corporate capital structure 
in developed countries and only a few similar studies in developing countries. These 
empirical studies have examined the capital structure decisions of firms by relating 
debt policy/ratio to a number of explanatory variables selected to capture the 
influence of competing theories. Although some studies have examined the 
determinants of corporate capital structure in general, only a few studies have been 
designed to test the impact of changes in government legislation, within a country, on 
firm financial policy. For this reason, these studies have focused on testing one 
particular theory, while controlling for a number of other variables. In this respect, we 
intend to review the empirical literature under four groups; those that investigate the 
influence of tax benefits and bankruptcy costs, the influence of agency costs, the 
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influence of asymmetry information and the influence of corporate strategy. 9 The 
problem with this approach is that a variable could be capturing a couple of effects 
and therefore, could fall into more than one classification. For example, the asset 
structure variable has been used as a proxy for agency (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), 
information asymmetry (Myers, 1977) and corporate strategy (Jordan et al, 1998) 
factors. In this case, we will classiffy it under the group in which the original author 
intends it to capture. 
Tax and bankruptcy factors 
Corporate tax rate 
Modogliani and Miller (1963) have shown that interest tax deductions reduce the 
corporate tax bill and for this reason, the corporate tax rate is positively related to debt 
ratio. However, the computation of a variable to capture corporate tax effect has not 
been easy and has often been a source of controversy among researchers (for example, 
see Graham, 1996). In most countries, the corporate tax rate is a flat rate across 
industries and firms. Furthermore, in other countries the corporate tax rate has been 
constant for decades. However, in order to assess the impact of corporate tax on 
firm's capital structure decisions, researchers have been looking for a variable that 
varies across firms and over time. The most popular proxy has been the ratio of total 
taxes paid to total taxable income for each firm. The empirical results to date are 
inconclusive. Homaifar et al (1994) and Jong and Dijk (1998) find supportive 
evidence of Modigliani and Miller (1963) proposition that the corporate tax has a 
positive impact on debt usage. On the other hand, the findings of Wansely et al 
(1996), Krisma and Moyer (1996) and Hussain (1995) suggest that the corporate tax 
rate has an adverse effect on debt usage. 
Non- debt tax shields 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) argue that marginal tax interest deduction is not the only 
way to reduce the corporate tax bill. Depreciation, tax carry-forwards and investment 
tax credits can also shield the corporate income from tax payment. For this reason, 
leverage is hypothesised to be inversely related to non-debt tax shields like 
depreciation, tax carry-forwards and investment credits. The empirical studies have 
9 This approach is similar to Harris and Raviv (1991) and Prasad et al (2001) 
45 
found weak evidence to support the prediction that non-debt tax shields are substitutes 
for tax benefits of debt financing. Wansely et al (1996), Benett and Donnelly (1993), 
Wiwattanakantang (1999) and Saa-Requej (1996), all find evidence to support the 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) hypothesis, while Mackies-Mason (1990) and Boyle and 
Eckhold (1997) find significant evidence that non-debt tax shields lead to higher debt 
usage. 
Firm size 
The theoretical literature argues that large firms are more diversified and hence are less 
likely to be in a state of financial distress. In addition, large firms can easily access 
both credit and capital markets. In this case, easy access to credit markets supports the 
argument that larger firms are more geared than the small ones, while easy access to 
the capital markets suggests that small firms rely more heavily on debt financing. The 
empirical findings of Homaifar et al (1994), Rajan and Zingales (1995) Firth (1995), 
and Saa-Requejo (1996), provide evidence to support the predictions of the optimal 
capital structure that large firms are unlikely to experience financial distress and are 
therefore capable of maintaining high debt levels. The results can also mean that large 
firms have easy access to credit markets. The only exceptional study that finds a 
negative relationship is that of Titman and Wissels (1988). Their study employs the 
natural logarithm of sales as a proxy of firm size and 6 measures of capital structure; 
the ratio of short-term, long-term and convertible debt to market and book values of 
equity. Using the LISREL methodology, the results show that there is a negative and 
significant relationship between firm size and the ratio of (i) short-term debt to market 
and book values of equity, (ii) long-term debt to book value of equity. Commending on 
the negative significant relationship between firm size and long-term book debt visa 
avis the insignificant relationship between firm size and long-term market debt, Timan 
and Wissels (1988, p 14) state that, " This finding may be due to the positive 
relationship between our size attribute and the total market value of the firm. Firms 
with high market values relative to their book values have higher borrowing capacities 
and hence have higher debt levels relative to their books. Thus, rather than indicating a 
size effect, we think that this evidence suggests that many firms are guided by the 
market value of their equity when selecting their long-term debt levels. " 
46 
Profitability 
The trade-off hypothesis suggests that firms with high current cash flow should have 
easy access to credit markets (Rajan and Zingales, 1995) and in addition the optimal 
capital structure theory predicts that profitability greatly reduces the probability of 
bankruptcy/financial distress. Therefore, profitability is hypothesised to be positively 
related to debt usage. However, the pecking order theory suggests that internal finance 
is preferred to equity finance. Thus profitability is hypothesised to be inversely related 
to leverage. The empirical findings of Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Wiwattanakang 
(1999), among others, support the pecking order view. 
Firm risk 
In general, firms with unstable cash flows have a greater chance of being unable to 
honour their debt payments. In this case, there should be an inverse relationship 
between volatility of firm earnings and leverage. However, firms in financial distress 
may find it difficult to raise equity finance such that debt usage becomes positively 
related to earnings volatility. Moreover, earnings volatility encourages firms to use 
more debt since stockholders gain if the project is successful and stockholders and 
debtholders share losses if it fails. Jensen et al (1992), Saa-Requejo (1996) and Chen 
and Choi (1999), among others, have found a significant inverse relationship between 
debt usage and firm risk. Therefore, firms with high levels of earnings volatility tend 
to use less debt than those with stable earnings. 
Agency factors 
The agency cost models emphasise the potential conflicts of interests between 
managers, equity holders and debt holders as the major determinants of firm 
performance and argues that debt financing, to some extend, can mitigate this 
problem. However, debt policy is not the only agency-cost reducing mechanism 
available. Managerial and institutional stock ownership have been considered to be 
the major subsititutes for debt policy. If this is true, then there is a strong negative 
relationship between debt policy and managerial and institutional stock ownership. 
Furthermore, the nature of board of director composition, shareholder concentration 
and asset structure also have an important influence on capital structure. What follows 
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is a summary discussion of the nature of the relationship between these factors and 
debt policy and the empirical evidence. 
Managerial Ownership 
The theoretical model of Jensen and Meckling (1976) has shown that increasing 
managerial ownership reduces the agency problem since high managerial stock 
ownership aligns the interests between managers and outside stockholders. In this 
case, managerial ownership is a substitute for debt such that debt ratio is predicted to 
be inversely related to managerial stock ownership. However, increasing managerial 
stock ownership and attempting to avoid diluting this ownership structure, implies 
that firms should resort to debt financing when new finance is required. For this 
reason, there is a positive relationship between debt ratio and managerial ownership. 
Thus, debt is a complement for managerial ownership. However, the other line of 
argument postulates a negative relationship. Jensen et al (1992) argue that if managers 
(insiders) are major shareholders in the companies they run, investing elsewhere 
becomes infeasible and hence they end up with less diversified portfolios. In this 
respect, they have an incentive to reduce risk by reducing debt levels of the firm they 
run. Friend and Lang (1988) argue that the presence of high debt ratios in the firm's 
capital structure is against management self-interest and therefore firms with high 
managerial ownership are hypothesized to have lower debt levels. In most empirical 
studies the percentage of equity shares held by insiders (officers and directors) has 
been employed as a proxy for managerial ownership. Wansely's et al (1996) study 
find evidence to support the hypothesis that increasing managerial ownership will lead 
to an increase in debt usage as firms seek more finance. However, the results from the 
studies by Firth (1995), Jensen et al (1992), Barthala et al (1994) and Friend and Lang 
(1988) show that managerial ownership is a substitute for the use of debt financing as 
a monitoring device. Cruthley and Jensen (1996), Jahera and Lloyd (1996) and 
Wiwattanankatang (1999), however, do not find a significant relationship between 
capital structure and managerial ownership. 
Institutional Stock Ownership 
Institutional investors, through their research capabilities, can monitor managerial 
activities better than individual investors (Crutchley and Jensen, 1996). In addition, 
Chaganti and Damanpour (1991) argue that large institutional equity holding limits 
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the flexibility of moving funds from one firm to another and therefore compels 
institutional investors to be actively involved in firm decision making. Since 
institutional investors are active monitors of managerial behaviour, institutional 
ownership is therefore, hypothesized to be inversely related to firm leverage. Firth 
(1995), however, argues that institutional investors may limit management's ability to 
reduce the level of debt in the firm's capital structure. Thus, a positive relationship 
between institutional stock ownership and the debt ratio is predicted. The agency 
theory also suggests that institutional investors have well diversified portfolios such 
that they can tolerate the use of higher debt levels in capital structures. Therefore, 
institutional stock ownership is positively related to debt usage. The proxy variable 
that has been used to capture the influence of institutional ownership is the percentage 
of equity shares held by institutions. For the few studies that have examined the 
impact of institutional stock ownership on debt usage, Crutchley and Jensen (1996) 
and Bathala et al (1994) find evidence to support that institutional stock ownership 
reduce the need for debt financing as a monitoring device. This implies that 
institutional investors are active monitors of managerial behaviour. Firth (1995), 
however, find a positive relationship between capital structure and institutional 
stockholding, implying that institutional investors constrain the ability of management 
to reduce the level of debt in the capital structure. 
Shareholder Concentration 
Large shareholders are effective monitors of management (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986). They have the incentive to actively monitor managerial activities since the 
benefits of doing so are greater than the associated costs. In the case of dispersed 
ownership, monitoring managerial behaviour is costly due to the free rider problem. 
For this reason, high ownership concentration reduces the need for debt financing as 
an agency cost reducing device. Thus, ownership concentration is inversely related to 
firm leverage. Mehran et al (1999) and Wiwattanakantang (1999) have used four 
measures of ownership concentration; percentage of equity shares held by the largest 
(i) individual shareholder, (ii) corporation, (iii) financial institution and (iv) five 
shareholders. In the Wiwattanankantang (1999) study, the estimated coefficients of 
the first three proxies are found to be highly significant and of the expected signs. 
Thus it can be concluded that large shareholders in Thailand are effective monitors of 
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management. Firth's (1995) study provides more supportive evidence of the positive 
relationship between institutional stock ownership and debt ratio. 
Board of directors 
The role of the board of directors is to safeguard the interests of shareholders by 
monitoring management performance especially the chief executive officer. The 
board should be actively involved in monitoring and planning for the future of the 
company. However, sometimes the board size could be too small or too big to 
effectively perform its duty, such that debt financing is used, instead, to control 
managerial behaviour (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). This suggests that there is an 
optimal board size for each firm and if the actual board size is above or below this 
optimal size, then more debt in the firm's capital structure is required to monitor 
management. Therefore the actual relationship between debt ratio and board size is 
indeterminant. Wittanakantang (1999) and Wen et al (2002) do not find a significant 
relationship between board size and firm leverage. However, Wen et al (2002) report 
a negative relationship between board composition (% of outside directors of the 
board) and leverage and thus suggesting that outside directors actively monitor firms' 
activities. 
Asset Structure 
Before a loan is advanced to a firm, the lender first assesses the nature of the 
investment project, in particular the firm's business, risk and its expected future cash 
flows. The terms and conditions of a loan, together with the interest rate charged all 
depend on these factors. But once a loan has been advanced, managers may substitute 
riskier investments for less risk ones (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This asset 
substitution problem is harmful to lenders if the project fails and in order for lenders 
to protect their interests, they ask for loan covenants and provisions. In turn, loan 
covenants and provisions limit managerial discretion and therefore affect company 
performance. However, the asset substitution together with the loan covenants and 
provisions problems can be greatly reduced if assets could be used as collaterals. For 
this reason, firms with collateralizable (tangible) assets enjoy favourable debt terms 
than those with less collateralisable assets. To this end, the variable proxing asset 
tangibility is positively related to firm leverage, while the proxy for intangible assets 
is negatively related to firm leverage. The measures of collateral value that have been 
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employed in the empirical literature are; the ratio of tangible assets to total assets and 
the ratio of intangible assets to total assets. The empirical findings of Friend and Lang 
(1988), Jensen et al (1992) and Chen et al (1996) provide strong evidence that is 
consistent with the predictions of the asset structure argument. That is, tangible assets 
enhance the borrowing capabilities of a firm. However, Firth (1995) and Krishnan and 
Moyer (1996), although they find a positive relationship, the coefficient of the 
tangibility measure is insignificantly different from zero. There is also strong 
evidence to suggest that intangible assets cannot support high debt levels (Jensen et al 
1992, Bathala et al 1994 and Jahera and Lloyd, 1996). Crutchley's et al (1996) 
results, however, suggest that intangible assets are positive predictors of leverage. 
They argue that this result is due to their measure of asset intangibility (change in R& 
D), which might be proxing growth. 
Firm Growth Opportunities 
In the agency cost framework, firm growth opportunities exasperates the agency 
problem. The incentive to transfer wealth from debtholders to equityholders is more 
pronounced for high growth firms. This implies that firms with high growth 
opportunities find it difficult to attract bondholders. In addition, the Jensen (1986) 
model suggests that firms with high growth opportunities do not need debt as a 
monitoring device. It is therefore, expected that growth is inversely related to 
leverage. The empirical results to date are mixed. The findings of Krishnan and 
Moyer (1996) and Chen and Choi (1999) are supportive of the optimal capital 
structure hypothesis that firm growth has a positive impact on capital structure. Firms 
with high growth rates, therefore, have the capacity to service high debt levels than 
those with low growth rates. On the other hand, Friend and Lang (1988) and Homaifar 
et al (1994) find evidence to suggest that firms with high growth rates use less debt. 
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms with high growth 
opportunities find it difficult to attract debtholders. However, Boyle and Eckhold 
(199) and Bennet and Donnelly (1993) do not find any significant relationship 
between leverage and firm growth opportunities. 
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Asymmetric Information factors 
The capital structure theory based on information asymmetry does not suggest as 
many empirical factors as the previous two. Profitability and dividend payments are 
the most two factors determining capital structure when information between owner 
managers and investors is asymmetric. The pecking order hypothesis, first proposed 
by Donaldson (1961) and extended by Myers (1984) and Myers and Malijuf (1984), is 
at the heart of the asymmetric information theory. Asymmetric information limits the 
firm's access to external financing and the problem is more severe when accessing 
equity finance rather than debt finance. The decision to issue new shares is interpreted 
as bad news about the firm by potential investors who respond by undervaluing the 
shares. This adversely affects the firm's relative cost of capital. In addition, 
transaction costs (e. g. reporting requirements) are generally greater for issuing new 
equities than debt finance. However this does not mean that debt finance is without 
costs (present costs of debt finance). A cheaper alternative source of finance available 
to profitable firms is retained earnings. To this end, the pecking order hypothesis 
predicts that the firm will meet its financial needs by considering (firstly) internal 
finance, (secondly) external debt finance and (lastly) external equity finance. Baskin 
(1989) argues that the tax system (in USA) in conjunction with dividends payments 
also motivate the pecking order behaviour. Issuing shares drives up dividends, which 
in turn raise personal tax payments. 
Testing the pecking order theory has been carried out in conjunction with the 
predictions of the optimal capital structure theory. One strand of literature relates debt 
ratios to current and past profitability (e. g. Baskin, 1989; Allen, 1993). Profitability of 
the firm determines the availability of internal resources to meet the firm's cash needs 
(for investment and dividend payments). In this case, profitable firms should seek less 
external finance and thus, all other things being equal, leverage is inversely related to 
profitability. This is contrary to a positive relationship postulated by the optimal 
capital structure theory. The Baskin (1989) and Allen (1993) studies are devoted to 
testing this relationship. Baskin (1989) further argues that past dividend payments 
could adversely affect the availability of internal finance. Sticky dividend policy 
compels a firm to seek external finance in order to maintain the same level of 
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dividends and to meet other future cash needs of the firm, especially new investment 
opportunities. For this reason, a positive relationship between debt usage and (past) 
dividends supports the pecking order hypothesis. 
Empirical studies discussed above have shown that profitability is inversely related to 
debt ratios and thus supporting the predictions of the pecking order hypothesis. 
However, the Baskin(1989) study was wholly devoted to testing the pecking order 
theory. The sample consists of 378 large public US firms spanning over the period 
1960-1972. The debt ratio is first regressed on profitability (in 1972,1970 and 1965) 
and growth (ratio of invested capital in 1972 to its value in 1965). The coefficients of 
all three measures of profitability are negative and highly significant. The results 
show that, on aggregate, an increase of 10% in firm profitability will lead to a 20% 
fall in the firm's debt ratio. The second regression equation assesses the influence of 
dividend payment in 1965 on firm's debt levels in 1972. The coefficient of the 
dividend measure is found to be positive and significant, implying that firms, which 
paid out higher dividends in 1965 borrowed more in 1972. 
Allen (1993) replicated the Baskin study using a sample of 89 Australian firms over 
the period 1954 to 1982. Three regressions are estimated for 1954-1966,1967-1982 
sub-periods and for the whole period 1954-1982. The first regression has five 
explanatory variables; profitability (in 1965,1962,1958 and 1954) and growth. The 
coefficients on the profitability measures for 1958 and 1954 are negative and 
significant at the 5% level. Profitability in 1962 is positive but insignificant, while the 
1965 profitability is negative and significant at the 10% level. The coefficient for 
growth is positive but insignificant. The other two regressions report almost similar 
results and thus rejecting the optimal capital structure hypothesis in favour of the 
pecking order behaviour. However, the predictions of dividend stickness relationship 
with debt policy, is not supported by the results. Allen suggests that this may be due 
to multicollinearity problem rather than a rejection of the pecking order hypothesis. 
Claggett (1992) takes a different view on how the two theories differently predict 
corporate financing behaviour. The optimal capital structure theory predicts that firms 
in the same industrial classification tend to face the same corporate tax rate and risk. 
For this reason, there exists an optimal (target) capital structure for the industry. 
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Claggett argues that if this is correct, then at any point in time some firms will be 
either above or below this target capital structure. It is therefore suggested that the 
firms with optimal capital structures will preserve them while the rest strive to reach 
this optimal capital structure. Indeed, Bowen et al (1982) have found evidence to 
support the hypothesis that over time capital structures of firms of the same industries 
converge to their industry capital structure mean. On the contrary, the pecking order 
theory does not suggest that such targets debt ratios exist. In particular, Claggett 
argues that according to the pecking order hypothesis, a firm, which persistently 
attains high profits keeps on reducing its debt ratio and thus moving further and 
further away from the industry mean. 
Using data from 253 US companies representing 13 industrial groups over the period 
1979-1988, Claggett (1992) makes use of the Goodman-Kruskal technique to test 
convergence and pecking order corporate behaviour. In testing the convergence, a two 
by two matrix is analysed. For each matrix the Goodman-Kruskal gamma (G) and the 
associated test statistic (Z) are estimated. The hypothesis to be tested is that G is 
significantly different from zero. Rejection of this hypothesis implies that there is no 
tendency to move towards or away from industry mean capital structure. A positive 
(negative) value of G implies convergence (divergence) to the mean. In the case of the 
pecking order hypothesis, a positive and significant estimate of G supports the 
predictions of the pecking order theory. 
The Claggett (1992) results show that firm debt ratios converge to the industrial mean. 
However, the adjustment is more pronounced for firms with above industry mean than 
those with below average ratios. The results also support the predictions of the 
pecking order theory. Haven et al (1999), using a sample of 256 US firms over a 
longer period (1974-92) replicates the Claggett's study. The results are consistent with 
those of Jalilvand and Havis (1984), March (1982) and Claggett (1992). The results 
from these studies, therefore, show that the optimal capital structure and the pecking 
order theories coexist. 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) also examine the predictions of the static trade-off 
model against those of pecking order. The results show that the pecking order model 
explains corporate financing behaviour better than the static trade-off model. Picking 
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the results from the best target adjustment regression model shows that the adjustment 
coefficient (0,41) with R2 of 25% is significant at the 1% level. The dependent 
variable for this model is the change in debt ratio. In the case of the pecking order 
regression model, the best model reports a pecking order coefficient of 0,85, which is 
less than the predicted value of 1. However, the explanatory power (86 %) is very 
high. The dependent variable for this model is gross debt issued scaled by total assets. 
This implies that the external funding for firms is mainly from debt and thus 
supporting the pecking order. 
Corporate strategy factors 
The few studies that have examined the impact of corporate strategy on the firm's 
capital structure have mainly focused on the effect of asset-specificity, diversification 
or environment dynamism. From a business strategy perspective, firm specific assets 
make a firm unique and thus enhancing its competitive advantage. However, these 
highly specialised firm assets (e. g. R& D) do not have much collateral value and 
therefore adversely affect the firm's borrowing capacity (Balakrisnan and Fox, 1993). 
As a result, the influence of asset-specificity on capital structure is the same as the 
asset structure under the agency theory. In fact, the empirical literature has used the 
same variable measures for tangibility and intangibility. Since the impact of these 
factors has been discussed above, in this section we concentrate on the influence of 
the other two issues. 
Barton and Gordon (1987,1988) argue that the observed corporate capital structures 
reflect managerial choice. They propose that top management's goals and attitude 
towards risk have an important influence on the firm's diversification strategy. Risk 
averse managers normally try to avoid risk by diversifying the operations of the firms. 
A firm can adopt a related, unrelated or direct entry diversification strategy and each 
is predicted to have a different influence on firm capital structure. A number of 
researchers have examined these factors. Barton and Gordon (1988) using a sample of 
279 US firms for the period 1970-74 have investigated the influence of managerial 
values and goals on capital structure. They use diversification strategy measure as a 
proxy for managerial values and goals. Their empirical results in general provide 
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supportive evidence of a link between corporate strategy and capital structure 
decisions. In particular, the findings support the predictions of the theory in two 
respects; the average debt ratios of single strategy firms were found to be the lowest 
and those unrelated strategy firms were found to have the highest debt ratios. 
Jordan et al (1998) extend this line of research by examining the relationship between 
capital structure and strategy in the small firm context. The sample consists of 275 
small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in UK. They distinguish between 
corporate and competitive strategy variables. Jordan et al (1998) find that in the 
context of SMEs corporate strategy does not affect capital structure decisions. One 
measure of competitive strategy (innovation) is found to affect capital structure. It is 
argued that innovation strategy is firm specific and therefore SMEs pursuing these 
strategies will find it difficult to attract debt holders. As a result, innovation strategy is 
inversely related to leverage. However, the other two measures of competitive 
strategy (differentiation and cost reduction strategies) have no significant impact on 
capital structure. 
Kochhar and Hitt (1998) have examined how capital structure is linked to the nature 
of diversification. That is, they emphasise the nature of diversification (related, 
unrelated and direct entry) strategy as a major predictor of debt financing. The sample 
is for 187 large manufacturing firms in US over the period 1981-86. In a simultaneous 
equation framework their empirical results show that there is a positive (negative) and 
significant relationship between change in unrelated (related) diversification and debt 
financing. This supports the argument that asset specificity is associated with related 
diversification. The results also support the prediction that diversification through 
direct entry is financed from private sources (e. g. bank finance). Direct entry 
exasperates the information asymmetry problem since historical information about the 
firm does not exist in such cases. Thus, direct entry through direct entry compels 
firms to rely to a larger extend on private funding. 
Simerly and Minfang (2000) argue that the choice of capital structure is linked to a 
firm's competitive environment (environment dynamism). They argue that firms need 
to build competitive capabilities in order to survive in a dynamic environment. But 
firms pursuing such strategies will find debt more expensive because they cannot use 
their assets as collaterals. In addition, operating in a dynamic environment increases 
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the chances of business failure and thus making it difficult to attract debtholders. 
From a transaction cost economics theory perspective, such investments should be 
financed by equity (Williamson, 1988). Simerly and Mingfang (2000) then suggest 
that the impact of corporate strategy on capital structure depends on whether the firm 
is operating in a stable or dynamic environment. This is tested via the relationship 
between leverage and firm performance in a stable or dynamic environment. Their 
results, based on a sample of 700 large US firms through 1992, show that leverage has 
a positive (negative) and significant impact on firm performance in a stable (dynamic) 
environment. 
Summary 
To sum up, several firm characteristics have been found, by previous researchers, to 
be important determinants of capital structure decisions and thus rejecting the 
Modigliani and Miller's (1958) irrelevance theorem. A summary of these empirical 
studies is presented in table 2.2 below. It is however; clear from the table that the 
empirical results are inconclusive since some of the determinants have conflicting 
effects on capital structure decisions. The conflicting results may be attributable to the 
following reasons; 
First, the theoretical work, derived from competing theories does not always agree on 
the effects of certain variables. For example, the trade-off theory suggests that 
profitability has a positive impact on borrowing decisions, whilst the pecking order 
and the transaction cost theories hypothesise a negative influence. 
Second, the theoretical work does not suggest how to measure the determinants of 
capital structure, and thus the empirical work has relied on proxies. The empirical 
researchers do not always agree on definitions of proxies and as a result different 
proxies have been employed in different studies. In some cases, the definitions of 
these proxies are similar yet measuring different determinants with opposing 
influence on capital structure decisions. The third reason might be that some of the 
factors might have different influences in different institutional environments. 
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Table 2.2. Summary of selected Empirical Studies 
Factor Expected Theoretical Reference 
Sign 
Empirical 
Positive 
Evidence 
Negative 
Profitability Positive Rajan &Zingales (1995) Titman & 
Negative Myers(1984) Wissels(1988) 
Jensen & Meckling 
(1992) 
Size Positive Kim & Sorensen (1986) Firth (1995) Titman & 
Hussain (1997) Wissels(1988) 
Free cash flow Positive Jensen (1986) Shenoy and Koch Lowe, Naughton, & 
(1996) Taylor (1994) 
Growth Negative Myers(1977) Krishnan & Moyer Homaifar, Zietz & 
opportunities Jensen (1986) (1996) Benkato (1994) 
Asset Positive Myers (1977) Jensen & Meckling 
tangibility (1992) 
Thies & Klock (1992) 
Risk Negative Bradley, Jarrell & Mackie-Mason 
Kim(1984) (1990) 
Saa-Requejo(1996) 
Corporate tax Positive Modgliani and Miller Homaifar, Zietz & Krishnan & Moyer 
rate (1963) Benkato (1994) (1996) 
Non-debt tax Negative DeAngelo & Masulis Boyle & Eckhold Wiwattanakantang 
shields (1980) (1997) (1999) 
Inflation Positive BADM (2001) BADM (2001) 
Bank liquidity Positive Dermirguc-Kunt & BADM (2001) 
Maksimovic(1996) 
Stock market Negative Dermirguc-Kunt & BADM (2001) 
development Maksimovic(1996) 
BADM: Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic (2001) 
2.3 Review of previous studies on determinants of Dividend Policy 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Although the literature on the overall issue of dividend policy is vast, few studies 
have analysed the cross-sectional variations in firms' payout ratios. According to 
Partington (1989), the studies on dividend policy have addressed two main issues; the 
impact of dividend policy on firm value and the dividend behaviour in practice. The 
former issue was initiated by Miller and Modigliani's (1961) seminal work that argues 
that under perfect market conditions dividend policy does not affect the value of the 
firm. However, recent theoretical models have demonstrated that market 
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imperfections such as taxation, information asymmetry and agency costs, to some 
extent, can influence firm dividend behaviour. Allen and Michaely (1995) and Lease 
et al (1999), among others discuss in detail the theoretical as well as the empirical 
literature on dividend policy in general. The main aim of the present section is to 
summarise the literature that has analysed cross-sectional variations in corporate 
payout ratios. 
2.3.2 Theoretical Background 
Although the finance literature has argued that taxes, information asymmetry and 
agency costs affect dividend policy in general, determinants of payout ratios have 
mainly been derived from the agency theory. Therefore, we will briefly outline the 
predictions of each of the above theories before discussing the influence of agency 
cost factors on cross-sectional variations in firms' payout ratios. 
The tax system and dividends 
Brennan (1970) and Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979,1980), among others, have 
demonstrated that differential tax treatment of dividends and capital gains should 
influence firm dividend behaviour. For example if the tax rate on dividends is higher 
than the tax rate on capital gains, shareholders in high tax brackets will prefer non- 
dividend paying shares. This may lead to a high demand for non-dividend paying 
stocks such that share prices of these firms will be higher than their non-dividend 
paying counterparts. In other words, firms with low payout policies are more valuable 
than firms with high payout dividend policies. This suggests the following predictions 
about dividend policy. The first is that firms should avoid paying dividends and 
issuing shares at the same time, as this will increase the tax burden of shareholders. 
Second, in order to compensate for high tax rates on dividends, shareholders will 
demand high pre-tax returns for company shares with high dividend yields. Third, 
share prices fall on the ex-dividend day by less the amount of dividend paid. Fourth, 
share repurchase policy becomes the most preferred method of distributing cash since 
it has a tax advantage. 
Information signalling and dividends 
In a world of informationally imperfect markets, Miller and Modigliani (1961) 
suggest that changes in dividends may convey information from the insiders 
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(managers) to outsiders (investors). The signalling models of Bhattacharya (1979), 
Miller and Rock (1985) and John and Williams (1985) predict that dividend increases 
signal good news about a company's future cash flows while dividend cuts send bad 
news. This implies that corporate managers aim to smooth dividend payments. 
Agency costs and dividends 
Agency cost theory suggests that high dividend payouts mitigate the agency problems. 
Easterbrook (1984) argues that paying dividends continuously reduce the level of 
retained income and thus forcing dividend- paying companies to source external funds 
whenever they need additional funding. This has two implications. First, this subjects 
managers to monitoring by outside professionals. Second, seeking external financing 
reduces management's ability to reduce the firm's debt level and as has been shown 
by Grossman and Hart (1982) high leverage forces management to work in the best 
interest of shareholders. Jensen (1986), further, suggests that high dividend payouts 
reduce the free cash flow problem. The theory of dividend policy based on agency 
costs argument, therefore, suggests the following; Dividend payment is an effective 
way of constraining management's wasteful behaviour. However, where alternative 
forms of corporate control exist, we expect firms to have low payouts (Dewenter and 
Warther (1998). Contrary to the tax argument, firms simultaneously pay dividends 
and raise external finance (Allen and Izan (1992). Leverage is positively related to 
dividend payments (Lease et al, 1999). 
2.3.3 The Lintner Model 
Lintner's (1956) stable dividend hypothesis is based on two empirical observations; 
(1) corporate managers have a target payout ratio which is a proportion of earnings 
and (2) dividend payment slowly adjust towards this target payout ratio. Therefore, 
from the first observation the relationship between desired dividends D; and earnings 
Et in any period can be expressed as, 
D; = pE, 2.1 
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where D; is the target/desired dividend payment, pis the payout ratio and E, is 
earnings. Based on the second observation Lintner hypothesised that in any one year, 
firms maintain stable dividend payouts by partially adjusting them to the desired level. 
Thus, the change in corporate dividend payment from year t-1 to t can be expressed as 
follows. 
Po +S(D: -D, 1) 2.2 
The constant ßo is assumed to be positive to reflect the reluctance of firms to reduce 
dividend payment in any year. The parameter 8 is the speed of adjustment factor. 
Substituting equation 1 into 2 we obtain 
D, = ßo + BpE, + (1- 8)D, -,. 
2.3 
Defining P, = Sp, ß2 =(I - S) and adding an error term, the estimated equation 
becomes 
Dý = Po +PIE, +ß2D, -, + it 
2.4 
The parameter estimates from the above equation are expected to be positive, from 
which the adjustment factor and payout ratio can be recovered as 
5=1-P2 and p= 
s' 
respectively. 
In the empirical literature D; and E, are respectively defined as dividend and earnings 
per share. 
As shown above, Lintner's econometric specification of corporate dividend behaviour 
hypothesises the change in dividends to be mainly explained by the current earnings 
and the lagged dividends. Ryan (1976) estimated the Lintner model using data from 
60 British firms over the period 1965-1970. The results show that the payout ratio and 
the adjustment factor for British firms during that period were 1.01 and 0.184 
respectively. The constant was found to be negative and highly significant. Therefore, 
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Ryan concludes that the estimation results do not support the prediction of Lintner 
model. 
Fama and Babiak (1968) extended the original Lintner model by adding lagged 
earnings. This model hypotheses a negative sign on the lagged earnings variable and 
their empirical results strongly support this hypothesis. Their simulation results, 
however, show that the constant term in the Lintner model is close to zero and as such 
the model should be estimated without a constant term. Another contribution of Fama 
and Babiak is that they disaggregated the earnings and dividend variables. 
Nakamura and Nakamura (1985) propose a rational expectation model of corporate 
dividend behaviour as an extension of the Lintner model. Their model differs from the 
Fama and Babiak variant in the sense that the lagged earnings variable is hypothesised 
to have a negative coefficient. Nakamura and Nakamura estimated both the rational 
and Lintner models using data from USA and Japanese firms in various industrial 
groups. Their results are consistent with the predictions of both models. 
Another extension of the Lintner model was proposed by Lasfer (1996), who 
incorporated tax exhaustion and discrimination variables in the Lintner's original 
model. In this modified model the desired dividends level D' is hypothesised to be a 
function of current earnings, firm's corporate tax (tax exhaustion) and the personal 
income tax rate of shareholders (tax discrimination). For this model, the signs of tax 
exhaustion and discrimination variables are expected to be respectively positive and 
negative. This model was estimated for 108 industrial and commercial British 
companies over the period 1973-1983. Their estimation results show that the constant 
has a negative significant coefficient, but other coefficients are consistent with their 
expectations. 
The above literature, therefore suggests that the Lintner model describes well the 
dividend behaviour of firms operating in developed countries. However, it is not clear 
whether the Lintner model is applicable to firms in emerging markets. 
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2.3.4 The determinants of dividend payout ratio 
Agency factors 
The theoretical literature suggests that dividends can be used to mitigate the agency 
problems between managers and shareholders. The main argument is that dividend 
payment reduces the funds available to managers for perquisites consumption and 
therefore reduces the manager-stockholder conflict (Jensen and Meckling, 1976 
Rozeff, 1982). Jensen (1986) also argues that firms with free cash flows should pay 
higher dividends in order to reduce the free cash flow problem. In addition 
Easterbrook (1984) argues that high dividends forces firms to source external finance 
and therefore subjecting managers to active monitoring by outside professionals. 
Thus, the agency cost theory suggests that where alternative forms of corporate 
governance do not exist, firms should pay dividends as an effective way of controlling 
the wasteful behaviour of management. In other words, firms are expected to pay low 
dividends if alternative ways of reducing agency costs exist. Using a sample of 1000 
US firms over the period 1974-1980, Rozeff (1982) investigates the effect of two 
agency factors on dividend payment. He argues that, " as outside equity holders own a 
larger share of the equity, they will demand a higher dividend as part of the optimum 
monitoring package", p254. Therefore he suggests that insider ownership should be 
negatively related to dividend payout. He also argues that ownership concentration 
reduces the agency costs and therefore leads to a lower payout ratio. Rozeff then 
included, in his study, the number of common stock holders as a proxy for ownership 
dispersion, and this variable is hypothesised to have a positive impact on dividend 
payment. The empirical results support the hypothesis that firms with higher inside 
ownership have low payout ratios. Dempsey and Laber (1992) extend the Rozeff 
study to the period 1981-1987. This period is characterised by lower inflation, 
stronger economic growth and lower taxes when compared to the period of Rozeff's 
study period, 1974-1980. However, despite the significant macroeconomic differences 
between the two periods, they reach the same conclusions as Rozeff and in addition 
their results also show that the model remains stable over the period 1974-1987. The 
other studies that have supported the negative relationship between payout ratio and 
inside ownership are Jensen et al (1992), Hansen et al (1994) and Holder et al (1998). 
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However, D'Sounza (1999) uses international data to examine the effects of 
institutional holdings on dividend payment. This variable is used as a proxy for 
agency cost mitigating factor and is therefore hypothesised to have a negative effect 
on dividends. The empirical results are consistent with this hypothesis and thus 
suggesting that firms with significant institutional ownership have relatively low 
payout ratios. Saxen (1999) compares the dividend policy of regulated and 
unregulated US firms and argues that regulated firms should have lower agency costs 
since the regulator acts as a delegated monitor. The empirical findings show that the 
insider variable is negatively correlated with payout ratio but is insignificant for the 
regulated sample. This implies that the agency cost variables do not significantly 
influence the dividend behaviour of regulated firms and thus supporting the 
hypothesis that dividend payment reduces agency costs. 
Leverage 
Kalay (1982) suggests that debt service and covenants, to some extent, can limit 
dividend payouts. The agency theory (Jensen, 1986) also suggests that leverage is a 
substitute for dividend payout in reducing agency costs. Thus, leverage is expected to 
exert a negative effect on the payout ratio. However, on the contrary, Easterbrook 
(1984) theorise a positive relationship. The empirical study by Dutta (1999) supports a 
positive relationship, while Jensen et al (1992) report a negative relationship. Dalton 
and Pointon (1995), however, find no significant relationship. 
Size 
Chang and Rhee (1990) argue that large and mature firms can afford to pay higher 
dividends than their smaller counterparts because they can easily access capital 
markets when the need arises. In this case, we expect a positive relationship between 
firm size and dividend payout ratio. Using industrial level data over the period 1965- 
1985, Smith and Watts (1992) find a positive relationship between dividend yield and 
size and thus supporting the view that large firms pay higher dividends than small 
firms. This hypothesis is also supported by empirical studies that have used firm level 
data (Gayer and Gayer, 1993, Holder et al, 1998, and Jones and Sharma, 2001). 
However, using a sample of 38 Indonesian firms, Ang et al (1997) report an inverse 
relationship between size and payout ratio and thus suggesting that large firms pay 
lower dividends than small firms. The contradiction in the empirical findings maybe 
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due to the fact that the Ang's et al (1997) study uses data from a developing country 
and also uses the payout ratio as the dependent variable. 
Growth 
A fast growing firm needs to retain a higher proportion of its earnings than a mature 
one. Rozeff (1982) argues that firm growth (past and future) entails higher investment 
expenditures such that high growth firms are expected to have low dividend payouts 
as a way of retaining internal funds and avoiding the costs of external finance. In 
addition, Jensen (1986) argues that firms with more growth opportunities have lower 
free cash follows and are therefore most likely to pay low dividends. 
The empirical results of Rozeff's (1982) study are consistent with the above 
predictions. In particular, the dividend payout ratio is found to be negatively related to 
past and future growth variables. Another study by Hansen et al (1994) of regulated 
electric utilities also support the hypothesis that high growth firms pay low dividends. 
Using a sample of 333 US firms Saxen (1999) compares the dividend policies of 
regulated and unregulated firms. He hypothesises that growth variables do not have a 
significant influence on dividends of regulated firms since the growth prospects of 
these firms are largely determined by appointed regulators. Similar to Rozeff's study 
the empirical results indicate that past growth plays a significant role in explaining the 
dividend payout of both regulated and unregulated firms. Other empirical studies, 
however, have suggested the use of investment opportunity set variables (for example 
market-to-book) as a better proxy for firms' growth opportunities. Such studies 
include Saxen (1999) Gaver and Gaver (1999) and Jones and Sharma (2001), among 
others. However, although these studies find a significant negative relationship 
between dividend yield and investment opportunity set, they do not find a significant 
relationship between dividend payout and investment opportunity set variables. 
Investment 
Cash dividends and expenditure on investments are the major alternative uses of 
corporate profits. Moreover firms with sticky dividends are most likely to cut 
investment expenditures during times of low profits. This is also consistent with the 
prediction of the pecking order theory that hypothesises that when investment 
expenditure is high firms will cut dividends in order to save internal funds to finance 
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this investment (Haan, 1997). Thus a negative trade-off between dividends and 
investment is predicted. The study of Haan (1997) involving Dutch firms, supports 
this trade-off hypothesis. Using a causality-based approach, Mougoue and Mukherjee 
(1994) investigate the relationship between dividends and investment. Their results 
suggest that there is a strong bi-directional relationship between dividend and 
investment decisions. The study by Jensen et al (1992) also indicates that greater 
investment reduces dividends. 
Earnings variability 
Annual company loss is expected to have an adverse effect on dividend policy, since 
cash dividend is legally paid out of profits (current or retained) rather than capital. 
This implies that firms persistently reporting negative after tax earnings cannot 
continue to pay dividends. DeAngelo et al (2000) argue that annual loss is a necessary 
condition for firms with established dividend record to reduce dividends. Lintner's 
(1956) pioneering study of dividend policy of US firms documents the importance of 
net income in determining dividend changes. In addition, the empirical evidence 
provided by Lintner (1956) and Smith (1971) respectively shows that firms' dividend 
payments are fairly stable and managers would only cut dividends when firms 
persistently report losses. This suggests that firms with fairly stable earnings have 
stable dividends and such firms can commit to paying higher dividends with less risk 
of cutting the dividend in the future. Thus greater earnings variability is expected to 
have a negative impact on dividend payout. The empirical evidence by Chang and 
Rhee (1990) and Holder et al (1998) support this hypothesis. 
2.3.5 Dividend change 
Recently, few studies have empirically examined the determinants of a change in 
dividend policy, especially the decision to pay or not pay and the decision to cut or 
increase dividend payment. Fama and French (2001) examine the influence of firm 
characteristics (profitability, growth of assets, market to book ratio and size) on the 
firm's decision to pay dividends. Their results suggest that profitability and size 
increase the likelihood of paying dividends but growth opportunities make it less 
likely that the firm will pay dividends. Thus, the results support the view that 
profitable firms pay higher dividends while firms with more growth opportunities pay 
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lower dividends and these results are consistent with the predictions of the pecking 
order and transaction costs theories as discussed above. Using a sample of 1412 
Indian firms, Manos et al (2002) report that free cash flows, size and age increase the 
probability of paying dividends while growth expectation reduces the likelihood of 
paying dividends. Thus the results also support the transaction cost argument. 
DeAngelo et al (1992) study the determinants of dividend cut for a sample of 167 US 
firms over the period 19980-1985. During this period 82 firms reduced dividends 
while 85 did not. Using the discrete choice approach (Logit model), they postulate 
that the decision to reduce a dividend payment depends on current income, prior year 
income and future earnings (up to two years after the initial loss). The results indicate 
that current loss increases the likelihood of a dividend reduction. Dewenter and 
Warther (1998) also use a logit model to estimate the determinants of the decision to 
cut dividends for Japanese and US firms. They hypothesise the decision to cut 
dividends to solely depend on firm's market adjusted stock returns in year t=0 
through t= -3. In this case year t=0 is the year when firm cuts its dividend payment. 
The results show that the decision to cut dividend for US firms in year t=0 depends 
on firm stock performance in year t=0, through t= -2. The Japanese sample 
however, suggests that dividend cut in year t=0 is tied to firm stock performance in 
year t=0 only. This suggests that there is a significant difference in dividend policies 
of Japanese and US firms. 
Charitou (2000) also estimate a logit model for Japanese industrial firms over the 
period 1990-1994 in order to examine the impact of cash flows, earnings and losses in 
setting dividend policy. The results show that cash flows, earnings and loss are 
important determinants of a dividend change in Japan. However, using data from 
2963 UK firms over the period 1974-1999, Benito and Young (2001) estimate a 
random effects probit model to examine the influence of cash flow, leverage, 
investment opportunities, actual investment and size on the decision to omit and cut 
dividends. The results show that cash flow, actual investment and firm size lower the 
probability of omitting a dividend payment while leverage and growth opportunities 
increase the probability of omitting dividends. They also report that cash flow, 
leverage, actual investment and firm size have the same impact on the decision to cut 
dividends. Thus, while the investment opportunities variable increases the probability 
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of omitting dividends it lowers the probability of cutting dividends. Silva et al (2002) 
estimate an ordered probit model using data from 221 German firms over the period 
1984-1993. The main objective is to examine the influence of past dividends, net 
earnings and loss on the decision to reduce, maintain and increase dividends. The 
results show that loss-making firms are most likely to reduce dividends. 
In summary the empirical studies on the determinants of dividend change show that 
large and profitable firms are most likely to have higher payout ratios, while loss- 
making and high growth firms are most likely to reduce or omit dividends. 
2.4 The interaction between financing and dividend policies, a 
literature survey 
Although Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Miller and Modigliani (1961) have 
demonstrated respectively that, under certain assumptions, investment decisions are 
independent of financing and dividend policy decisions, the recent finance literature 
tends to suggest that there is some degree of interdependence among financial policy 
decisions (see, for example, Jensen et al, 1992 and Noronha et al, 1996). The 
empirical implication of interdependence among financial policies is that estimation 
of the individual equations without taking into consideration the information provided 
by other equations in the system is likely to yield biased and inconsistent parameter 
estimates. Therefore, a few studies have empirically examined the determinants of 
financial policies in a system of simultaneous equation framework and the results 
suggest that financial policies are indeed interdependent. 10 However, most of the 
recent empirical studies are based on US and other developed countries data. In this 
subsection we will discuss the literature that has analysed the interaction between 
capital structure and dividend payout. 
The theoretical models and empirical evidence on the interaction of financial policies 
are limited. However, the few studies that have examined the relationship between 
dividend and financing policies tend to support the hypothesis that these two policies 
10 See Haan (1997), for a recent review of the literature. 
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are interdependent. Jensen et al (1992) argues that these policies are not only directly 
related to each other but are also affected by similar firm-specific factors such as 
profitability, size and growth opportunities. They further argue that the direct 
relationship between dividend and debt policies is through agency and signalling 
theories. Rozeff (1982) and Noronha et al (1996) have incorporated the payout ratio 
into the Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency cost model and have shown that debt and 
payout ratios are simultaneously determined. The results of Noronha's et al (1996) 
model are contingent on agency cost theory as suggested by Easterbrook (1984) who 
argues that high dividend payouts mitigate the agency problems. Easterbrook (1984) 
argues that paying dividends continuously reduce the level of retained income and 
thus forcing dividend- paying companies to source external funds whenever they need 
additional funding. This has two implications. First, this subjects managers to 
monitoring by outside professionals. Second, seeking external financing reduces 
management's ability to reduce the firm's debt level and as has been shown by 
Grossman and Hart (1982) high leverage forces management to work in the best 
interest of shareholders. Jensen (1986), further, suggests that high dividend payouts 
reduce the free cash flow problem. The theory of dividend policy based on agency 
costs argument, therefore, suggests the following. Dividend payment is an effective 
way of constraining management's wasteful behaviour. However, where alternative 
forms of corporate control exist, we expect firms to have low payouts (Dewenter and 
Warther (1998). Therefore, leverage is positively related to dividend payments (Lease 
et al, 1999). However, in this agency cost framework, if leverage and dividends are 
alternative forms of controlling agency problems a negative relationship between 
leverage and dividend payments is hypothesised. 
Kalay (1982) suggests that debt service and covenants, to some extent, can limit 
dividend payouts. Debt and dividend policies can also be related in the sense 
suggested by the pecking order hypothesis that firms prefer to use internal finance to 
pay dividends (Adedeji, 1998). Baskin (1989) further argues that past dividend 
payments could adversely affect the availability of internal finance. Sticky dividend 
policy compels firms to seek external finance in order to maintain the same level of 
dividends and to meet other future cash needs of the firm, especially new investment 
opportunities. Therefore, a positive relationship between leverage and payout ratio is 
hypothesised, if firms borrow in order to pay dividends. 
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Table 2.3 summaries previous studies that have examined the empirical relationship 
between firm leverage and payout ratio. 
Table 2.3 Empirical tests of interdependence between financing and dividend policy decisions by 
means of simultaneous equation systems 
Author Decision 
modelled 
Estimation 
method 
Sample 
period 
Sample 
size 
Sample 
country 
Are policies 
Independent? 
Noronha et al 
(1996) 
Div, Fin 3SLS 1986-88 80 US No 
Mougoue and 
Mukherjee (1994) 
Div, Fin, Inv VAR 1978-87 100 US No 
Jensen et at 
(1992) 
Div, Fin, Ins 3SLS 1982, 
1987 
565,632 US No 
Haan (1997) Div, Fin, Inv 3SLS 1983-94 146 Dutch Yes 
Switzer (1984) RD, Inv, 
Div, Fin 
OLS, 2SLS, 
3SLS 
1977 125 US No 
Johar (1973) Inv, Div, Fin OLS, 3SLS 1950-67 1333 India No 
Peterson and 
Benesh (1983) 
Inv, Div, Fin 2SLS, 3SLS, 
SUR 
1975-79 538 US No 
McCabe (1979) Inv, Div, Fin OLS, 2SLS 1966-73 112 US No 
McDonald et al 
(1975) 
Inv, Div, Fin OLS, 2SLS 1962-68 75 France Yes 
Adedeji (1998) Inv, Div, Fin OLS, 3SLS 1993-96 244 UK No 
The table shows that only the results of studies that have used data from Dutch and 
French companies have accepted the hypothesis that leverage and dividend payment 
decisions are independent. The data from companies operating in US, UK and India 
suggest that these policies are interdependent and therefore, support the proposition 
that these policies should be determined in a system of equations. 
McDonald et al (1975) employ a2 SLS procedure to examine the dividend, 
investment and financing decisions of 75 French firms for each of the seven years 
over the period 1962-68. The regression results do not support the hypothesis that 
financing and dividend decisions are interdependent. Using a 2SLS model, McCabe 
(1979) examine the interdependence between investment, dividend and new debt 
behaviour of 112 US firms over the period 1966-1973.2SLS estimates indicate that 
dividends and investment are inversely related and thus suggesting that both policies 
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compete for the firm's funds. New debt, on the other hand, is found to be positively 
related to dividends and investment. Overall, the results support the hypothesis of 
interdependence among financial policies. 
More recent literature has relied on ratios (especially agency variables) as key 
determinants of financial policies. Jensen et al (1992) consider a simultaneous 
equation model of dividends, insider ownership and debt ratio based on data from US 
firms. The three equations were estimated by 3SLS technique and the results strongly 
support interdependence of firm's financing and dividend decisions. 
Noronha et al (1996) apply 3SLS procedure to examine the simultaneous 
determination of financing and dividend decisions of 80 US firms over the years 
1986-88. They hypothesise that agency cost variables, suggested by Rozeff (1982) are 
empirically relevant to low growth firms with low use of alternative mechanisms for 
controlling management behaviour. To test this hypothesis, the sample was divided 
into two main sub-samples: HA + LA HO and LA LG. The sub-sample HA + LA HG 
contains high growth firms with alternative agency controlling devices, while the sub- 
sample LA Lo comprises low growth firms without alternative agency controlling 
mechanisms. The results are in line with their hypothesis, evidence of strong 
simultaneity between debt financing and dividend paying is reported for the later 
sample and thus suggesting that financing and dividend policy decisions are 
interdependent if dividends are used to mitigate the agency problem. 
Adedeji (1998) also apply the 3SLS technique to study the interaction of dividends, 
financial leverage and investment decisions of 224 UK firms over the period 1993-96. 
The results indicate that dividend payout ratio is inversely related to investment, but 
positively correlated with financial leverage. The results, however, reject an 
association between investment and financial leverage. Thus for the UK, there is 
empirical evidence to suggest that financing and dividend decisions are 
interdependent. 
Most of these studies, however, have neglected one source of endogeneity arising 
from the correlation of unobservable firm effects with some or all of the explanatory 
variables. Haan's (1997) study of firm financial behaviour in the Netherlands was the 
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first attempt to solve both the simultaneity and firm effects in this area of research. 
The results, however, reject the interdependence between financing and dividend 
policies hypothesis. 
2.5 Summary and conclusions 
From what we have discussed in this chapter, both theoretical and empirical studies 
suggest that firm characteristics are the major determinants of corporate financial 
policy. Although the empirical studies are inconclusive the main findings suggest that; 
" Firms in developing countries rely on internal finance to a lesser extent than 
those in developed countries. 
" Equity finance is a significant source of finance in developing countries 
" Internal finance is a significant source of finance in developed countries 
" Larger firms have high leverage and payout ratios 
" Firms with more tangible assets are highly leveraged 
" High growth firms have low leverage and payout ratios 
" Firms with more non-debt tax shields borrow less 
" Profitable firms have low leverage ratios but high payout ratios 
" High risk firms have low leverage and payout ratios 
" Firms with high managerial ownership have low leverage and payout ratios 
" Firms with high institutional ownership have low leverage and payout ratios 
" Highly leveraged firms have low payout ratios 
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Chapter 3- Data, definition of variables and methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
The main objective of this chapter is to describe the data set, variables and the 
methodology employed to empirically examine financial practices of the Zimbabwean 
corporate sector. The second section of the chapter describes the characteristics of the 
sample of firms. The third section presents the definitions of the variables selected for 
the empirical applications and the fourth section introduces and justifies the 
methodology employed in the subsequent empirical chapters. 
3.2 Data description 
The data used in this study is obtained from non-financial companies listed on the 
Zimbabwe stock exchange. The study is based on accounting data obtained from 
company financial reports (income, balance sheets, cash flow statements and the 
accompanying notes to the financial statements). Depending on the objectives, three 
samples were used in the study. 
The first objective is to document and compare financial structure and dividend 
patterns across three regimes (UDI, independence and Reform) and for this purpose 
we use a sample of 32 non-financial companies listed on the Zimbabwe stock market 
in 1999. The stocks of these companies must have been listed for at least 25 years and 
since the study spans over 25 years, the data is balanced. The process of selecting the 
32 companies is summarised as follows: 
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Firms listed on the Zimbabwe stock exchange in 1999 66 
Less 
Firms listed for less than 25 years -28 
Less 
Financial firms -2 
Less 
Firms for which annual reports could not be found -4 
Final sample 32 
The second objective is to empirically investigate determinants of capital structure 
and dividend policy of Zimbabwean firms over 5 years (1995-1999) and for this 
purpose the sample consists of 51 non-financial firms. Since we also estimate 
dynamic models, the stocks of these companies must have been listed for at least 3 
years. The data set is unbalanced in the sense that time series observations for some 
firms are not available for the entire period of analysis. The process of selecting the 
51 companies is summarised as follows: 
Firms listed on the Zimbabwe stock exchange in 1999 66 
Less 
Firms listed for less than 3 years -3 
Less 
Financial Firms -8 
Less 
Firms for which annual reports could not be found -3 
Less 
Firms reporting in currencies other than Zimbabwean dollars -1 
Final sample 51 
The third objective is to compare financial behaviour of holding and no-holding firms. 
The estimation period is from 1995 to 1999, therefore, the selection process starts 
from the 51 firms as shown above. From the sample of 51 firms, we aim to classify 
firms as either holding or non-holding. Holding firms are the firms that consolidate 
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their annual financial statements while non-holding do not. Four firms out of the fifty- 
one firms could not consistently be classified as either holding or non-holding, and 
therefore were deleted from the sample. Eighteen firms could consistently be 
classified as non-holding and forty-seven as holding. In order to balance the two 
samples, holding firms were ranked in order of size and the first eighteen (largest) 
were selected. Thus for the purpose of comparing financial behaviour of holding and 
non-holding firms the final sample consists of 36 firms, 18 from each group. 
3.3 Definition of variables 
The previous chapter has discussed theoretical and empirical literature on 
determinants of capital structure choice. However, definitions of both dependent and 
independent variables were mentioned in passing. Therefore, the main objective of 
this section is to discuss how these variables have been defined in the empirical 
literature from which we draw the definitions of the variables to be employed in the 
present study. However, it should be mentioned that although some of the definitions 
might be appealing, data availability might prevent us from using that definition. Our 
starting point is to discuss how leverage has been defined and then select the 
definitions that are to be used in the present study. After selecting the definitions of 
leverage, we will discuss the definitions of five factors: payout, tangibility, tax, size, 
profitability, liquidity, growth, non-debt tax, stock liquidity and agency factors. These 
factors have been extensively used in studies of corporate financial policy. Therefore, 
we need to see, first, how these variables have been defined in the empirical literature 
and then select the definitions that are appropriate to the Zimbabwean case. 
a) Leverage 
The definition of the leverage variable has always been a source of controversy. Since 
it is a ratio, researchers have to decide what to include in the numerator and 
denominator. In particular, the problem is on whether to use total, book or market 
measure of equity in the denominator and whether to use total, long term or short-term 
debt in the numerator. Thus, there are alternative ways of defining both numerator and 
denominator of the leverage ratio. However, Sweeney et al (1997), in their study of 
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comparing the differences in book and market values of leverage conclude that in 
cross-sectional studies book values give similar results to market values. Researchers 
have resorted to using at least two measures of leverage in empirical case studies of 
capital structure choice. 
Bennet and Donnelly (1993) use 6 measures of leverage. The first three measures are 
total debt, long-term debt and short-term debt scaled by the sum of market equity and 
total debt, while the second three measures are total debt, long-term debt and short- 
term debt scaled by total assets. Hall et al (2000) on the other hand used only two 
measures; short-term and long-term debt scaled by total assets. Chen et al (1998) also 
use two measures of leverage; total debt scaled by book and market equity. Other 
definitions of leverage found in the literature are presented in table A. 3.1 
In this study we use five alternative measures of leverage to examine the capital 
structure of listed firms in Zimbabwe. The first measure of leverage, book debt to 
total assets, is defined as the ratio of total interest bearing debt to total assets. This is a 
broad definition of leverage and has been extensively used in the capital structure 
empirical literature. The second definition, book debt-equity is the ratio of total 
interest bearing debt to book equity. Although few researchers have used this measure 
in empirical studies, this is the mainly used measure of leverage in Zimbabwe 
(company reports and stock market reports). The third measure, book debt-capital, is 
defined as total interest bearing debt divided by the sum of book equity and interest 
bearing debt. Fourth, market debt-equity, is defined as the ratio of total interest 
bearing debt to market value of equity. 
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Table 3.1(a) Definitions of leverage 
Definition Reference 
Total borrowing (book va 
total assets (book value 
Total borrowing(book value 
Shareholders funds(book value 
Total borrowing (book value) 
Total borrowing (book value)+ Shareholders funds(book value 
Total borrowing (book value 
Shareholde rs funds (market value 
Totalborrowinibookvalue) 
Totalborrowin4bookvalue)+ Shareholdes fundýmarketvalue) 
Debt- Wald (1999), 
total Wiwattanakantang 
assets (1999) 
Book Browne (1994) 
debt- Chen et al (1998) 
equity 
Book Hirota (1999) 
debt- Jordan et al (1998) 
Capital 
Market Chen et al (1998) 
debt- Prasad et al (2001) 
equity 
Market Adedeji (1998) 
debt- Wiwattanakantang 
capital (1999) 
The final measure of leverage is market debt capital which is defined as the ratio of 
total interest bearing debt to the sum of market value of equity and total interest 
bearing debt. The definitions of these measures and the references are shown in the 
table 1.1 (a) above. 
b) The determinants of capital structure 
We now turn to the definitions of the 11 independent variables. The selected 
definitions and the references are shown in table 3.1(b). 
Payout ratio 
All the previous studies have unanimously defined the proxy for dividend payout as a 
proportion of ordinary dividends to distributable earnings (e. g. Allen and Mizuno, 
1989 and Adedeji, 1998) or equivalently dividend per share divided by earnings per 
share (Gul, 1999). Following this literature, we define the payout ratio as total 
ordinary dividends divided by earnings attributable to ordinary shareholders. 
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Rate of Corporate tax 
The simplest proxy for corporate tax is the ratio of tax paid to taxable income before 
depreciation (Jahera, 1996 and Jordan et al, 1998 among others). However, Homaifar, 
[(tax paid - differed tax)+ statutory tax rate] 1994 defined the corporate tax as . In before tax cash flow 
this study, we use the simplest definition, thus we define the tax variable as total tax 
paid divided by earnings before tax. 
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Size 
In the empirical literature, firm size has been mostly defined as the natural logarithm 
of either total assets or sales. Homaifar (1994) and Wansely (1996), among others, 
have employed the natural logarithm of total assets, while Prasad, et al (2001) have 
used the natural logarithm of sales. Following Shuetrim, et al (1993), we use the 
natural logarithm of real assets as a proxy for firm size. 
Profitability 
Firth (1995) and Hirota (1999) have defined profitability as the rate of return on 
assets, while Krishnan, et al (1996) and Hall et al (2001) have defined it as the rate of 
return on sales. Consistent with most of the empirical literature, we define 
profitability as the ratio of net income before interest and tax to total assets (i. e. return 
on total assets). 
Liquidity 
Liquidity in the accounting literature can be defined as the proportion of current assets 
to current liabilities or ratio of current assets less stocks to current liabilities (quick 
ratio). Both of these ratios have been used in studies of UK corporate financial policy 
by Adedeji (1998) and Ozkan (2001)11. In the Zimbabwean case, figures for stocks are 
not available for most of the companies; therefore we define liquidity as the ratio of 
current assets to current liability. 
Growth 
The most common definitions of firm growth opportunities variables are the rate of 
growth of assets and/or sales (Titman and Wissells, 1988, Krishnan, 1996 and 
Badhuri, 2002). Another definition for growth that is becoming more popular is total 
assets less book equity plus market equity all divided by total assets. In the present 
study we use 3 proxies for firm growth; rate of growth of total assets (Badhuri, 2002), 
ratio of total assets less book equity plus market equity, to total assets (Bevan and 
Donalbot, 2002) and the ratio of net income to book equity multiplied by the ratio of 
retained income to net income after tax (Green et al, 2002). 
" Adedeji (1998) uses quick asset ratio, while Ozkan (2001) employs asset ratio. 
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Non-debt tax 
In the empirical literature non-debt tax has been defined as; 1) the ratio of 
depreciation to total assets (Titman and Wissel, 1988, Wald, 1999), 2) earnings after 
tax less tax paid to statutory rate (Titman and Wissel, 1988 and Hirota, 1999), 3) the 
ratio of investment tax credits to total assets (Titman and Wissel, 1988) and 4) the 
ratio of differed tax liabilities to total assets (Bennet and Donnelly, 1993) 
Stock Liquidity 
Homaifar et al (1994) have argued that capital market conditions have an impact on 
capital structure decisions. They used first differences in natural logarithms of stock 
prices as proxies for capital market conditions. Our proxy for capital market condition 
(stock liquidity) is defined as the ratio of value of shares traded per annum to market 
capitalisation at the end of the year. 
Ownership structure/agency factors 
The most common form of ownership structures that have been suggested to have an 
impact on corporate financial policy are percentage of shares held by: insiders (Jahera, 
1996), largest blockholder (Jong, 2001), financial institutions, foreigners and family 
(Wiwattanantang, 1999). The agency factors we employ in this study are ratio of 
shares held by insiders (managers and directors) to shares outstanding, proportion of 
shares held by the largest shareholder and the ratio of shares held by all financial 
institutions to outstanding shares. 
3.4 Methodology adopted 
3.4.1 Introduction 
The objective of this section is to discuss the econometric models that will be used to 
empirically investigate the determinants of corporate capital structure in Zimbabwe. 
The nature of the problem requires pooling of cross-section and time-series company 
data (panel data analysis). A comprehensive discussion of the advantages as well as 
the limitations of panel data procedure is found in Hsiao (1985,1986), Maddala 
(1987) and Baltagi (1995), among others. However, the advantages of using panel 
data methodology, often cited in the literature, can be summarised as follows: 
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First, panel data sets are suitable for studying micro units and thus, making it more 
appealing in our case where we study firm financial behaviour. Second, panel data 
sets give more data points, more degrees of freedom, reduce collinearity among 
variables and therefore, produce more efficient estimates than pure cross-sectional or 
pure time-series data sets. Third, panel data methodology gives the researcher greater 
flexibility in controlling for the effects of firm heterogeneity (i. e. firm-specific 
variables) and time-specific variables which could bias estimates if omitted, as the 
case in pure cross sectional and time series studies. Fourth, panel data sets are well 
suited for modelling the dynamics of adjustment, such as modelling why a given firm 
behaves differently at different time periods. 
3.4.2 The Static model 
Given a panel sample of N companies observed over T periods, the pooled regression 
equation can be written as: 
Yit = Xäß +µßt 3.1 
i =1,2 ............. N 
t =1,2 ............. T 
with µ;, =%+u;, 
Where the subscript i denotes the i -th firm (i. e. the cross section dimension) and the 
subscript t denotes the t -th year (the time series dimension). For this model the y;, is 
the observation on the debt ratio (dividend payout) for firm i at time t, x it is a vector 
of exogenous variables for the i -th firm in the t -th year, ß is a vector of slope 
parameters, m represents time-invariant (firm effects) variables and )it represents the 
stochastic term. 
The assumptions underlying the above equation are 
1) {y;,, x it :i =1,2,....., N; t =1,2,......... T} is a random sample where N is large 
while T is relatively small, 
2) {x '} is strictly exogenous with respect to u;, , implying that there are no 
predetermined endogenous variables such that cov(u; t ;x)=0 for any 
(t, s), 
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3) The errors (v )take the following classical structure 
E(v;, ) = 0, 
b" i= j, t=s 
us 
0 otherwise 
The main estimation problem is that the unobserved firm heterogeneity (firm effects) 
rl; may be correlated with the regressors (i. e. cov(rl; ;x ý) # 0) such that estimating 
equation (1) by OLS estimator gives inconsistent estimates. 
However, the econometric literature suggests alternative estimators of (1) that are 
consistent. In this chapter we briefly discuss 3 estimators that have been widely used 
in empirical work; OLS in first differences, Fixed effects and Random effects (for 
details, see Baltagi, 2002). 
3.4.2.1 OLS in First differences 
OLS in first differences estimator is one way of eliminating the firm effects (ii) as 
can be illustrated below; 
The first step is to transform the variables as follows 
Ya = YIº - Yi, t_1 x=x- Xi. t-1, Pit = Pit - Pi, t-I = ui, - ui. t-I 
3.2 
since T; is time - in variant 
Therefore by taking time differences in equation (3.1) we get the transformed 
equation 
Yit = Xi P+µ*i, 3.3 
In this case, cov(j ;x n) =0 such that OLS estimation of (2) gives consistent 
estimates of ß. 
3.4.2.2 The Fixed effects (Within) estimator 
The fixed effects model assumes that the slope coefficients are constant for all firms, 
but the intercept varies across firms. Thus the differences in firm behaviour are 
assumed to be captured by differences in the constant terms. In this case the approach 
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is to estimate ß and i, (i = 1,2......... N)by least squares. Thus equation (1) can be 
estimated as 
Y; º =xj+di rii + ui, 
(3.4) 
where d; is a dummy variable that is 1 if observation belongs to firm i, and zero 
otherwise. For this model it is necessary to test for joint significance of d; using the 
standard F or Wald test. 
However, if the sample contains thousands of firms it is not feasible to estimate d; and 
an alternative method (the within estimator) that sweeps away the fixed effects is 
used. The first step in deriving the within estimator is to write equation (1) in terms of 
firm means as follows: 
ym = XmR+11i +Um 
3.5 
where y; " =T Lº Y; t ,xm=T 
Zc_" x it and u; 
" =T Iý, uit 
and subtracting equation (3.5) from equation (3.1) we get 
yiW, =xß+u 3.6 
where. yt=y; t - y; 
', x=x;, -x ;n and uiwt = u;, - v; ' iwt 
Applying OLS to equation (3.6) gives the Within estimates which are exactly 
equivalent to the Fixed effects estimates. The within group estimator is consistent 
since 
cov(xiwt 
3.4.2.3 Random effects 
The random effects estimator is more efficient than the fixed effects estimator if it can 
be assumed that firm effects (%) are randomly distributed across firms. 
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E(rl ; 
)=0 
Eýý il ' 
S,, i=J 
0 otherwise 
E(u; t)=0 
E(ui,; u;. 
)= uy i=j, t=s 
0 otherwise 
and E(11; u;, )=0 
In this case, the generalised least squares (GLS) estimator of Balestra and 
Nerlove(1966) can be used. An advantage of using GLS estimator is that it is a 
weighted average of the within-group and between-group estimators and therefore, 
enables the researcher to extract information from those two variations (Owusu- 
Gyapong, 1986, Greene, 1997). 
The major problem facing an applied researcher is a decision on whether the effect 
should be treated as fixed or random. In other words, when to use the random effects 
model rather than the fixed effects model. Several guidelines regarding this problem 
have been proposed in the econometric literature (see Maddala, 1987, Balestra, 1992 
and Baltagi, 1995, among others). The arguments for choosing the random effects 
model in favour of the fixed effects model can be summarised as follows. 
First, the random effects model is appropriate when the researcher has some time- 
invariant observation. In fact, the within-group estimator, by failing to estimate time 
invariant effects, has been criticised for `wasting' useful information contained in the 
relations among individual means (Owusu-Gyapong, 1986). Second, "if individual 
effects are believed to be related to a large number of non-observable random causes, 
then the random interpretation is clearly indicated" (Balestra, 1992, p. 27). Third, the 
random effects model is more appropriate when N individuals are randomly drawn 
from a large population. On the other hand the fixed effects model is an appropriate 
specification if the sample is closed and exhaustive. Fourth, for panel data sets where 
N is very large relative to the size of T, the LSDV estimator suffers from an enormous 
loss of degrees of freedom and thus giving inconsistent parameters. In this case one 
should use the random effects model. Fifth, "the rl; measure firm-specific effects that 
we are ignorant about just as the same way that u;, measure effects for the i -th cross- 
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section unit in the t -th period that we are ignorant about. Thus if 0jt is treated as a 
random variable, then there is no reason that rl; should be not" (Maddala, 1987, 
p. 304). However, most studies are not based on these a priori reasons for the choice of 
modelling technique. Researchers use the Hauseman test to choose between the 
random effects and the fixed effects models. 
The Hausman test is based on the observation that the Random effects is correct only 
if the orthogonality assumption that unobservable firm effects are uncorrelated with 
the exogenous variable is not violated, while the fixed effects estimator is unbiased 
and consistent even if the orthogonality condition is violated. Therefore the null 
hypothesis of the Hausman test is that the unobserved firm effects (m) and the 
exogenous variables (x ) are uncorrelated. The Hausman tests statistic is computed 
as follows 
H=O 
FE - F'REJ[Var(kE 
)- 
Väi(ßRE 
)rl (kE 
- 
PRE) iCK 
. where K denotes the dimension of slope vector P. 
Thus Ho : cov(ii 1; x; 1) =0 
H, : cov(ll j; x; 1) :#0 
The Fixed effects is (a) consistent but inefficient under Ho (b) consistent under HI. 
On the other hand the Random effects estimator is consistent and efficient under Ho , 
but inconsistent under H,. 
3.4.3 The Dynamic model 
The dynamic linear model with exogenous variables and a lagged dependent 
variable is specified as 
Yit = 4Y1, t-I +XitR+Tli +A, +ui, 
(3.7) 
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where, y; t is the 
debt (payout) ratio, x;, is vector of exogenous variables (current 
and lagged), rl; and X, are respectively firm and time specific effects. It is 
assumed that the number of firms (N) for which data is available is large while the 
number of time periods (T) for which data is observed is small. It is further 
assumed that firm effects (%) are correlated with the lagged debt (payout) ratio, 
y; t_, and the 
disturbances are serially uncorrelated. 
For this model y1 
, , _, ,a 
right hand regressor, is correlated with the error term, 
since it is a function of i1;. Therefore OLS estimator of (6) is biased and 
inconsistent even if the error term is serially uncorrelated. 
Nickel (1981) demonstrates that the within estimator does not remove the 
correlation between the transformed lagged dependent variable and the error term. 
Thus the within group estimator is also inconsistent in estimating dynamic panel 
data models. Bond (2002) argues that parameter estimates from OLS and within 
estimators are, respectively, biased upwards and downwards. However, instrument 
variable estimation methods, that mitigate the problem, have been suggested in the 
econometric literature (see Arellano and Bond, 1991) and the most popular are the 
Anderson and Hsiao (1981,1982) first differenced two stage least squares (2SLS) 
and the Arellano and Bond (1991,1998) GMM estimators. 
The method suggested by Anderson and Hsiao (1981) solves the inconsistent 
problem, firstly, by taking first differences of equation (6) in order to eliminate the 
firm effects. This gives 
Yit - Yi, t-I _ 
4Yi, 
c-1 - YI, c-z)+ 
ß(X1c - Xi, 1-1)+ 
(oil 
- ui, c-t 
It=2,..... T 3.8 
The second step is to use either y;,, _2 
(instrument in levels) or 
yi t_Z - yi t_3 
(instruments in differences) as an instrument for y;, t_, - y;,, _2 since 
each of these variables is correlated with y;, t_, - y;, t_2 but not with v;, - v;. t_, . 
The Arellano and Bond GMM estimators use an instrument matrix of the form 
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Y>>w . ............................................................................ 0 
0 [Y; 1Y; 2w2] 
zi _ 
0....................................................................... ý Y11.. Y 
, T-2 
WiT I 
where the rows correspond to the first-differenced equations for t=3,4,.... T for 
firm i, and exploit the moment condition E(z; Ou1) =0 for i =1,2,..... N. 
w; can take the form (x il ............ x; T), 
(x2 
,....... &x; c 
), or 
depending on the assumptions made about x;, . 
3.5 Summary and conclusion 
In this chapter we have described the data set, variables and the methodology to be 
used in the empirical analysis of corporate financial policy of the Zimbabwean 
corporate sector. The available data of 32 firms spanning over 25 years will be used 
for analysing the evolution of financial structure and the dividend pattern over the 
period 1975- 1999. Since this period is characterised by three dramatically different 
regimes, this sample of 32 firms will also be used to compare company financial 
behaviour across the regimes. 
Although the finance literature has suggested several different measures of firm 
characteristics, our definitions will mainly be guided by availability of data. The 
discussion on methodology highlights that the appropriate econometric models for 
analysing firm financial behaviour are fixed effects and random effects. If dynamics 
are introduced in the model then GMM technique of Arrellano and Bond (1991) 
becomes more appropriate. Therefore in the study we will employ the fixed effects, 
random effects and GMM estimators to study the financial policy of the 
Zimbabwean corporate sector and by using the appropriate tests (e. g. Hausman test) 
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the data will guide us on which estimator to use. The next chapter empirically 
examines the financial behaviour of the Zimbabwean corporate sector across the 
three regimes. 
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Table A. 3.1 
Alternative definitions of variables as suggested in the literature 
Variable Definition References 
Leverage 
Tangibility 
total debt 
total assets 
long - term debt 
total assets 
total assets 
total debt 
short - term debt 
book equity 
total debt 
market equity 
total debt 
total debt + book equity 
total debt 
total debt + market equity 
long - term debt 
total assets 
bank loans 
book equity 
long - term debt 
market equity 
long - term debt 
long - term debt + market equity 
long - term debt 
total debt + market equity 
short - term debt 
total assets 
short - term debt 
total debt + market equity 
fixed assets 
total assets 
sales 
fixed assets 
inventories 
total assets 
Friend and Lang (1988) 
Michaelas (1999) 
Badhuri (2002) 
Firth (1995) 
Michaelas (1999) 
Badhuri (2002) 
Bennet and Donnelly (1993) 
Michaelas (1999) 
Badhuri (2002) 
Jahera (1996) 
Gul and Kealey (1999) 
Jahera (1996) 
Gul and Kealey (1999) 
Hirota (1999) 
Adedeji (1998) 
Balalaishman (1993) 
Wald (1999) 
Firth (1995) 
Browne (1994) 
Krishman (1996) 
Wansely (1996) 
Bennet and Donnelly (1993) 
Bennet and Donnelly (1993) 
Michaelas (1999) 
Bennet and Donnelly (1993) 
Hirota (1999) 
Krishman (1996) 
Colombo (2001) 
Profitability 
pretax profits Hall et al (2000) 
sales 
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Variable Definition References 
EBIT Firth (1995) 
total assets 
EBIT + depreciation Bevan and Danbolt (2001) 
total assets 
Tax 
total tax paid Jahera (1996) 
EBIT + depreciation 
[(tax paid - differed tax)+ tax rate] Homaifar (1994) 
before tax cash flow 
Non-debt tax shield 
(tax paid Hirota (1999) EAT - Titman and Wessel (1988) 
tax rate 
depreciation Wald (1999) 
total assets 
Titman and Wessel (1988) 
investment tax credit Titman and Wessel (1988) 
total assets 
differed tax liability Bennet and Donnelly (1993) 
total assets 
Payout ratio 
dividends Adedeji (1998) 
distributable earnings 
Allen and Mizuno (1989) 
Growth 
total assets, - total assetst_, Titman and Wessel (1988) 
total assetst_, 
salest - salest_, Krishman (1996) 
sales,, 
total assets- book equity+ market equity Ozkan (2002) 
total assets 
market value of assets Ozkan (2002) 
book value of assets 
NIBIT retained earnings 
- 
( ) Green et al (2002) 
book equity t-, earnings after tax 
Size 
Log (total assets) Wen et al (2002) 
Log (sales) Bevan and Danbolt (2002) 
Capital market stock price;, Jalilvand and Harris (1984) 
conditions (stock rice + stock price 
2 
Log p, - log p t-, 
Homaifar (1994) 
total value of traded shares Demirguc-kunt and 
market capitalisation 
Maksimovic (1996) 
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Chapter 4- The Zimbabwean Corporate Sector 
4.1 Introduction 
The main objective of this chapter is to explore the characteristics of non-financial 
firms listed on the Zimbabwean Stock Exchange. In the finance literature, firm 
characteristics have been singled out as the major determinants of corporate capital 
structure and dividend policy decisions. Therefore, a study of firm characteristics is a 
pre-request for a better understanding of the determinants of these corporate financial 
policies. 
In this chapter, we first discuss the pattern of corporate boards, share ownership 
structure and ownership concentration in the Zimbabwean context. In the second 
section of the chapter, we take up the theme of capital structure and empirically 
compare capital structure ratios and firm performance across the three regimes 
discussed in chapter one. In the third section of the chapter, we seek to document the 
financing patterns of the Zimbabwean corporate sector. A summary of the main 
findings is then presented in the fourth section. 
4.2 Board and Share Ownership Structure 
The modem corporation is characterised as having highly diffuse ownership structure 
such that separation of ownership and control is inevitable. The companies listed on 
the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange are large corporations employing from 400 to 45 000 
people. Dailami and Walton (1989) note that two thirds of these companies are 
foreign controlled. The management of such companies is vested in the hands of 
professionals who are often either chartered accountants or holders of MBAs or both. 
In this case, appropriate governance mechanisms are required to align the conflicting 
interests of shareholders and owners. It is often argued in the finance literature that 
management ownership, institutional ownership and the existence of large 
shareholders mitigate this principal-agent problem. In addition, the board of directors 
can effectively monitor managerial performance. In this section, we briefly discuss the 
structure of corporate boards, share ownership and ownership concentration of listed 
firms in Zimbabwe. 
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4.2.1 Board structure 
The primary duty of board of directors is to safeguard the interests of shareholders. In 
this case, it is highly recommended that a greater proportion of board members must 
be outside and independent directors (Monks and Minow, 1995 and Blair, 1995). 
Outside directors are the people who have no significant relationship with the 
corporation (blood or business). Thus, " company's lawyers, bankers, debtors, 
creditors, suppliers, consultants and customers" should not be considered as outsiders 
(Monks and Minow, 1995 p. 202). In addition, the Cadbury Commission (1992) 
recommends that the chairman of the board should be an outsider, thus separating 
chairman and chief executive roles. However, in practice it is common to find boards 
with executive chairpersons and in some instances board members who have 
significant relationships with corporations. Hence, in such circumstances we expect 
the board of directors to be ineffective in monitoring management and as proponents 
of agency theory argue, debt financing can be used as an alternative-monitoring 
device. 
The number of board members of listed non-financial companies in Zimbabwe ranges 
from 7 to 9 with an average of 70 % being non-executives. In contrast, the boards in 
USA and UK have an average of 15 and 16 members respectively. It is encouraging to 
note that by 1999 most of companies (85 %) have clearly separated the chairman and 
chief executive/managing director roles. Not all directors own shares of the 
companies they lead, but where they do the company law requires that this should be 
published in the annual reports. Within the board of directors there are other board 
committees like the audit committee, remuneration committee, finance committee, 
nominating committee and the executive committee. 
12 Most companies now publish 
governance reports together with the annual reports, " but like mission statements, 
vision statements, corporate charter and so on, these governance reports may end up 
being statements of intent only" (Chiura, 2000 p. 13). Another common feature of 
boards of Zimbabwean-listed companies is that some directors sit on several boards. 
This may create problems. For example, a director who sits on the boards of two 
12 The audit committee reviews reports from the internal and external auditors and other accounting 
procedures. The remuneration committee 
is responsible for executive compensation. The finance 
committee is responsible for investment of company funds. The nominating committee oversees the 
selection of new board members and the executive committee approves important decisions between 
full board meetings. 
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companies with conflicting interests will find it difficult to fairly represent the 
interests of shareholders of both companies. 
4.2.2 Share Ownership structure 
Who are the owners of Zimbabwean corporations and how has the pattern of 
ownership evolved over the past few years? In this section we use data published in 
company annual reports to examine the corporate ownership structure in Zimbabwe. 
The published ownership data show percentage shareholding by companies, 
individuals, insurance companies, pension funds, unit trusts, non-residents, banks, 
government, and investment, trust and properties companies. Managerial ownership is 
part of the individual shareholding category. 
The results from our sample of listed non-financial firms presented in table 4.1, show 
that domestic corporate bodies are the largest shareholders. They hold on average 44.4 
% of the outstanding shares for the period 1990-1999. Most of these corporate holders 
are either conglomerates/holding companies or nominees. A holding company is 
established for the purpose of controlling subsidiaries and affiliated companies in a 
group of companies. Holding companies constitute 60 % of companies listed on the 
Zimbabwe Stock Exchange. These companies are large and well diversified. They are 
the top performers on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange. The largest is Delta corporation 
limited with 860.1 million shares and employing 13 028 workers in the year 1999. 
Table 4.1 Percentage of outstanding shares held by investors (1990-99) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1990- 
99 
Companies 50 49 58 41 52 33 46 34 34 46 44.4 
Individuals 16 12 14 11 9 13 6 9 8 9 10.6 
Insurance 14 9.1 10 13 8 17 20 15 11 10 12.5 
companies 
Pension 6 14 8 12 3 3 4 6 10 9 7.3 
Funds 
Non 13 8 5 10 9 10 18 15 17 9 11.5 
Residents 
Banks and 1 6 4 4 5 19 4 11 9 11 7.3 
Nominees 
Investment, 0 0.4 0.4 10 7 2 2 6 2 3 3.2 
trust & 
prop. Cos 
Government 0.6 2006444 10 5 3.1 
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Other domestic corporate bodies form companies for the sole purpose of holding 
shares. In that case all the paper work and the day-to-day administration of the 
portfolio is delegated to the nominee. Most of these nominee companies were formed 
to manage portfolios of foreign investors during the time when foreign ownership was 
restricted. Insurance companies are the second largest shareholders, holding 12.5 % of 
equity market shares. Foreign investors and local individuals own 11.5 % and 10.6 % 
of the equity market shares respectively. The percentage share ownership of pension 
funds is similar to that of bank nominees, which is 7.3 %. The government hold 3.1 % 
of the outstanding shares, which is also equivalent to the proportion held by 
investment, trust and property companies. Therefore financial institutions altogether 
hold on average 40.4 % of outstanding shares, which is a substantial amount. These 
financial institutions are the largest shareholders in 23.3 % of non-financial firms in 
the sample. In comparison to other studies, Wiwattanang (1999) reports that financial 
institutions held about 8% of Thai firms in 1996. In 1984, Prowse found that 
financial institutions in Japan and US owned respectively, 43.3 % and 26.6 % of the 
outstanding stock of all firms. Therefore, financial institutions in Zimbabwe play a 
bigger role than in other countries. The results presented in table 4.1 above show that 
there is no clear pattern of ownership over the past ten years, except that foreign 
ownership has slightly increased from 5.4 % in1992 to 17.4 % in 1998, but the 
increase was not all that smooth. As mentioned above, the company law in Zimbabwe 
requires disclosure of directors' share ownership. Therefore, where directors own 
shares, this is reported under, `directors' interests' in the ZSE handbook. Using that 
data we found that director share ownership for each company ranges from 0% to 
36% with a mean of 3 %. 
4.2.3 Ownership Concentration 
Table 4.2 shows the values of 10 concentration ratios computed from 1999 figures: 
the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder, the percentage of shares held 
by two largest shareholders, the percentage of shares held by three largest 
shareholders and so on up to the percentage of shares held by the ten largest share 
holders. One striking feature of percentages of shares held by the ten largest 
shareholders is that they rarely change. Thus the 1999 data is representative of the 
whole period of the study (1990-99). 
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Table 4.2 Ownership Concentration 
Mean Std. Deviation Median Minimum Maximum 
Largest shareholder (CRI) 44.4 20.1 43.2 11.4 99.4 
Two largest shareholders 60.2 19.3 60.8 18.3 99.8 
Three largest shareholders 67.7 17.3 71.5 23.6 99.8 
Four largest shareholders 72.5 15.8 76.7 27.5 99.8 
Five largest shareholders 76.2 14.6 79.1 31.1 99.9 
Six largest shareholders 78.7 13.7 81.5 33.8 99.9 
Seven largest shareholders 80.5 13.1 82.7 36 99.9 
Eight largest shareholders 81.8 12.6 83.9 37.6 99.9 
Nine largest shareholders 82.9 12.2 84.9 38.9 99.9 
Ten largest shareholders 83.8 11.9 85.8 40.26 99.9 
The results show that on average, the largest shareholder owns 44.4 % of outstanding 
shares. In this case the investor has an incentive to monitor management behaviour 
because he bears about 44% of the benefits and the costs of shirking. On the other 
hand, the ten largest shareholders own about 84 % of equity market shares and we can 
therefore conclude that ownership of Zimbabwean non-financial companies, is 
concentrated in the hands of few individuals and institutions. 
4.3 Corporate financial performance across the regimes 
The main aim of this section is to investigate whether capital structure ratios and firm 
characteristics have changed in response to the removal of economic sanctions and 
government controls. In other words we want to compare capital structure and firm 
characteristics during repressive and liberalised periods. There are several reasons to 
believe that firm performance improved after the reform. For example, the 
transformation of the macroeconomic environment, as discussed in chapter 1, might 
increase the operation efficiency of the corporate sector. In addition, the liberalisation 
of financial markets may greatly improve firm accessibility to external finance and 
therefore promote growth of the corporate sector. 
For analysing the effect of the economic structural adjustment programme on 
corporate financial behaviour, we divide the data into three periods: UDI (1975-1979), 
independence (1986-1990 and reform (1995-1999). Thus we analyse firm behaviour 
during the last 5 years of each regime. In this case, we exclude 1980-85 and 1991-94 
periods because we take them to be transitional periods. In particular, during the 
1980-85 period, Zimbabwe was receiving a lot of foreign aid and this might distort the 
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results. Moreover, the reform was introduced in sequential form such that we expect 
that the full impact was felt in 1995. 
The approach we adopt in this section is to compare firm performance across the three 
regimes. We restrict the analysis to 4 characteristics that are considered in the finance 
literature to be the major determinants of corporate financial policy. These ratios are 
profitability, liquidity, size and growth. We quantitatively test whether the mean and 
median of each of these ratios after the reform period are significantly different from 
UDI and independence periods. For completeness, we also compare performance 
during UDI and independence periods. We make use of parametric and nonparametric 
tests, namely t-test and Wilcoxon test, respectively. The results from the parametric (t- 
test) and nonparametric (Wilcoxon test) tests are reported in tables 4.3 and 4.4 
respectively and the definitions of the variables used are shown in table A. 4. We now 
turn to a discussion of the statistical results. 
Profitability 
We measure the profitability of the corporate sector using return on total assets. This 
ratio is widely used in the finance literature to evaluate whether assets are profitably 
employed in the business. In the capital structure and dividend policy literature it is 
the most commonly used determinant of financing and dividend policy decisions. 
Return on assets employed is defined as the ratio of income before tax to total assets. 
It can, however, be shown that this ratio is the product of two other ratios: profit 
margin and turnover of total assets. Profit margin is the ratio of income before tax to 
sales, while turnover is the ratio of sales to assets. We also report results from these 
two ratios. 
We first compare the UDI and Independence regimes. The results show that there was 
no significant improvement in profitability following independence. However, the 
other two ratios, profit margin and turnover suggest that there was a significant 
change in profitability after independence. The mean (median) decrease in profit 
margin is 2.8 (2). However, there was a significant improvement in turnover. The 
mean (median) of turnover increased by 38 (33). 
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Comparing company characteristics during UDI and reform periods shows that 
profitability and turnover improved significantly after implementation of ESAP. The 
mean (median) in profitability is 7.9% (4.4%) while the change in mean (median) of 
turnover is 0.41(0.28) times. Finally the results in table 4.3c show that profitability 
after the reform period is significantly higher than during the independence era. 
Liquidity 
We also examine whether the liquidity position of the corporate sector, measured as 
the ratio of current assets to current liabilities, changed following independence and 
the reform programme. The results suggest that there is a significant increase in 
liquidity of the corporate sector following the removal of economic sanctions. 
Furthermore, the liquidity position of firms also increased after the reform 
programme. Thus, the ability of firms to meet short-term obligations without 
disrupting normal business operations greatly improved after the reform. 
Table 4.3(a) A comparison of firm characteristics across the three regimes (parametric test) 
Nest 
Variable UDI Indep Reform UDI vs Indep UDI vs Reform Indep vs Reform 
Profitability 0.1598 0.1641 0.2383 0.346 2.512 2.557 
(0.747) (0.066) (0.063) 
Profit margin 0.131 0.1026 0.1459 3.663 1.266 7.692 
(0.022) (0.274) (0.002) 
Turnover 1 1.2136 1.6005 1.6191 5.013 3.641 0.126 
(0.007) (0.022) (0.906) 
Turnover 2 1.3870 1.9183 2.0922 4.940 3.810 0.683 
(0.008) (0.019) (0.532) 
Liquidity 1.2888 1.3940 1.4814 3.263 6.133 2.503 
(0.031) (0.004) (0.067) 
Sizel 5.6988 6.4194 7.3997 20.465 34.776 68.089 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size2 5.6260 6.4705 7.4456 30.568 28.094 22.462 
(0.000) (0.00) (0.000) 
Growth 1 0.116860 0.204835 0.2592 1.601 2.237 3.789 
(0.185) (0.089) (0.019) 
Growth 2 0.116054 0.211453 0.3777 2.610 4.587 1.954 
(0.059) (0.010) (0.122) 
Notes: In parenthesis are p-values 
Growth 
If the corporate sector has to play a significant role in poverty-reduction, then it must 
grow rapidly. Moreover, one of the major objectives of the reform programme was to 
promote the growth. of the corporate sector and in order to assess whether this was 
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achieved we calculated two commonly used ratios: growth in total assets (growthl) 
and sales (growth2). 
Table 4.3(b) A comparison of firm characteristics across the three regimes (non-parametric test) 
Wilcoxon test statistic 
Variable UDI Indep Reform UDI vs Indep UDI vs Reform Indep vs Reform 
Profitability 0.1690 0.1659 0.2125 -0.405 -2.023 -2.023 
(0.686) (0.043) (0.043) 
Profit margin 0.1306 0.1080 0.1484 -2.023 -0.944 -2.023 
(0.043) (0.345) (0.043) 
Turnover 1 1.2033 1.5359 1.4792 -2.023 -2.023 -0.135 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.893) 
Turnover 2 1.3980 1.8639 1.7873 -2.023 -2.023 -0.405 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.685) 
Liquidity 1.2715 1.4061 1.4712 -1.753 -2.023 -1.75 
(0.080) (0.043) (0.080) 
Sizel 5.7150 6.3969 7.3684 -2.023 -2.023 -2.023 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
Size2 5.5957 6.4777 7.3775 -2.023 -2.023 -2.023 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
Growth 1 0.12130 0.21521 0.2350 -1.214 -1.753 -2.023 
(0.225) (0.080) (0.043) 
Growth 2 0.11596 0.21030 0.3675 -1.753 -2.023 -1.75 
(0.080) (0.043) (0.080) 
Notes: In parenthesis are p-values 
The results show that the growth rate of the corporate sector (growth2) significantly 
improved after the removal of the economic sanctions. The mean (median) growth 
rate (growth 2) increased by 9.5 (9.4) point from UDI to independence. However, the 
major change occurred from UDI to the reform period where both measures of growth 
rates significantly improved. 
Size 
Given the significant changes in firm characteristics, as discussed above, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the size of the corporate sector has also significantly increased with 
time. The results show that the increase in the mean (median) firm size from one 
regime to the other is significantly different from zero at the 1% level. Since the 
profitability of the corporate sector did not significantly improve, we expect the 
financial sector to play a major role in financing this growth. Therefore, there is need 
to investigate the role of the financial sector in financing the corporate sector in 
Zimbabwe. 
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Capital structure ratios 
We first document the evolution of the structure of corporate balance sheets over the 
period 1975-99 and then empirically investigate whether there was a significant 
change in capital structure ratios following the implementation of the economic 
reform programme. 
In this section we examine 5 key ratios calculated from company's financial 
statements. Each of the ratios is calculated as follows: The debt ratio is the ratio of 
total borrowing to net assets, long-term debt ratio is the ratio of long term borrowing 
to net assets, new equity ratio is the ratio of new equity issue to net assets, new loan 
ratio is the ratio of new long term loans to net assets, investment ratio is the ratio of 
capital expenditure to net assets and internal finance ratio is the ratio of retained 
earnings to net assets. These definitions are presented in table A4.1. Figure 4.1 below 
shows the evolution of these ratios over the 1975-99 period. 
Figure 4.1 
Zimbabwe. Capital structure ratios (1975-1999) 
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Next we consider whether these ratios have significantly changed over time (i. e. 
across the three "regimes). The statistical results, presented in table 4.4a-b, show that 
there is no significant change in the total debt ratio across the three regimes. However, 
long term debt ratio during UDI is shown to be significantly higher than during the 
other two regimes. The new equity ratio after the reform is also significantly higher 
than during the Independendence period. We find no statistical evidence of a change 
in the new loan ratio across the regimes. The statistical results also show that the 
investment ratio after the reform is significantly higher than during both the UDI and 
Independence regimes. We also find evdidence to suggest that internal finance 
significantly increased over time. 
Table 4.4(a) A comparison of capital structure ratios across the three regimes (parametric test) 
I-test 
Variable UDI Indep Reform UDI vs Indep UDI vs Reform Indep vs Reform 
Debt ratio 54.5890 55.5294 62.1677 -0.469 -1.176 -1.082 
(0.663) (0.305) (0.340) 
Debt Equity 32.2816 19.8418 25.9350 2.580 2.464 -1.885 
(0.061) (0.069) (0.133) 
LTD 28.4555 17.1486 21.1597 2.986 3.478 -2.056 
(0.040) (0.025) (0.109) 
New Equity 1.462 0.6088 1.802 1.015 -0.301 -2.792 
(0.367) (0.778) (0.049) 
New Loan 2.423 1.650 2.311 1.029 0.249 -1.515 
(0.362) (0.815) (0.204) 
Investment 8.826 10.67 14.40 -1.269 -3.690 -4.163 
(0.273) (0.021) (0.014) 
Internal finance 3.292 6.809 8.317 -1.973 -8.108 -1.183 
(0.120) (0.001) (0.302) 
Notes: In parenthesis are p-values 
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Table 4.4(b) A comparison of capital structure ratios across the three regimes (non-parametric test) 
Wilcoxon test 
Variable UDI Indep Reform UDI vs Indep UDI vs Reform Indep vs Reform 
Debt ratio 54.4334 55.8924 58.0353 -0.674 -0.674 -0.944 
(0.500) (0.500) (0.345) 
Debt Equity 33.4523 18.1388 25.0773 -1.753 1.753 -1.483 
(0.080) (0.080) (0.138) 
LTD 29.9495 16.2532 21.2837 -1.753 -1.753 -1.483 
(0.080) (0.080) (0.138) 
New Equity 0.439 0.4666 1.887 -0.405 -0.135 -2.023 
(0.686) (0.893) (0.043) 
New Loan 2.801 1.227 2.167 -1.214 -0.135 -1.483 
(0.225) (0.893) (0.138) 
Investment 8.777 10.10 13.39 -1.214 -2.023 -2.023 
(0.225) (0.043) (0.043) 
Internal finance 3.336 5.058 8.245 -2.023 -2.023 -0.944 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.345) 
Notes: In parenthesis are p-values 
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4.4 The Patterns of Corporate Financing in Zimbabwe13 
It is widely agreed that the emergence of a dynamic business sector is an important 
ingredient in the process of economic development in poorer countries. In this 
respect, a crucial issue is to understand how firms in developing countries finance 
their activities and how changes in economic policy impact on these financing 
decisions. However, as Prasad, Green and Murinde (2001) point out, very little is 
known about company financing decisions in developing countries. Even the basic 
facts are by no means agreed. The seminal studies of Singh and Hamid (1992) and 
Singh (1995) utilized company accounts data covering the largest companies in 
selected developing countries within the International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
database. They found that, in comparison with firms in OECD countries, firms in 
developing countries generally utilize a greater proportion of external funding than 
internal funding and a greater proportion of equity finance than debt finance. Given 
that capital markets in developing countries are invariably less well developed than in 
the industrial countries, especially for equities, these findings were surprising. 
However, Cobham and Subramaniam (1998) argued that the findings were in part an 
artefact of Singh and Hamid's methodology and sampling, which they claimed biased 
the statistics in favour of external funding. Concentrating on a single country (India), 
but using larger samples of companies and a different methodology based on work by 
Mayer (1988) and by Corbett and Jenkinson (1997), they argued that external and 
equity funding ratios in India were substantially lower than claimed by Singh and 
Hamid. A further study of the accounts of large companies in 10 developing countries 
using the IFC database by Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) 
utilized a methodology proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1995), and found that debt 
ratios varied substantially across developing countries, but overall were not out of line 
with comparable data for OECD countries. 
A partial reconciliation of the different methodologies employed by previous 
researchers was discussed by Green, Murinde and Suppakitjarak (2001) who also 
analysed a large sample of Indian company accounts. Their results broadly confirmed 
Singh and Hamid's findings on external funding ratios but not on debt ratios which, 
13 This is a revised and extended version of Mutenheri and Green (2003) 
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like Booth et al (2001), they found to be more in line with OECD data. Crucially 
however, they found that time- and company-averages could conceal considerable 
changes in company behaviour. In India, there were measurable, significant changes 
over time in external funding and debt ratios. Many of these could have been related 
to the economic reform programmes undertaken in India during the late-1980s and 
early 1990s, but Green et al (2001) did not test this hypothesis explicitly. It is clearly 
reasonable to expect that company financing patterns in developing countries will 
evolve over time as capital markets develop, and in response to any economic reform 
programmes which may be undertaken. Therefore an essential next step in 
understanding company financing in developing economies is to examine how far the 
data are influenced by economic policy changes in different countries. 
In this section, we summarise the patterns of corporate financing in Zimbabwe using 
company accounts data. The main objective of the analysis is to investigate the role 
of the domestic financial markets, particularly banks and the stock market in financing 
the Zimbabwean corporate sector in the period 1990-99, just prior to and then 
following economic reform. Table 4.5 below shows the type of financing, uses and 
sources of finance for the Zimbabwean corporate sector. 
Table 4.5 Financial institutions that provide finance to the Zimbabwean corporate sector. 
Type of financing Use Sources finance 
Short-term Working capital (overdrafts) Commercial banks 
finance 
Lease finance Leasing of capital equipment Finance houses 
Development For Large scale projects VCC, IDC, ZDB, Sedco, Merchant banks, 
finance Commercial banks, CDC, IFC and CSC 
Commercial Discount bills Merchant Banks 
paper 
Agricultural Crop, equipment and farm purchase AFC and Commercial banks 
Finance financing 
Construction For construction of houses, offices Building societies 
Finance and other dwellings 
Long-term capital Equity and loan issues Zimbabwe Stock Exchange 
Notes: 
VCC-Venture Capital Company of Zimbabwe, IDC- Industrial Development Corporation 
ZDB-Zimbabwe Development Bank, CDC-Commonwealth Development Corporation 
IFC-International finance Corporation, SEDCO-Small enterprise development Corporation 
AFC-Agricultural finance Corporation, CSC- Cold storage Commission 
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The data that we use in this section consist of the annual accounts of 51 non-financial 
companies listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange from its inception in 1946 
through 1999, but excluding companies that were either delisted or taken over. The 
data were obtained from the annual reports of the individual companies and from 
various issues of the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Handbook'. 
Table 4.6 shows the gross sources of finance for the 51 sample companies for the 
period under review (1990-1999). These data were calculated by summing the cash 
amounts from each source over all companies and then expressing the totals as 
percentages of gross investment. For 1990-99 as a whole (the rightmost column), the 
cash amounts were summed over time and then expressed as percentages of the total 
for 1990-99. This methodology for measuring corporate financial structures is most 
nearly akin to that proposed by Corbett and Jenkinson (1997) and used by Cobham 
and Subramaniam (1998) in their study of India. 
Since the basic financing choice faced by firms is between internal and external 
sources, we subdivided the sources accordingly. Internal sources were further 
subdivided into depreciation and retained profits. External sources were subdivided 
into long-term and short-term. Long-term finance comprises equity, bonds, bank 
loans, foreign loans, finance lease, hire purchase, and others. Equity finance is mainly 
composed of new and rights issues. Bonds consist of preference shares and 
debentures. Bank loans represent medium and long-term loans provided by the 
domestic banking sector, mainly commercial banks and the Zimbabwe Development 
Bank. Foreign loans encompass offshore financing and other foreign loans from 
institutions such as the International Finance Corporation and the African 
Development Bank. `Other' long-term sources consist of loans from domestic non- 
bank financial institutions, such as pension funds and building societies. Short-term 
finance comprises bank overdrafts, bank acceptances, trade credit and other short- 
term sources. `Other' short-term sources consist of the portion of long-term debt 
falling due in a year's time and other short-term borrowings not included in the other 
categories. 
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Table 4.6. Zimbabwe: Listed Companies' Gross Sources of Finance, 1990-99 
(51 companies; in per-cent of total financing) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1990-99 
Internal Finance 
Retained Income 
Depreciation 
External Finance 
Long-term Finance 
Equity Finance 
Bonds 
Bank Loans 
Foreign Loans 
Finance Lease 
Hire Purchase 
Other sources 
Short-term Finance 
Bank Overdraft 
Bank Acceptance 
Trade Credit 
Other S/Term Sources 
16.3 17.8 17.7 19.7 28.7 22.9 19.9 17.9 25.3 32.8 24.6 
9.4 12.0 10.9 12.9 22.0 14.1 12.0 10.9 18.5 25.8 17.5 
6.9 5.8 6.8 6.7 6.7 8.8 7.9 7.0 6.9 7.0 7.1 
83.7 82.2 82.3 80.3 71.3 77.1 80.1 82.1 74.7 67.2 75.4 
29.8 37.4 32.0 26.4 24.9 29.3 30.8 34.6 15.4 14.9 23.6 
8.8 17.6 6.4 7.9 7.0 7.6 9.5 20.5 2.7 2.8 7.8 
0.9 2.7 1.0 0.2 0.2 1.6 0.7 1.8 1.1 0.7 1.0 
2.6 2.0 1.3 2.1 0.9 0.3 1.7 1.8 1.1 0.5 1.2 
3.0 2.7 2.1 3.2 11.9 10.3 8.9 4.7 2.0 3.8 5.0 
0 0 0 0 0 1.3 1.0 0.4 2.4 0.4 0.9 
0.1 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 0 2.0 0.3 0.6 
14.4 12.4 21.2 12.9 4.8 8.2 7.9 5.3 4.1 6.3 7.2 
53.9 44.8 50.3 54.0 46.4 47.8 49.3 47.6 59.3 52.3 51.8 
8.5 8.6 14.7 8.8 8.8 8.7 6.2 7.4 11.5 9.5 9.3 
2.6 1.3 1.7 2.6 2.2 1.2 3.2 2.7 4.1 1.3 2.4 
27.3 18.5 24.1 27.1 22.7 23.7 25.7 23.9 35.5 29.3 27.8 
15.4 16.4 9.8 15.5 12.7 14.3 14.2 13.6 8.2 12.2 12.2 
Source: Own calculations based on company accounts 
For 1990-99 as a whole, external finance contributed 75% of total funds and internal 
finance provided the remaining 25%. Short-term finance accounted for 52% of 
external funds with long-term finance contributing the remaining 23%. There were 
some interesting differences among the different components of long-term finance. 
Equity financing was the most important source of long-term finance at 8%. `Other' 
sources of long-term finance (7%) were the second most important source, and 
foreign loans contributed 5% of external funds. Long-term bank loans and bonds 
were each a very minor component of total external financing. The most important 
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source of short-term financing was from trade credit, which provided about 29% of 
the total, with most of the remaining 23% being provided by banks. Table 4.6 shows 
that there were surges in equity financing in 1991 and 1997 when equities contributed 
as much as 18% and 21% (respectively) of total financing. The high contribution of 
the stock market in these years may be related to policy changes involving the raising 
of barriers to foreign investors. These changes took place in 1991 at the start of the 
overall economic reform program, and at the end of 1996 when entry barriers to 
foreign investors were lowered further. Clearly though, the data suggest that the 
increased use of the equity market which followed these reforms was very short-lived, 
a phenomenon that was also documented for India in the 1980s by Cobham and 
Subramaniam (1998). However, Green et al (2002) argued that increased use of the 
equity market in India in the 1990s was more long-lived. 
It is interesting to compare the results from our study with other comparable studies. 
Singh and Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995) examined the financing patterns in 
Zimbabwe for the period 1980-89. Exceptionally among the countries they study, 
their data suggest that internal finance was more important than external finance in 
Zimbabwe. Our results suggest that Zimbabwean companies relied more heavily on 
external finance and are therefore more consistent with the other countries studied by 
Singh and Hamid. The difference between our findings and those of Singh and 
Hamid are more likely to be due to the different time periods studied than to the 
different methodologies used, as the Singh method tends to produce a higher share of 
external financing than ours. Singh and Hamid's data covers the early independence 
period following the end of UDI when Zimbabwean companies were largely forced to 
rely on their own resources, whereas our data covers a later period when the economy 
was more open. This would be consistent with the higher share of external financing 
that we find. Singh (1995) also reported a much higher share of equity finance in 
Zimbabwe (43.5%) than we do (8%). This difference probably is due more to 
methodological differences, as Singh's method does tend to produce a higher share of 
equity financing than ours. See inter alia Cobham and Subramaniam (1998) on these 
methodological points. 
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Sub-samples by industrial sector 
The Zimbabwe Stock Exchange classifies firms into different sectors of the industry 
depending on the nature of their businesses. All together, there are 17 sectors, but 
some sectors contain either one company or none from our sample and therefore it 
was necessary to leave out such sectors. We were able to analyse 47 companies 
classified into 9 sectors. The results from the analysis are shown in table A4.2 in 
appendix 4. There are noticeable differences in financing patterns across industries. 
Internal finance, at 49 percent, is widely used by firms operating in the agricultural 
input sector and least used by those in the textile sector, at 16 percent. The 
contribution of external equity as a source of finance is also most pronounced in this 
sector. Bank finance was not a significant source of funds in all sectors. It is found to 
contribute about 2 percent in those sectors with a high proportion of tangible assets 
like the mining and the industrial sectors. 
Trade credit as a source of finance was significant in the agricultural processing and 
conglomerate industrial sectors, where it accounted for 38 percent and 31 percent of 
total funds respectively. 
Sub-sample by size 
Although, all companies listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange are relatively large, 
they could further be classified as large and small using their net asset values. The net 
asset values for each company ranged from a minimum of Z$8.7m to a maximum of 
Z$2 281.5m and the average was found to be Z$396m. We then defined a small 
company as a company with net asset values less than Z$396m and a large company 
as a company with net asset values greater or equal to Z$396m. The results shown in 
table A4.3 suggest that the size of a company has an impact on its choice of finance. 
Internal finance contributed about 26 percent and 22 percent to financing of small and 
large firms respectively. Equity finance provided 7 percent and 5 percent to meet the 
financing needs of large and small firms respectively. The contribution of long-term 
bank loans was the same, at 2 percent for both small and large corporations. Large 
firms have better access to foreign loans (6%) than small firms (2 %). Trade credit is 
more important to small firms (28%) than to larger firms (24%). 
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Sub-sample by growth 
We also classified firms according to each firm's average net asset growth rates, 
which ranged from -2.35 to 1,5 and the mean growth rate for all companies was 0.34. 
All firms with mean growth rates less than 0.34 were classified as low growth rate 
firms, while those with mean growth rates above 0.34 were classified as high growth 
rate firms. The results from the analysis are reported in table A4.4. These results seem 
to suggest that firms with high growth rates use more internal, foreign loans and 
equity finance than low growth firms. On the other hand, low growth firms use more 
bond finance and bank loans. High growth firms seem to have more access to trade 
credit and bank overdrafts than low growth firms. 
Sub-sample by ownership 
As reviewed in the last chapter, it has often been argued in the finance literature that 
ownership of firms determine firm financial behaviour. It was possible in the 
Zimbabwean context to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders for all listed 
companies. These ultimate controlling shareholders, in order of importance, are 
corporate companies, institutional investors, family, foreigners and the government. 
Some of these investors are, however, interlinked. For example, corporate companies 
are foreign controlled and family owners are foreigners, therefore the first three 
shareholders are interdependent. 
The major observation, as reported in table A4.5, is that foreign controlled firms use 
internal finance and trade credit more than any other firms. The second observation is 
that long-term loans, at 43 percent, are the most important form of finance to 
government-controlled firms. Such a high contribution could suggest that other firms 
are constrained from using long-term loans. The government-controlled firms can use 
long-term loans to such an extent for three reasons. The first is that no banker can turn 
down an application for credit by the government, because the debt is secured. The 
second is that the government is a major shareholder in one of the commercial banks 
and also the Zimbabwe development bank, therefore state-owned firms can easily get 
loans from these two institutions. The third reason is that debt finance may be used to 
align the conflicting interests of management of state-owned enterprises with the 
owners. 
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4.5 Summary and conclusion 
In this chapter we have examined the characteristics (the board, share ownership 
structure, ownership concentration, corporate performance and financing patterns) of 
non-financial firms listed on the Zimbabwean Stock Exchange. The results show that 
for the period 1990 to 1999 domestic corporate bodies (holding firms) are the largest 
shareholders. On average they own about 44 % of the outstanding shares. The second 
largest shareholders are the financial institutions, which own about 40 %. The 
Zimbabwean government holds the least shares (3.1 %). This implies that holding 
firms as well as institutional investors play a major role in controlling firms in 
Zimbabwe. Whether these institutional investors play a major role in capital structure 
and dividend policy decisions is an empirical issue that will be investigated in the next 
two chapters. 
Using both parametric and non-parametric tests, we also compared capital structure 
ratios and firm characteristics during the UDI, Independence and Reform periods. We 
document a significant increase in long-term debt, new equity, internal finance and 
investment after the implementation of the reform programme. The results also 
suggest that firm profitability during UDI and Independence. A possible explanation 
is that both periods were repressive regimes. However, the profitability of firms 
significantly improved after the implementation of the reform programme. Liquidity, 
on the other hand, increased significantly from UDI to Independence and from 
independence to the reform period. Growth and firm size also significantly increased 
over time. 
We finally examined the pattern of financing the Zimbabwean corporate sector and 
document that firms mainly depend on internal finance, which is 25 % of total 
financing. Equity finance contributes 8% of total external financing, while bank 
finance contributes 1% of external loans. We also examined the financing pattern of 
firms after grouping them according to industrial sectors, size, rate of growth and 
ownership structure. There are two major observations. Firstly, foreign controlled 
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firms use internal finance and trade credit more than any other firms. Secondly, 
government controlled firms heavily rely on long-term loans. This observed 
heterogeneity of firms, needs to be taken into account when investigating financial 
policy of these firms. The next two chapters will empirically investigate the 
importance of firm characteristics in determining the corporate capital structure and 
dividend policy decisions. 
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Table A4.1 Definitions of firm performance variables 
Firm Characteristics Definition 
Profitability income before tax 
total assets 
Profit margin income before tax 
sales 
Turnover 1 sales 
total assets 
Liquidity current assets 
current liquidity 
Sizel Log (Total assets) 
Size 2 Log (Sales) 
Growth 1 TA, -TA,, 
TA, 
_, 
Growth 2 Sales, -Salest_, 
Sales, 
_, 
Capital structure ratios 
Debt ratio Total borrowing 
Net assets 
Debt Equity ratio Total borrowing 
Net assets 
UTerm debt ratio L/ term borrowing 
Net assets 
New Equity ratio New issue 
Net assets 
New loan ratio New L/ term loans 
Net assets 
Investment ratio Capital expenditure 
Net assets 
Internal finance ratio Retained earnings 
Net assets 
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Table A4.3 (a). Zimbabwe: Listed Companies' Gross Sources of Finance, 1990-99 
(in per-cent of total financing), Large Companies (net assets z Z$4m) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1990-99 
Internal Finance 
Retained Income 
Depreciation 
External Finance 
Long-term Finance 
Equity Finance 
Bonds 
Bank Loans 
Foreign Loans 
Finance Lease 
Hire Purchase 
Other sources 
Short-term Finance 
Bank Overdraft 
Bank Acceptance 
Trade Credit 
Other S/Term Sources 
10.6 13.4 14.1 16.5 25.3 19.8 17.7 15.5 22.4 30.8 21.9 
5.5 8.7 8.1 11.2 21.1 12.8 11.2 9.7 16.3 24 15.8 
5.2 4.7 6 5.3 4.2 7 6.6 5.9 6.1 6.7 6.1 
89.4 86.6 85.9 83.5 74.7 80.2 82.3 84.5 77.6 69.2 78.1 
34 42.2 37.6 27.5 37 41.9 36.6 40 15.3 16.1 27.7 
11.4 16.2 7.7 6.5 7 9.1 8.3 20.8 0.5 2.3 7.4 
0.6 2.8 1.2 0.1 0.2 2.2 0.6 2 1 0.7 1.1 
2.9 2.2 1.1 1.6 1 0.1 1.4 1.8 0.5 0.3 0.9 
2.2 1.8 1.4 2.8 13.4 12.8 11.1 5.4 1.8 4.4 5.6 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 2.9 0.1 0.6 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1.3 0 2.6 0.4 0.8 
17 19.1 26.3 16.5 15.4 17.8 13.9 9.9 6 7.8 0.8 
55.3 44.4 48.3 56 37.7 38.3 45.7 44.4 62.4 53.2 50.4 
6.7 8 6.9 7.3 6.9 6.7 4.3 6 9.5 10 7.9 
0.5 0.3 0.5 1 0.3 0 3.1 2.2 3.8 0.9 1.8 
25.2 16.3 24 22.8 15.8 18.1 21.7 20.4 34.4 25.9 24.5 
23 19.7 16.8 24.9 14.7 13.5 16.6 15.8 14.7 16.4 16.3 
Source: Own calculations based on company accounts 
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Table A4.3 (b). Zimbabwe: Listed Companies' Gross Sources of Finance, 1990-99 
(in per-cent of total financing), small Companies (net assets < Z$4m) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1990-99 
Internal Finance 
Retained Income 
Depreciation 
External Finance 
Long-term Finance 
Equity Finance 
Bonds 
Bank Loans 
Foreign Loans 
Finance Lease 
Hire Purchase 
Other sources 
Short-term Finance 
Bank Overdraft 
Bank Acceptance 
Trade Credit 
Other S/Term Sources 
21.6 23.2 22 21.5 26.1 22.4 23 16.9 27.3 34.1 25.6 
13.9 16.3 14.7 13.3 15.1 12.6 12.6 9.9 19.9 27.1 17.6 
7.8 6.9 7.3 8.2 11 9.8 10.4 7 7.5 78 
78.4 76.8 78 78.5 73.9 77.6 77 83.1 72.7 65.9 74.4 
23.4 38.6 21.6 21.7 29.2 14.3 20.2 18.4 20.3 17.7 20.3 
1 17.1 2.4 8.7 4 2.8 2.8 9.6 7.3 1.2 5.2 
1.2 2 0.4 0.4 0.1 0 1 0.6 1.1 0.8 0.7 
1.2 1.1 1.4 2.8 0.4 0.7 1.1 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.8 
3.7 3.9 3.3 3.3 2.3 2.8 2.2 1.5 2.1 2.2 2.3 
0 0 0 0 0.1 3.4 3.5 1.1 0.7 1.3 1.3 
0.2 0 0.2 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16.1 14.4 14 13.9 7.4 10.5 7.6 7.2 8.8 11.3 9.9 
55 38.2 56.4 49.4 59.6 57.3 58.7 62.8 52.4 48.2 54.1 
9.3 8.3 28.4 9.7 10.1 10 10.3 7.9 12.9 7.2 10.3 
6.1 2.8 3.8 5.5 6.7 3.1 3.3 2.8 0.7 2.2 2.8 
20.9 19.4 17.5 26.4 31.5 26.9 31.7 22.6 29.9 34.1 28.5 
18.7 7.7 6.8 7.8 11.3 17.3 13.4 29.5 8.9 4.6 12.6 
Source: Own calculations based on company accounts 
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Table A4.4 (a). Zimbabwe: Listed Companies' Gross Sources of Finance, 1990-99 
(in per-cent of total financing), High growth Companies (average annual growth rate z 34 %) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1990-99 
Internal Finance 
Retained Income 
Depreciation 
External Finance 
Long-term Finance 
Equity Finance 
Bonds 
Bank Loans 
Foreign Loans 
Finance Lease 
Hire Purchase 
Other sources 
Short-term Finance 
Bank Overdraft 
Bank Acceptance 
Trade Credit 
Other S/Term Sources 
11.9 16.7 14 32.2 29.6 19.5 18.4 17.8 22.7 31.1 23.9 
6.5 11.6 10 21.4 24.8 13.2 12.5 11.5 17.7 25.3 18 
5.5 5 4 10.8 4.8 6.2 5.9 6.2 5 5.8 5.8 
88.1 83.3 86 67.8 70.4 80.5 81.6 82.2 77.3 68.9 76.1 
33.6 44 40.2 27.5 32.2 39 38.6 38.8 20.5 19 28.5 
10.4 17.9 10.3 6 5.7 9.6 10.3 17 3.6 2.8 7.4 
0.7 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 0 1 0.8 0 0.4 
3.5 3 1.6 1.9 1.4 0.4 1.7 1.5 0.3 0.2 0.9 
2.8 1.9 2.5 3.8 10.6 10.8 10.5 6.8 2.3 4.8 5.7 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.4 3.1 0.2 0.8 
0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.7 0.4 0.7 
16 20.4 25.5 15.7 14.3 18.2 16 12.2 7.8 10.5 12.6 
54.5 39.3 45.8 40.3 38.2 41.5 43 43 56.8 49.9 47.6 
6.3 6.6 16.8 5.3 7.8 7.3 7.4 7.9 11.6 8.2 8.9 
2.7 1.9 1.4 1.8 1.6 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.5 0.1 0.7 
26.3 17.9 22.7 21.3 18.2 22.8 23 22.1 32.8 28.4 26 
19.3 12.9 4.8 12 10.5 10.7 12 12.5 11.8 13.2 12.1 
Source: Own calculations based on company accounts 
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Table A4.4 (b). Zimbabwe: Listed Companies' Gross Sources of Finance, 1990-99 
( in per-cent of total financing), Low growth Companies (average annual growth rate < 34 %) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1990-99 
Internal Finance 
Retained Income 
Depreciation 
External Finance 
Long-term Finance 
Equity Finance 
Bonds 
Bank Loans 
Foreign Loans 
Finance Lease 
Hire Purchase 
Other sources 
17.2 14.7 20.3 18.2 19.5 18.7 20.4 14.3 26.3 33.2 22.4 
10.4 9.6 10.5 10.4 11.9 9.8 10.2 7.7 16.6 24.3 13.9 
6.8 5.1 9.8 7.8 7.7 9 10.2 6.6 9.7 9 8.5 
82.8 85.3 79.7 81.8 80.5 81.3 79.6 85.7 73.7 66.8 77.6 
26.7 45.7 21.8 22.1 29.8 39.8 20.9 29 8.4 11 21.8 
4.8 13.3 0 7.1 7 1.9 1.5 19.3 0.1 0.3 5.4 
0.9 3.6 1.8 0.3 0.3 3.3 1.8 2.6 1.5 2.1 1.9 
0.9 13 0.6 1.5 0 18 0.6 1.3 0.7 1.2 2.9 
2.5 2.8 1.3 1.1 10.4 5.6 5.9 0.6 0.9 1.3 2.8 
0 0 0 0 0 2.7 2.4 0.3 0.2 0.9 0.8 
0 0 0 0 0.1 0 2.4 0 0 0 0.3 
17.5 13 18 12.1 12.1 8.3 6.4 4.9 4.8 5.3 7.7 
Short-term Finance 156.1 39.6 57.9 59.7 50.7 41.5 58.8 56.7 65.4 55.7 55.9 
Bank overdraft 9.1 8.4 9.2 9.8 7.6 7.3 3.9 5 8 11.4 7.9 
Bank Acceptance 1.9 0.4 1.8 2.6 2.4 1.4 6.8 5 8.1 3.9 4.4 
Trade Credit 20.7 14.8 20.9 21.7 22.1 14.8 26.8 14 33.7 28.3 23.4 
Other S/Term Sources 24.4 15.9 26 25.6 18.6 18 21.2 32.7 15.5 12.2 20.2 
Source: Own calculations based on company accounts 
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Table A4.5 (a). Zimbabwe: Listed Companies' Gross Sources of Finance, 1990-99 
( in per-cent of total financing), Firms controlled by holding companies 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1990-99 
Internal Finance 
Retained Income 
Depreciation 
External Finance 
Long-term Finance 
Equity Finance 
Bonds 
Bank Loans 
Foreign Loans 
Finance Lease 
Hire Purchase 
Other sources 
Short-term Finance 
Bank Overdraft 
Bank Acceptance 
Trade Credit 
Other S/Term Sources 
19.5 21.2 23.2 31.2 40 23.9 28.6 20.6 20.6 34.1 27.4 
11.4 13.7 13 20.9 32.2 10.5 14.9 13.1 13.2 26.7 17.9 
8.1 7.5 10.2 10.3 7.9 13.4 13.7 7.7 7.4 10.4 9.5 
80.5 78.8 76.8 68.8 60 76.1 71.4 79.3 79.4 62.9 72.6 
38.9 42.7 29.7 34.5 35.6 32.1 25.3 26.8 10 10.1 21.9 
13 29.1 13.7 12.6 10.3 5.7 4.9 13.3 5.3 1.3 7.8 
1.2 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.1 4 0 1.7 0.4 1.2 1 
2.5 1.4 0.4 4.6 1.3 0 2.4 2.4 0.6 1 1.4 
2 1.3 1.1 5.3 13.3 9.5 8.3 1.3 0.1 1 3.5 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.3 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2.7 0 0 0 0.3 
20.1 10.1 14 11.6 10.4 12.9 6.8 7.7 3.3 4.9 7.5 
41.6 36.1 47.1 34.3 24.4 44.1 46.1 52.5 69.4 52.9 50.7 
3.8 4.7 26.7 6.5 5.8 7.2 5.4 9.6 12.1 10.4 9.7 
0.5 0.5 0 0.4 0.6 0.1 6.2 5 0.5 0.4 1.8 
26 18.7 15.8 18.8 13.1 23.1 22.8 20.9 44.6 29.9 27.4 
11.3 12.1 4.6 8.6 4.8 13.7 11.7 16.9 12.2 12.2 11.9 
Source: Own calculations based on company accounts 
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Table A4.5 (b). Zimbabwe: Listed Companies' Gross Sources of Finance, 1990-99 
( in per-cent of total financing), Firms controlled by Institutional companies 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1990-99 
Internal Finance 
Retained Income 
Depreciation 
External Finance 
Long-term Finance 
Equity Finance 
Bonds 
Bank Loans 
Foreign Loans 
Finance Lease 
Hire Purchase 
Other sources 
Short-term Finance 
Bank Overdraft 
Bank Acceptance 
Trade Credit 
Other S/Term Sources 
12.2 11.6 11.8 10.2 16 21.2 13.9 13.9 19.3 22 17.1 
7.8 8.8 8.5 7 12.2 17.5 11.3 10.8 14.6 18.6 13.6 
4.4 2.8 3.3 3.2 3.9 3.7 2.6 3.1 4.7 3.3 3.6 
87.8 88.4 88.2 89.8 84 78.8 86.1 86.1 80.7 78 82.9 
21.7 39.9 34.1 20.5 26.4 35.2 24.6 31.2 12.2 11.2 21.3 
8.7 9.8 1.4 2.9 5.4 11.6 2.9 11.5 1.8 4.2 5.3 
0.1 4.2 1.4 0 0.3 0 2 1.3 1.4 1 1.1 
0.1 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.3 1.4 0.7 0.6 0.5 
0 1.3 0 0 6.7 8 10 7.9 1.9 0.8 3.8 
0 0 0 0 0 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.1 0.3 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 
12.8 24.5 31.3 17.6 13.9 15 8.9 8.3 6.1 4.3 10.3 
66.1 48.6 54.1 69.3 57.6 43.6 61.6 54.9 68.5 66.9 61.6 
10.4 11.6 7.9 8.4 9.9 9.7 5.6 5 11.9 10.6 9.2 
0.5 0.2 0.5 8.2 0.5 1.8 1.8 0.8 8.1 3.2 3.4 
26.8 13.3 23.6 23.1 21.5 17.1 29.9 28.2 30.1 30.3 26.9 
28.4 23.5 22 29.6 25.6 15 24.2 20.8 18.4 22.7 22.1 
Source: Own calculations based on company accounts 
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Table A4.5 (c). Zimbabwe: Listed Companies' Gross Sources of Finance, 1990-99 
( in per-cent of total financing), Firms controlled by Families 
11990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1990-99 
Internal Finance 
Retained Income 
Depreciation 
External Finance 
Long-term Finance 
Equity Finance 
Bonds 
Bank Loans 
Foreign Loans 
Finance Lease 
Hire Purchase 
Other sources 
Short-term Finance 
Bank Overdraft 
Bank Acceptance 
Trade Credit 
Other S/Terrn Sources 
15.7 25.6 24.2 16.6 24.4 19.3 14 12.3 33.2 42.9 27.4 
10 18.2 13.8 8.1 15.4 10.7 7.7 8.4 28.3 39.3 22.3 
5.7 7 10.4 8.5 9 8.5 6.3 3.9 4.9 3.6 5.1 
84.3 74.4 75.8 83.4 75.6 80.7 86 87.7 66.8 57.1 72.6 
34 40.5 31 38.4 7.2 21.7 54.2 24 22.7 31 30 
2.5 18.1 0 22.6 0 3.9 27.6 5 0.3 0.6 5.9 
2.4 0.9 1.7 1.5 0.2 0.1 0 3.4 3.5 0 1.5 
0 1.1 3.7 0 0 0 1.4 0.6 0 0 0.4 
7.3 6.9 8.6 5.6 1.6 0.9 1.1 4.5 5.1 12.2 6.5 
0 0 0 0 0 8.7 4.8 0.3 0.3 0.9 1.5 
0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.6 0.5 
21.3 13.5 17 8.8 5.5 8.1 19.1 10.2 13.4 15.6 13.6 
50.3 33.9 44.9 44.9 68.4 59.1 31.8 63.7 44.1 26.1 42.7 
7.3 8.7 5 5.5 6.3 8.2 4.9 4.3 7.3 0.9 4.4 
3.7 0 7.2 9.5 11.1 0 0 0 0 0 0.9 
14.9 19.5 24 25.8 31.1 19.3 14.9 18.2 26.4 22.5 21.4 
23.3 5.7 8.6 4.1 19.9 31.6 12.1 41.2 10.3 2.7 16 
Source: Own calculations based on company accounts 
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Table A4.5 (d). Zimbabwe: Listed Companies' Gross Sources of Finance, 1990-99 
( in per-cent of total financing), Firms controlled by Foreigners 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1990-99 
Internal Finance 
Retained Income 
Depreciation 
External Finance 
Long-term Finance 
Equity Finance 
Bonds 
Bank Loans 
Foreign Loans 
Finance Lease 
Hire Purchase 
Other sources 
Short-term Finance 
Bank Overdraft 
Bank Acceptance 
Trade Credit 
Other S/Term Sources 
8.7 14.3 21.3 28.8 25.6 28 36.3 37.3 36 33.7 32.1 
1.4 10.1 15.1 19.5 16 18.4 20.3 17.3 22.9 23.2 20.2 
7.3 4.1 6.1 9.4 9.5 9.6 16 20 13.1 10.5 12 
91.3 85.7 78.7 71.2 74.4 72 63.7 62.7 64 66.3 67.9 
4.4 28.8 28.3 17.4 12.9 10.4 12.6 15.1 5.6 25.7 16.8 
0 0 15.4 0 0 0.4 0.1 10.1 0 0 1.7 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 1.6 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 6.4 3.8 4.2 3.4 7.9 3.1 5.1 2.2 3.8 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4.4 28.8 6.5 13.6 8.8 5 4.5 1.8 0.4 23.4 11.2 
86.9 56.9 50.4 53.8 61.5 61.7 51.1 47.6 58.4 40.6 51 
18.6 13 6.2 13.5 9 7.9 10.8 13.5 10 3.9 8.7 
7.8 0 3.8 0 7.9 000000 
30.7 34.6 35.9 39.2 43.9 47.7 36.8 33 42.3 34.2 38.2 
29.7 9.2 4.5 1.1 0.8 6.1 3.5 1.1 6 2.5 4.1 
Source: Own calculations based on company accounts 
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Table A4.5 (e). Zimbabwe: Listed Companies' Gross Sources of Finance, 1990-99 
( in per-cent of total financing), Firms controlled by Government 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1990-99 
Internal Finance 8.5 9.2 7.7 4.6 14 16.7 17.4 9.5 30.4 32.6 22.3 
Retained Income 2.1 2.4 2.4 2.4 4.6 0.4 0.5 0.2 22.9 21.1 12 
Depreciation 6.4 6.8 5.3 2.2 9.4 16.3 17 9.3 7.5 11.5 10.3 
External Finance 91.5 90.8 92.3 95.4 86 83.3 82.6 90.5 69.6 67.4 77.7 
Long-term Finance 45.1 44.6 39.2 35.4 36.7 55.3 48.5 70.7 42.4 21.4 43.6 
Equity Finance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 54 0 0.3 11.6 
Bonds 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bank Loans 14.8 16.3 10.5 6.6 1.5 1.1 0.8 0.2 0 0 1.3 
Foreign Loans 9.8 9.5 9.6 8.2 6.2 18.4 15.6 2.7 2.4 7 6.7 
Finance Lease 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 13.4 0.4 3.4 
Hire Purchase 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 12.8 0 3.1 
Other sources 20.4 18.8 19.1 20.6 29 35.9 32.2 13.7 13.7 13.7 17.4 
Short-term Finance 46.4 46.2 53.1 60 49.3 28 34.1 19.8 27.2 46.1 34.1 
Bank overdraft 2 4 3.5 6.8 5.2 5.7 7.7 4.4 6.2 16.1 8.6 
Bank Acceptance 10.3 12.3 8.4 12.5 6.3 3.5 2.9 3.3 0 0 2.3 
Trade Credit 11.5 16.9 29.3 25.5 20 17.6 16 7.3 14.2 24.5 16.8 
Other S/Term Sources 22.7 13.1 11.8 15.1 17.8 1.3 7.5 4.7 6.8 5.4 6.4 
Source: Own calculations based on company accounts 
123 
Chapter 5 The Determinants of Capital structure Choice in 
Zimbabwe 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the major determinants of capital structure choice of the 
Zimbabwean corporate sector. Although the capital structure literature has identified 
macroeconomic factors and firm characteristics as the major determinants of capital 
structure decisions, this study considers only company attributes as potential 
determinants of corporate capital structure. 
The chapter is divided into three empirical sections. The first section examines capital 
structure decisions across the three regimes discussed in chapter 1. The main objective 
of the analysis is to investigate whether there is a structural change in capital structure 
choice following changes in government policy. The second section examines the 
impact of agency variables on capital structure decisions and in this case, both static 
and dynamic models of capital structure are estimated. The third empirical section of 
the chapter compares the financial behaviour of firms that consolidate financial 
statements and those that do not. A summary of the chapter is presented in section 5. 
5.2 The Reform and capital structure choice's 
The main objective of this section is to investigate whether there is a structural change 
in parameters of the capital structure equation in response to changes in government 
policies (regimes). In particular we aim to investigate whether the determinants of 
capital structure are sensitive to changes in government policy. There are reasons to 
believe that capital structure determinants have changed over time. Firstly, the 
government by liberalising the economy (including financial reform) may have 
motivated firms to use more equity finance or debt finance depending on which form 
of finance is more attractive. Secondly, changes in corporate tax, and investment tax 
credits introduced in 1980 and 1992 might have an impact on firms' decision to 
borrow, as suggested in the literature. Third, we have documented in the previous 
chapter that capital structure ratios and firm attributes have significantly changed 
across the repressive and liberalised regimes. Therefore our aim in this section is to 
14 This section is a revised and extended version of Mutenheri and Green (2003) 
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investigate whether there are significant differences in the estimated intercept as well 
as slope parameters of the capital structure regression equation by disaggregating the 
data by time periods (regimes). 
The empirical approach that we adopt in this section is to first of all, test for structural 
change in the parameters of the capital structure equation. If there is evidence to 
suggest that coefficients of the variables have shifted, then the capital structure model 
is re-estimated, taking into account of the changes in these parameters. 
5.2.2 The Empirical Model and Estimation Issues 
The capital structure model takes the form 
yit =a+x (3+ t 
5.1 
with 
where y;, is the debt ratio, defined as total debt scaled by book equity, x is a vector 
of determinants that vary across firms and over time. These variables are size, tax, 
tangibility, liquidity, profitability, growth, and non-debt tax. The error term Pit, is 
decomposed into a firm specific component il i, a time specific component, X1 and a 
component that varies across firms and over time, u; t and a, ß, are parameters to be 
estimated. 
The definitions of the explanatory variables and the expected signs are presented in 
table 5.1 below. Thus, according to the expected signs shown in table 5.1 we test 
whether debt ratio is positively correlated with proxies for tangibility, tax and firm 
size. On the other hand, debt ratio is hypothesised to be negatively correlated with the 
proxy for non-debt tax. However, the hypothesised relationship between debt ratio 
and profitability, liquidity and growth could be positive or negative depending on the 
theoretical model under consideration. Thus the empirical results will help us to 
identify the theoretical model applicable to emerging markets. These variables, 
however, have been extensively used in empirical studies of capital structure yet there 
is still controversy on the hypothesised signs. 
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In this section, we estimate a model of capital choice using a balanced sample of 32 
firms, each with data for the entire period 1975 to 1999. As discussed in the 
methodology chapter, our model of capital structure can be estimated in several ways. 
However in this section we choose to estimate the model by OLS and two way fixed 
effects methods. These regression techniques are based on the assumption that the 
slope coefficients are stable over the period of estimation. However, in the present 
study such an assumption is most likely to be violated since the data set is drawn from 
firms that have operated from three dramatically different regimes. Therefore, an 
econometric issue that needs to be addressed is the possibility of parameter structural 
shift. Thus an issue of interest is whether a single regression equation will adequately 
describe the capital structure decision across the three regimes. The procedure that we 
adopt is to estimate four regressions using OLS method. For the first regression we 
use data for the entire period, 1975 to 1999. The other three regressions use data from 
each of the regime, 1975 to 1979,1980 to 1991 and 1992 to 1999. If we find evidence 
of structural change a fifth regression model, which allows for changes in coefficients, 
will be estimated. 
The F test statistic (Chow test) has been widely used to test for structural change in 
OLS regressions. Thus for the purpose of testing for evidence of structural change we 
employ OLS method that ignores firm and time effects in panel data. We will also 
assume that the disturbance variances of the three regressions are drawn from the 
same distribution (Greene p. 292). Furthermore, we assume that the change to a new 
regime is discrete rather than gradual. Thus, we assume that the relationship between 
leverage and its determinants is fairly stable over the period 1975 to 1979, changes in 
1980 and becomes stable up to 1991, changes again in 1992 and becomes stable up to 
1999. 
The null hypothesis that we wish to test is that there has been no structural shift 
against the alternative that there have been three distinctly different structures 
separated by two transitional periods in 1980 (independence) and 1992 (the reform 
programme). Empirical evidence of structural change would validate the importance 
of government policy in influencing corporate financial policy. 
Our starting point is to estimate the following restricted model 
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debt;, =a0 +a, Size +a2Tax+a3Tangib+a4liquidity+a5 Profit 5.2 
+a 6Growth +a7 
Nondebt + v; t 
This model assumes equality of both intercepts and regression slopes across the three 
regimes. 
The second model is less restrictive. It allows for a different intercept across the 
regimes but maintains a common slope vector. This relationship is captured by the 
following equation 
debt1, = ap +aindep +areform +a, Size+a2Tax+a3Tangib+a4liquidity+a5 Profit 5.3 
+a6 Growth +a7 Nondebt + v;, 
The third model allows intercepts and regression slopes to vary across the three 
regimes. This is the same as estimating three equations one for each regime as shown 
below 
debt 
wJ =a 
UDI + a; 'Size +a2 D' Tax +a u)' Tangib +aä D1 liquidity +aS n' Profit 5.4 
Growth + a; D1 Nondebt +v UDI 
debt =a 
Indep +a 
Indep Size +a Indep Tax + CC 
Indep Tan gib +a 
Indep liquidity + cc 
'""P Pr of lt 
Indep 012345 
+a6 d'P Growth + a; d`P Nondebt + v, naep 
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debt =aR`r°"" +aR`f°"° Size+aR`f°"" Tax+aR`f°r' Tan ib+aR`f°"" liquidity +aR`f°"" Profit s Re form 0123g4 
+ab`f°"" Growth+a; `f°"" Nondebt+vý 
In order to choose the best model to capture the process underlying the data, we can 
employ an F test to test for (1) differential regressions (intercepts and slopes), (2) 
differential intercepts only and (3) differential slope vectors. We use residual sum of 
squares from models 1 (RSS1), 2 (RSS2) and 3 (RSS3) and the associated degrees of 
freedom are n-k, n-k-1 and n-pk respectively 15. Table 5.2 presents the three null 
hypotheses that we wish to test and the associated formula for the F test. 
Table 5.2 Testing for structural change (chow test) 
Null Hypothesis Comment F Statistic Critical values ((F0,99)) 
a UDI = «' Indep =a Re form 9 
Equality of intercepts and slopes FI =4.40 F (16,776) =2.04 
P 
UDI Indep -P Re form 
a UDI 
a' Indep = 
a' Re form 2 
Equality of intercepts F2 =20.0 F (2,790)=4.61 
(ý 
UDI 
P 
Indep 
P 
Re forth 
Equality of slopes F3 =3.30 F (7,776) =2.04 F' 
The first computed F statistic (F, ) is a test for the null hypothesis that the regression 
coefficients are stable across the regimes against the alternative that there is a 
significant structural change in response to changes in regimes. The computed F 
statistic is 4.40 and is greater than the critical value of 2.04 at the 1 percent level and 
thus rejecting the null hypothesis that coefficient vectors have not changed over time. 
The second F statistic (F2) tests for structural change in the intercept assuming a 
common slope vector across the regimes. The computed F statistic is 19.97 compared 
to the critical value of 4.61 and thus rejecting the null hypothesis. The third F statistic 
(F3) is a test for the null hypothesis that slope coefficients are the same across the 
regimes conditional on differential intercepts. The computed F statistic is 3.30 
compared to 2.04, which again rejects the null hypothesis. 
'SRSS3 is the sum of residuals from the three separate equations, K is the number of estimated 
parameters and p is the number of periods. 
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The above F statistics therefore, suggest that there was a structural shift in the process 
underlying capital structure decisions of listed firms in Zimbabwe for the period 1975 
to 1999. We can therefore conclude that all or some of the coefficients have changed 
in response to changes in economic regimes and the next logical procedure is to 
investigate which coefficients vary across the regimes. 
The regression results for four equations (model 1 and model 3) are reported in table 
5.3 below. The results show that the parameter estimates of these regressions are not 
only different in magnitude but also in some cases in the signs. 
Table 5.3 Capital structure, OLS Results 
Variable Modell UDI Independence Reform 
(1975-99) (1975-79) (1980-91) (1992-99) 
Constant 0.2197 0.3590 0.3409 -0.3357 
(5.51) (2.55) (3.48) (4.000) 
Size -0.0029 0.0017 -0.006 0.0399 
(0.861) (0.120) (0.706) (5.96) 
Taxation -0.0004 -0.0933 -0.0004 -0.0467 
(1.15) (1.81) (0.903) (1.81) 
Tangibility 0.0532 -0.0258 -0.0358 0.0057 
(1.48) (0.332) (0.526) (0.116) 
Liquidity -0.0210 -0.0580 -0.0571 -0.0072 
(3.94) (3.83) (3.21) (1.51) 
Profitability . -0.1885 -0.3110 -0.1367 -0.1543 
(2.98) (1.77) (1.39) (1.84) 
Growth 0.0254 0.0754 0.0192 0.0086 
(1.30) (1.80) (0.612) (0.323) 
NDT 0.0704 -0.0630 0.1871 0.2201 
(0.364) (0.155) (0.530) (0.868) 
R2 0.05 0.20 0.04 0.18 
Wald (joint) 38.54 38.41 14.65 55.31 
[0.00] [0.000] [0.041] [0.000] 
Notes 
In parentheses are absolute t-statistics values 
In square brackets are p-values 
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We use interaction variables to test for stability of individual coefficients over time. 
The three dummy variables D UDI ,D Indep and D re form of model 
3 help to capture the 
effects of UDI, Independence and reform regimes respectively. Each of these dummy 
variables is interacted with each of the explanatory variables. In the first step 
DPI acts as the reference period such that the Independence and the Reform effects 
are relative to the UDI period. Treating D. )I as the reference period the following 
equation is estimated. 
Debt =a UDI 
+ 
((X 
Re form -a UDI 
)D 
Re form 
+ 
(a 
Indep - (X UDI 
) 
Indep 
+N 
UDI 
1j X 5.5 
+ 
(' 
Re form -f UDI 
)D 
Re form 
X+ 
(P 
Indep - 
I3 
UDI) Indep 
ZX+V 
Thus the significance of each of these parameters as indicated by t statistics, is of 
economic interest. For example, if the coefficient of the interaction of liquidity and 
DRe form (liq(reform)) 
is found to be statistically significant, this would mean that the 
coefficient on liquidity is not the same during UDI and reform periods and thus 
making the pooled OLS inappropriate to estimate the capital structure model. 
However, the above specified equation tests for differences in parameter estimates 
between UDI and each of the other two regimes. Therefore in order to test differences 
in coefficients between Independence and Reform periods we estimate the following 
interaction equation. 
Debt 
-a Indep 
+ \(X Re form -a Indep)D Re form 
+ 
(a' 
UDI -a Indep 
)D 
Indep + 
Pindep X+ 
0Reform 
- 
ßIndep»Re 
forth 
X+0 
UDI - 
PIndep»UDI Y. X+V5.6 
The above equation shows that the independence period is the reference period 
therefore the estimation results from these two equations will help us to test for the 
equality of regression coefficients in the three regressions of the three regimes. 
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The estimation results from the above equations are reported in table 5.4. First we 
compare the coefficients of independence and UDI regressions. The null hypothesis is 
that the coefficient vectors are the same in the two periods (Independence and UDI). 
The results in the first row show that the coefficient on taxation is significantly 
different between Independence and UDI periods and the differences in all other 
coefficients are insignificantly different from zero. These results, thus, suggest that 
the change in Government tax policy in 1980 had an impact on corporate financial 
behaviour. 
Table 5.4. Testing for structural change (dummy variable approach) 
Parameter 
Dummy Size Taxation Tangibility Liquidity Profitability Growth NDT 
Indep vs UDI -0.0184 -0.0076 0.0930 -0.0099 0.0005 0.1677 -0.0557 0.2606 
(0.114) (0.482) (1.88) (0.102) (0.0246) (0.877) (-1.13) (0.515) 
Reform vs -0.6947 0.0382 0.0466 0.0315 0.0507 0.1567 -0.0668 0.2831 
UDI (4.07) (2.38) (0.791) (0.327) (3.22) (0.789) (1.28) (0.565) 
Reform vs -0.6762 0.0458 -0.0464 0.0414 0.0502 -0.0110 -0.0110 0.0225 
Indep (4.93) (4.03) (1.45) (0.476) (2.90) (0.0800) (0.252) (0.050) 
Notes 
In parentheses are absolute t-statistics values 
Rows 2 and 3 of table 5.4 show that the Reform equation has intercept, size and 
liquidity estimates that are significantly different from the Independence and UDI 
periods. On the other hand the empirical tests show that the relationship between 
leverage and each of the tangibility, profitability, growth and non-debt tax variables is 
fairly stable across the three regimes. 
The above simple tests suggest evidence of a structural change in estimated 
coefficients on tax, size and liquidity across the regimes and in order to incorporate 
this into our model, we interact the independence dummy with tax variable 
(tax*Indep), and the reform dummy with size (size*Reform) and liquidity 
(liq*Reform) variables. In this way tax*Indep allows the effect of tax on leverage to 
be different during the independence period. The coefficient measures to what extent 
the effect of corporate tax is different for the independence period in comparison with 
the reference period, being UDI and reform periods. In the same way size *reform and 
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liq*reform allow the effect of size and liquidity to be different during the reform and 
the coefficients measure the extent to which the effects of size and liquidity are 
different for the reform regime in comparison with the reference period, being UDI 
and independence periods. 
The equation with interaction terms is estimated as a two way fixed effects model. 
This model assumes that the unobservable firm and time effects are significant. Thus 
the model allows for differential intercepts and slope vectors for tax, size and 
liquidity, but assumes a common slope vector for tangibility, profitability, growth and 
non-debt tax. We use the F-test to test for the significance of firm and time effects and 
the results of the F-tests are reported in table 5.5. 
The results show that for the four regression equations, the null hypothesis that firm 
capital structure decisions are not influenced by the unobservable firm-specific and 
time-specific effects factors is rejected at the 1 per cent level of significance. 
Therefore the methodology adopted in this section is appropriate since it controls for 
the effects of these unobservable factors (e. g management attitude, macroeconomic 
shocks and financial market changes). Thus, we re-estimate the capital structure 
equations by two way fixed effects estimator. Since we have controlled for differences 
in intercepts and slope coefficients, in this section, our discussion of capital structure 
decisions is primarily based on the regression results of the sample data set 1975 to 
1999. The estimation results are presented in table 5.6 and we now turn to a 
discussion of these results. 
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Table 5.5 Test of significance of firm and time effects 
Null Hypothesis Test Statistic Statistic Distribution P-Value 
Panel A; Entire period 1975- 
99 
Firm and Time effects 0 629.3 2 0.00 X56 
Firm effects 
Time Effects 
Panel B; UDI period 1975-79 
Firm and Time effects 
Firm effects 
Time Effects 
Panel C; Indep. period 1980- 
91 
Firm and Time effects 
Firm effects 
Time Effects 
Panel D; Reform period 1992- 
99 
vi =1,... 32 
dt=1,.... 25 
tl i=0 
532.9 2 X 0.00 
`d = 1,... 32 
31 
71 
t=0 
66.54 
x24 0.00 
vt=1,.... 25 
%t=0 711.7 X36 0.00 
vi = 1,... 32 
vt=1,.... 5 
i=0 
659.9 
x 3z 0.00 
t1 = 1,... 32 
I, 
t=0 
37.81 
xä 0.00 
dt =1,.... 5 
=0 667.4 71i = 
X, 
x2 0.00 43 
vi =1 .... 32 
Vt =1 ..... 12 
0 625.1 X32 0.00 
V, =1 .... 32 
%t =0 36.50 x2 0.00 
V, =1,.... 12 
Firm and Time effects Il; = X, =0 310.6 x3 0.00 
di=1,... 32 9 
V, =1,.... 8 
Firm effects 0 268.7 2 0.00 
X32 tf 1,... 32 
Time Effects x=0 22.57 
x 0.002 
Vt =1,.... 8 
7 
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Table 5.6 Regression Results. Two Way Fixed Effects 
Variable Modell 
(1975-99) 
Model 2 
(1975-99) 
UDI 
(1975-79) 
Independence 
(1980-91) 
Reform 
(1992-99) 
Constant -0.1181 0.0885 0.1575 -0.7067 0.3437 
(1.08) (0.747) (0.694) (3.26) (1.31) 
Size 0.0256 0.0108 -0.0096 0.1010 -0.0283 
(2.11) (0.842) (0.393) (4.31) (1.22) 
Taxation -0.0006 -0.0367 0.0222 -0.0006 -0.0320 
(2.04) (1.67) (0.790) (2.26) (1.57) 
Tangibility 0.0923 0.0672 -0.2215 -0.0516 0.1212 
(2.05) (1.49) (2.81) (0.709) (1.77) 
Liquidity -0.0199 -0.050 -0.0356 -0.0610 -0.0045 
(4.48) (5.32) (4.01) (3.87) (1.17) 
Profitability -0.2231 -0.2230 -0.02466 -0.2535 -0.1696 
(3.91) (3.93) (0.216) (3.27) (2.10) 
Growth 0.0287 0.0282 0.0102 -0.0012 0.0315 
(1.74) (1.73) (0.424) (0.0510) (1.50) 
NDT 0.2499 0.2076 -0.2044 0.8368 0.2403 
(1.20) (1.01) (0.720) (1.72) (1.02) 
Size(Reform) - 0.0267 - - - 
(3.02) 
Liq(Reform) - 0.0375 - - 
(3.59) 
Tax(Indep) 0.0362 
(1.65) 
RZ 0.47 0.48 0.89 0.67 0.65 
Wald (joint) 69.9 94.01 26.64 61.08 14.31 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.046] 
Wald (dummy) 629.3 618.5 763.4 667.4 310.6 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Wald (time) 66.54 84.56 19.42 36.50 22.57 
[0.00] [0.000] [0.001] [0.00] [0.002] 
Notes 
In parentheses are absolute t-statistics values 
In square brackets are p-values 
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5.2.3 Discussion of Results 
Size 
The coefficient on size has the expected positive sign. For the model without the 
interaction terms (model 1), the relationship between leverage and firm size is 
significant at the 5 per cent level. However, adding interaction variables to model 1 
renders this relationship insignificant. However, the variable size*reform, which is the 
interaction of firm size and reform dummy is positively related to leverage at the 5 per 
cent level. This shows the importance of firm size to debt market accessibility after 
the implementation of the reform programme. Therefore, the estimation results 
support the hypothesis that firm size has a positive impact on borrowing decisions and 
this is consistent with the empirical findings of Firth (1995) and Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), among others. 
Taxation 
Although the estimated coefficient on the tax variable is significantly different from 
zero in both models, it has an unexpected sign and has a relatively small magnitude. 
The negative relationship between the tax rate and the debt ratio is consistent with the 
findings of Hussain and Nivorozhkin (1997), Lowe et al (1998) and Booth, et al 
(2001), but inconsistent with the empirical work of Homaifar et al (1994) and Jahera 
and Llyods (1996). 
Tangibility 
The tangibility variable has the expected positive sign in models 1,2 and reform 
equation. For the other two periods, UDI and Independence, tangibility has a negative 
sign. At the 5 per cent level, tangibility is significantly different from zero in model 1, 
independence and reform equations. The positive sign of the coefficient on tangibility 
would suggest that firms with more fixed assets tend to borrow more, which is 
consistent with the predictions of theory, as suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
or Williamson (1988). On the other hand, the negative sign of the coefficient on 
tangibility in the pre-reform period would suggest that firms with more fixed assets 
tend to borrow less. A possible explanation for this relationship is that the variable 
may be a proxy for the non-debt tax shields of Zimbabwean firms rather than a 
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measure of asset specificity. In Zimbabwe, in the pre-reform regime, a wide range of 
fixed assets used to qualify for a Special Initial Allowance which allows 100% first 
year depreciation of fixed assets for corporate tax purposes. Companies that acquired 
fixed assets used to enjoy a substantial tax shelter, which in turn would reduce the 
taxable income that could be shielded by debt. Thus, purchases of fixed assets may 
tend to dominate the tangibility ratio and also the tax shields enjoyed by Zimbabwean 
firms during that time. The reform programme has reduced the number of fixed assets 
qualfying for the Special Initial Allowance. 
Therefore, the results from model 1 and the post-reform equation are consistent with 
the view that tangible assets act as colletarals, implying that firms with more tangible 
assets can borrow more than firms with few tangible assets (Rajan and Zingales, 
1995). Thus we find evidence to support the view that tangible assets mitigate the 
various costs (agency and bankruptcy costs) associated with the use of external 
finance. This suggests that the Zimbabwean financial sector, small as it is, is only 
willing to give finance to firms with more tangible assets. Thus we can predict that 
firms that are mainly involved in Research and development have less chance of 
getting loans from banks as compared to firms in the mining sector. 
Liquidity 
The coefficient on liquidity is negative and significantly different from zero. This 
negative relationship between leverage and liquidity implies that firms in Zimbabwe 
use liquid assets to finance their investments. In model 2, interacting liquidity with the 
reform dummy leads to a positive coefficient of 0.0375. consequently, the coefficient 
on liquidity during the reform period is -0.0125 which is smaller in magnitude to - 
0.050 before the reform period. Thus the use of liquid assets to finance investment 
was more pronounced under the repression period than under the liberalised financial 
system. This suggests that Zimbabwean firms face cash flow problems when 
financing investment projects. This is also consistent with the prediction of the 
pecking order theory that firms consider internal finance first before contemplating on 
borrowing. The negative relationship between liquidity and leverage is also in line 
with the empirical work of Ozkan (2001) and Ngugi (2002) for UK and Kenyan firms 
resepectively. 
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Profitability 
The estimated coefficient on profitability is negative and significantly different from 
zero at the 1 per cent level. This finding is consistent with predictions of the pecking 
order hypothesis and the empirical work of Hall et al (2000), Colombo (2001) and 
Bevan and Danbolt (2002). Thus firms may prefer internal finance because it is the 
cheapest form of financing investments. In the Zimbabwean context, firm ownership 
and control is in the hands of relatively few institutions, therefore the preference for 
internal financing strategically prevents dilution of existing shareholder claims. 
Another possible explanation is that firms heavily rely on internal finance because 
external capital markets are not easily accessible to most firms. Firms may also be 
found to rely on internal funds because of management's desire to maintain financing 
flexibility and reduce monitoring by outsiders. These econometric results are 
consistent with previous findings that internal finance contributes 25 % of corporate 
financing in Zimbabwe and also that it is costly to borrow since interest rates are 
extremely high in the range of 56-78%. 
Growth 
The estimated coefficient on growth variable is positively related to leverage but is 
significant only at the 10 per cent level. Although there is weak evidence of a positive 
relationship, these results contradict the theoretical predictions and other empirical 
studies that have found a negative and significant relationship (see for example, 
Barclay, et al 1996 and Gul, 1999). The positive relationship between leverage and 
growth in assets suggests that high growth firms borrow more to finance investments. 
This suggests that although firms prefer internal finance they eventually consider 
external financing when retained earnings are exhausted. Therefore, in this context the 
financial sector plays an important role in the financing of the firms' investment 
growth. 
Non-debt tax 
The estimated coefficient on nondebt tax shield variable, in the reform equation, 
models 1 and 2, is positive but insignificantly different from zero. A weak positive 
relationship between leverage and nondebt tax shield is, however found in the 
independence regression. Although the coefficient on non-debt tax is negative in the 
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UDI regression the relationship is insignificantly different from zero. Therefore we 
can conclude that for the Zimbabwean corporate sector nondebt tax shields do not 
play an important part in influencing firm behaviour. Thus, our results do not support 
DeAngelo and Masulis' (1980) hypothesis that non-debt tax shields negatively affect 
corporate financing decisions. The previous studies that do not find a significant 
influence of non-debt shields on firms' leverage ratios include Titman and Wissels 
(1988) and Homaifar et al (1994). However, the insignificant relationship between 
leverage and non-debt tax shields may be due to depreciation being a poor proxy for 
non-debt tax shield. We will consider an alternative measure of non-debt tax shield in 
the next sub-section below. 
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5.3 Agency Factors and capital structure Decisions 
5.3.1 Introduction 
As discussed in chapter two, the corporate finance literature suggests that agency 
factors are important determinants of capital structure decisions. Furthermore, the 
empirical literature suggests that these agency factors are proxied by ownership 
concentration, size of board of directors, state ownership, family ownership, 
managerial ownership and institutional ownership (Crutchley and Jensen, 1996, 
Wiwattanakantang, 1999 and Wen et al, 2002). However, the empirical results are 
inconclusive and it is also not clear whether agency factors are important in the 
context of emerging markets. Most studies using data from developing countries have 
not analysed the impact of agency factors on capital structure decisions due to data 
unavailability. However, in the Zimbabwean case, data on managerial and 
institutional ownership is available from 1995. Therefore in this section, we 
investigate the impact of agency factors on capital structure decisions over the period 
1995-1999. We estimate both the static and dynamic models and also consider 
alternative definitions of variables. 
5.3.2 Static Model 
In the empirical literature defining leverage and its determinants has always been a 
controversial issue. The debate on definitions of debt ratios is centred on whether to 
use market or book value of both debt and equity. Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue 
that `the extent of leverage- and the most relevant measure- depends on the objective 
of the analysis' p. 1427. In addition Bevan and Danbolt (2002) have examined the 
sensitivity of capital structure determinants to various measures of leverage and their 
sub-elements in the UK. Their findings suggest that both magnitudes and signs of 
coefficients are highly sensitive to alternative measures of leverage. Sweeney et al 
(1997), however, argue that the theory of capital structure is in terms of market rather 
than book value of debt. 
In this section we use five alternative measures of leverage to examine the capital 
structure of listed firms in Zimbabwe. The first measure of leverage, debt to total 
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assets, is defined as the ratio of total interest bearing debt to total assets. This is a 
broad definition of leverage and has been extensively used in the capital structure 
empirical literature. The second definition, book debt-equity is the ratio of total 
interest bearing debt to book equity. Although few researchers have used this measure 
in empirical studies, this is the mainly used measure of leverage in Zimbabwe 
(company reports and stock market reports). The third measure, book debt-capital, is 
defined as total interest bearing debt divided by the sum of book equity and interest 
bearing debt. Fourth, market debt-equity, is defined as the ratio of total interest 
bearing debt to market value of equity. The final measure of leverage is market debt 
capital which is defined as the ratio of total interest bearing debt to the sum of market 
value of equity and total interest bearing debt. These definitions and references cited 
are presented in table 5.8a. 
Our objective in this section is twofold. First, we want to examine the extent to which 
each of these measures of leverage, as defined above, can be explained by the firm 
characteristics suggested in the literature. Second, we examine the sensitivity of (signs 
and magnitudes) capital structure factors to alternative measures of leverage. In order 
to achieve these objectives we estimate the empirical model presented in the previous 
section (equation 5.1): 
5.3.2.1 Data and estimation issues 
We use data from a sample of 51 firms spanning over the period 1995-99 to 
understand capital structure decisions in Zimbabwe. The process of selecting the 51 
companies is summarised as shown below. 
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Firms listed on the Zimbabwe stock exchange in 1999 66 
Less 
Firms listed for less than 3 years -3 
Less 
Financial Firms -8 
Less 
Firms for which annual reports could not be found -3 
Less 
Firms reporting in currencies other than Zimbabwean dollars -1 
Final sample 51 
In selecting the factors affecting capital structure decisions we initially tried 15 
determinants and for each of these determinants we considered several different 
definitions. In the first stage of the estimation procedure we computed a correlation 
matrix and deleted all the determinants that had correlation coefficients of more than 
0.6 among themselves. Determinants with correlation coefficient of less than 0.1 with 
each of the determinants were also deleted. This procedure left us with 11 potential 
determinants of capital structure decisions and the definitions of these variables are 
presented in table 5.7b below. Tables 5.8 and 5.9 respectively show descriptive 
statistics and the correlation matrix of variables that are used in this section. 
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Table 5.7(a) Definitions of leverage 
Definition Acronyms Reference 
Total borrowing (book value) BDR Wald (1999), 
total assets (book value) Wiwattanakantang 
(1999) 
Total borrowing(book value) BDER Browne (1994) 
Shareholders funds(book value) Chen et at (1998) 
Total borrowing (book value) BDCR Hirota (1999) 
Total borrowing (book value)+ Shareholders funds(book value) Jordan et at (1998) 
Total borrowing (book value) MDER Chen et at (1998) 
Shareholde rs funds (market value) Prasaad et at (2001) 
Total borrowing (book value) MDCR Adedeji (1998) 
Total borrowing (book value+Shareholders funds(market value) Wiwattanakantang 
(1999) 
Notes 
BDR- Book Debt Ratio 
BDER- Book Debt Equity Ratio 
BDCR- Book Debt Capital Ratio 
MDER- Market Debt Equity Ratio 
MDCR- Market Debt Capital Ratio 
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Table 5.7 (b) definitions of explanatory variables 
Definition Reference 
dividends Payout Allen and Mizuno (1989) 
income attributab le to shareholde is 
Adedeji (1998) 
Fixed assets Tangibility Chung (1998) 
Total Assets Colombo (2001) 
Friend and Lang (1988) 
Tax paid Tax Jahera (1996) 
net income before tax Wansely (1996) 
total sales Size Shuetrim et al (1993) log 
( 
GDP deflator 
Net profit defore int Brest and tax (NIBIT ) Profitability Firth (1995) 
Total assets Hall et al (2000) 
current assets Liquidity Ozkan (2001) 
current liabilitie s 
Growth Green et al (2002) 
NIBIT Retained income 
Book Equity 
( 
NIBIT - Taxation 
defered tax 
total assets 
shares traded 
market capitalisa tion 
total shares held by insiders 
total number of floated company shares 
total shares held by largest single shareholder 
total number of floated company shares 
Non-debt tax 1)Wald (1999) 
Titman and Wisselss 
(1988) 
2) Bennet and Donnelly 
(1993) 
Stock liquidity 
Insider ownership Jahera (1996) 
Largest Jong(2001) 
shareholder 
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Table 5.8 Descriptive statistics 
Mean Std dev. Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
Debt-total assets 0.1501 0.1190 0.0013 0.6933 1.1923 1.9176 
Book debt-equity 0.3075 0.3108 0.0023 1.7954 1.8488 4.1434 
Book debt-capital 0.2014 0.1476 0.0023 0.6423 0.7418 -0.1836 
Market debt-equity 0.4947 0.6889 0.0013 4.2432 2.3687 6.4287 
Market debt-capital 0.2409 0.2119 0.0013 0.8093 0.8875 -0.3287 
Tangibility 0.4802 0.1960 0.0827 0.9482 0.1420 -0.663 
Profitability 0.1544 0.1041 -0.3194 0.5228 -0.3100 3.7858 
Tax 0.2428 0.1706 -0.2501 0.9646 0.1492 1.0696 
Non-debt tax 0.0826 0.0684 0 0.3949 1.0513 1.7937 
Payout 0.3097 0.1859 -0.2108 0.9408 0.2411 0.5552 
Growth 0.1966 0.1786 -0.1475 1.0620 1.488 3.1842 
Size 6.7721 1.0703 3.2066 9.1800 -0.4087 0.4309 
Stockliq 0.1122 0.1452 0.0012 1.3405 4.5311 29.694 
Liquidity 1.6042 0.5750 0.1204 4.1676 0.9082 1.3726 
Insider 0.0624 0.1428 0.00 0.7298 2.8223 7.6390 
Largest 0.4376 0.1838 0.0676 0.8500 0.1728 -0.6431 
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The first estimation issue that we need to address before choosing an estimator for our 
equation, is whether firm and time effects are significant. If both effects exist, then 
the best estimator is the two way fixed effects, as done in section 5.2 above. If either 
of these effects does not exist, then the model is estimated by a one way fixed effects 
(within) estimator. However, if both effects are insignificant, OLS becomes the best 
estimator. 
The results of the tests for firm and time effects shown in table 5.10 below, suggest 
that firm effects are significant for all the five equations. Thus, the null hypothesis 
that firm effects do not exist is rejected for all the five equations. Although time 
effects are insignificant in equations where leverage is defined in terms of book value, 
they are found to be significant in the two equations where leverage is in terms of 
market value. Therefore the null hypothesis that the time effects do not exist is 
rejected for the market leverage equations, but cannot be rejected for the three book 
leverage equations. Thus the three book leverage equations can be estimated as a one 
way fixed effects model, while the two market equations can be estimated as a two 
way fixed effects model. However, the within transformation sweeps the firm and 
time effects and therefore we choose the 2 way within estimator as the best estimator 
of equation 5.716 
16 The equation may also be estimated by the two way random effects model, but for consistence sake 
we use the within estimator throughout in this chapter. 
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Table 5.10 Tests for firm and time effects. 
F-Test Statistic 
x2 P-Value 
Panel A; debt-total assets 
Firm and Time effects 
Firm effects 
Time Effects 
Panel B; Book Debt-equity Ratio 
Firm and Time effects 
Firm effects 
Time Effects 
Panel C; book debt-capital 
Firm and Time effects 
Firm effects 
Time Effects 
Panel D; market debt-equity 
Firm and Time effects 
Firm effects 
Time Effects 
442.8 55 0.00 
432.9 50 0.00 
5.772 4 0.217 
371.8 55 0.00 
367.2 50 0.00 
4.212 4 0.378 
397.3 55 0.00 
397.4 50 0.00 
2.733 4 0.603 
172.4 55 0.00 
153.1 50 0.00 
12.29 4 0.015 
Panel C; market debt-capital 
Firm and Time effects 249.6 55 0.00 
Firm effects 216.6 50 0.00 
Time Effects 17.21 4 0.002 
Notes 
For the firm and time effects the null hypothesis is V1 =1....... 51 
`.. 1,....... 5 
For the firm effects the null hypothesis is 
11 '0 
V; =1,...... 51 
For the time effects the null hypothesis is 
ýt =0 
Vt =1........ 5 
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Since our aim is to examine the extent to which the leverage ratios can be explained 
by the 11 firm characteristics, we adopt a two step estimation procedure. Firstly, we 
estimate the general model including all the 11 explanatory variables. In the second 
step, all insignificant variables are eliminated one by one in each equation in order to 
get the specific model (the general to specific approach). The results from this two 
step procedure are reported in table 5.12 
The results reported in table 5.12b show that not all of these 11 determinants (for 
example, growth and size) have a significant effect on capital structure decisions. 
More importantly the magnitudes of the parameter estimates are very sensitive to 
alternative definitions of leverage. Some factors are important in explaining capital 
structure decisions when leverage is in terms of book value rather than market value 
and vice versa. 
Table 5.12 (b) shows estimation results after deleting insignificant variables in each of 
the five regressions and we now turn to the discussion and the interpretations of 
results. The discussion, however, shall be short since the results for liquidity, tax, 
growth and profitability are qualitatively similar to those presented in section 5.2. 
5.3.2.2Discussion of estimation results 
Tangibility 
Tangibility is inversely related to all measures of leverage. This relationship is, 
however not significant in the debt-asset equation. Therefore, we have found evidence 
that tangibility is negatively correlated with debt-equity (capital) ratios, regardless of 
whether the ratio is measured in terms of book or market value. These results are, 
however, inconsistent with the theoretical predictions of Williamson (1988) and 
empirical findings in the previous section. A possible explanation might be due to the 
difference in sample sizes and estimation period. During the 1995-99 period, 
tangibility might be a proxy for non-debt tax shield rather than a proxy for asset 
structure. 
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Capital structure regression Results: Static Model 
Table 5.12 
(a) General model (b) Specific model 
Variable BDCR BDER BDR MDCR MDER BDCR BDER BDR MDCR MDER 
Tangibility -0.2927 -0.6504 -0.0632 -0.3195 -0.9259 -0.2966 -0.6541 - -0.3547 1.0777 
(3.84) (4.05) (1.00) (2.52) (2.04) (4.15) (4.09) (3.02) (2.55) 
Profitability -0.2580 -0.7274 -0.1085 -0.3290 -0.6263 -0.2576 -0.7355 -0.0893 -0.3636 -0.5987 
(2.96) (3.96) (1.51) (2.27) (1.21) (3.05) (4.07) (1.46) (2.99) (1.20) 
Tax -0.1305 -0.3076 -0.1178 -0.1520 -0.5557 -0.1333 -0.3134 -0.1109 -0.1779 -0.5750 
(2.73) (3.05) (2.98) (1.91) (1.95) (2.87) (3.19) (2.89) (2.36) (2.08) 
NDT -0.2079 -0.5889 -0.2312 -0.1171 -0.8795 -0.2091 -0.5921 -0.2680 - - 
(1.27) (1.70) (1.70) (0.429) (0.9000) (1.30) (1.72) (2.05) 
Payout -0.0210 -0.0230 -0.0418 -0.1514 -. 5815 - - -0.0488 -0.1343 -0.6223 
(0.533) (0.276) (1.28) (2.30) (2.48) (1.62) (2.24) (2.73) 
Growth 0.0571 0.1409 0.0205 -0.0536 -0.4496 0.0672 0.1506 - - -0.4263 
(1.05) (1.23) (0.458) (0.594) (1.39) (1.31) (1.39) (1.33) 
Size 0.0117 0.0590 -0.0071 0.0371 0.1560 0.0614 - - - 
(0.490) (1.18) (0.362) (0.938) (1.10) (1.25) 
Stockliq. 0.0760 0.3606 0.0910 0.1032 0.0227 0.0708 0.3577 0.0931 - - 
(1.45) (3.25) (2.09) (1.18) (0.0724) (1.37) (3.25) (2.16) 
Liquidity -0.0866 -0.1680 -0.0722 -0.0684 -0.2096 -0.0879 -0.1683 -0.0666 -0.0748 -0.2244 
(5.98) (5.50) (6.02) (2.83) (2.43) (6.22) (5.53) (6.19) (3.21) (2.66) 
Insider -0.3171 -1.0793 -0.2249 -0.1884 -0.9284 -0.3059 -1.0648 -0.2308 - -1.0138 
(2.44) (3.94) (2.09) (0.869) (1.20) (2.43) (3.97) (2.19) (1.35) 
Largest 0.1582 0.3947 0.1949 0.1926 0.6915 - 0.3938 0.1853 - - 
(0.927) (1.10) (1.38) (0.678) (0.680) (1.10) (1.40) 
R2 0.31 0.39 0.30 0.18 0.17 0.31 0.39 0.30 0.17 0.16 
X2(I 1) 82.96 117.6 79.16 40.42 36.75 82.48 118.1 78.64 37.56 35.12 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Notes 
In parentheses are absolute t-statistics values 
In square brackets are p-values 
Profitability 
The coefficient on profitability is negative in all equations. The magnitude of the 
coefficient estimate for profitability attribute is largest in the debt-equity equation (- 
0.74) and least in the debt-asset equation (-0.09). However, at the 10 per cent level, 
this relationship is significantly different from zero in 3 equations, namely book debt- 
equity, debt-capital and market debt-capital. Thus we do not find empirical evidence 
of pecking order financing for the broad measurement of debt and market debt-equity. 
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Tax 
The regression coefficients for the effect of tax on corporate leverage are negative and 
statistically significant in all equations. This suggests that firms employ more debt in 
their capital structures when the tax rate decreases. Thus our results contradict the 
Modigliani and Miller (1963) hypothesis that the corporate taxation has a positive 
impact on firm borrowing decisions. However, the negative relationship between the 
corporate tax rate and leverage is still consistent with the findings of Krishman and 
Moyer (1996), Wansely (1996) and Jordan et al (1998), among others. In Zimbabwe, 
the negative relationship could be attributable to an expectation effect induced by 
government policy. The corporate tax rate was reduced every year from 1995-1999. 
Companies would therefore have had an incentive to bring forward tax shelters as 
much as possible to maximise their tax benefits prior to the next cut. Thus successive 
tax cuts would be associated with increases in debt ratios as firms expected further tax 
cuts in the future. 
Non-debt tax 
The coefficient estimates for the non-debt attribute are negative in all equations, but 
statistically significant in the book debt-equity and debt-asset equations. Thus, the 
results show that non-debt tax is not correlated with market leverage. The negative 
effect of non-debt tax on capital structure decisions is consistent with the theoretical 
prediction but differ from the empirical findings of the previous section. A possible 
explanation is that in this section we have employed a better proxy for non-debt tax 
shields. The results suggest that firms with more non-debt tax shields have low 
leverage ratios and these results are consistent with the finding of Bennet and 
Donnelly (1993) who use the same definition of non-debt tax shield. 
Payout 
The results indicate that there is a negative relationship between the payout ratio and 
all types of debt. However, at the 10 per cent level, this relationship is significant 
when leverage is defined in terms of book value. Thus we find no significant 
relationship between payout and market leverage. Allen and Mizuno (1993) and 
Adedeji (1998) also do not find a significant relationship between leverage and payout 
ratio for Australia and UK respectively. 
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Growth 
The coefficient for the growth variable is positively correlated with book leverage, but 
inversely correlated with market leverage. However, this relationship is not significant 
even at the 10 per cent level. Therefore, we do not find evidence to support the 
argument that firm growth opportunity has an impact on corporate borrowing 
decisions. Other studies that do not find a significant influence of growth 
opportunities on leverage include Bennet and Donnelly (1993) and Boyle and Eckhold 
(1994). However, previous studies by Ozkan (2002) and Bevan and Donbolt (2002) 
use the same definition but report a significant negative influence of growth on 
leverage. Thus, although previous studies have supported the prediction that high 
growth firms borrow less, in the Zimbabwean case the results suggest that leverage is 
independent of firm growth opportunities. 
Size 
Although the sign of the size variable has the expected positive sign in 4 out of 5 
equations it is insignificant in all equations. Our results, therefore, show that the size 
of the firm has no significant impact on borrowing decisions. Thus the results are 
inconsistent with the results reported in the previous section and previous studies by 
Shuetorim et al (1993) and Homaifar et al (1994), among others. A possible 
explanation may be attributable to differences in sample sizes employed in this 
section and the previous one. 
Stock liquidity 
The results show that the relationship between stock liquidity and two of the book 
leverage ratios (debt-equity and debt-asset) is positive and significant. Thus firms 
borrow more during the time when their stock prices are rising. 
Liquidity 
We find a significant inverse relationship between liquidity and all types of book and 
market debt ratios. This finding supports the prediction that firms use liquid assets to 
finance growth. This is consistent with the findings of Ozkan (2002) and Ngugi 
(2002) and the results reported in the previous section, using a sample of 32 firms. 
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Insider ownership 
Our results show that insider ownership has a significant inverse relationship with 
book value debt ratios. Thus, as predicted, firms with a substantial managerial 
ownership have lower debt levels. These results are consistent with the findings of 
Friend and Lang (1988), Jensen et al (1992) and Firth (1995), among others. 
However, the results contradict the empirical work by Wansley (1996) who report a 
positive relationship between leverage and insider ownership for US firms. The 
results are also inconsistent with the findings of Jahera and Lloyds (1996) and 
Wiwattanakantang (1999) who do not find a significant influence of insider ownership 
on leverage. 
Largest 
The regression results show that in all regressions, the variable largest is insignificant 
and thus concentration of ownership as proxied by percentage ownership of largest 
shareholder does not have an impact on corporate capital structure decisions. 
5.3.3. The Dynamic Model 
The static model assumes that adjusting leverage towards the optimal capital structure 
is costless. However, in the presence of adjustment costs there is a possibility that 
there is a lag in adjusting towards the desired leverage ratio (Myers, 1977, Fischer et 
al, 1989). Do Zimbabwean firms adjust to their new desired capital structure 
immediately as assumed in the previous capital structure model? In this section, we 
use a dynamic adjustment model and panel data methodology on a sample of 
Zimbabwean firms to examine the determinants of a time-varying optimal capital 
structure. The sample period is from 1995 to 1999. The empirical model is stated as 
follows. 
Yu = ýyi't-l + Wit + Ili +, 
%t + u;, 5.7 
where y;, is the debt ratio, xit is a matrix of determinants that vary across firms and 
over time, rl; is a firm specific component, 
% is a time specific component, and, u; t is 
a stochastic error term, ß are parameters to be estimated and 4 (where; 0S45 1) is 
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one less the speed of adjustment. In the absence of adjustment costs, 4 will be equal to 
zero. In other words, the absence of adjustment costs means that the actual level 
adjusts to the desired level instantaneously. It can be seen that the set of right hand 
variables now include a lagged dependent variable. The assumptions underlying the 
above model are that, the error term is serially uncorrelated, N (the number of firms) 
is large while T (period of time) is small. In addition firm effects are assumed to be 
correlated with the lagged debt ratio. Therefore, the OLS estimator of the above 
parameters is inconsistent since the lagged dependent variable is positively correlated 
with the error term due to the presence of the firm effects. Nickel (1981) demonstrates 
that the within estimator does not remove the correlation between the transformed 
lagged dependent variable and the error term. Thus the within group estimator is also 
inconsistent in estimating dynamic panel data models. Bond (2002) argues that 
parameter estimates from OLS and within estimators are biased upwards and 
downwards respectively. 
Instrumental variable estimation methods have been suggested in the econometric 
literature to be suitable for estimating dynamic panel data models. Anderson and 
Hsiao (1981,1982) have suggested a first differenced two stage least squares (2SLS) 
estimator. Recent developments include the GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond 
(1991). 
To check for the potential misspecification of the model, we report 6 test statistics. 
The first Wald statistic (Waldl) tests for the joint significance on all regressors, 
except the dummy variables, under the null of no relationship between the dependent 
and the explanatory variables. The Wald test 2 statistic tests for the significance of all 
dummies (constant and time dummies). The Wald test 3 statistic tests for the 
significance of the time dummies. The fourth test statistic is the Sargan test of over- 
identifying restrictions, which tests for the validity of the instruments. The null 
hypothesis is that there is no correlation between instruments and error term, which 
means the instruments used are valid. Finally we report two F test statistics for 
autocorrelation. The first F statistic tests for first order autocorrelation under the null 
hypothesis of no serial correlation. The second F statistic tests for second order 
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autocorrelation of residuals under the null hypothesis of no second order serial 
correlation. 
We use the GMM estimator to estimate the above dynamic model by considering two 
sets of right hand variables. Firstly, the set of right hand variables is comprised of the 
lagged debt ratio and the company characteristics considered in section 5.3. The 
regression results of which are presented in table 5.12 (a) below. This approach is 
similar to Guha-Khasnobis and Bhaduri (1998) and Miguel and Pindado (2001), 
However, this is not the only approach (see, Bamerjee, 2000, Bevan and Danolt, 
2000, for other approaches). 
Capital structure GMM Regression Results: Dynamic Model 
Table 5.13a, n=51 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
Debt j 
0.4445 23.9 
Tangibility -0.3481 7.47 
Profitability -0.6543 5.41 
Tax -0.2606 6.08 
Growth 0.0690 2.24 
Liquidity -0.1210 9.52 
Largest -0.1072 5.70 
Constant 0.6995 13.6 
Wald 1 (joint) 4124[0.00] 
Wald 2 (dummy) 201.8[0.00] 
Wald 3 (time) 64.43[0.00] 
Sargan test 42.74[0.396] 
F Test 1 -3.279[0.001] 
F Test 2 0.8114[0.417] 
The second approach that we use in this study is to include the lagged dependent and 
independent variables as well as the firm characteristics in the set of regressors. 
Although this approach is common in other research areas it was used by Ozkan 
(2001) in the capital structure literature. In this case our second approach is to re- 
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estimate the model with these regressors. However we restrict ourselves to the first 
lag of each variable. The regression results from this approach (model 2) are 
presented in table 5.12 (b) below. 
Table 5.13b n =51, Capital structure GMM Regression results; dynamic model 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
Debt 1 
0.3808 15.6 
Tangibility -0.4060 9.42 
Profitability -0.5443 4.71 
Taxation -0.2734 5.02 
Stockliq 0.2378 3.62 
stockliq, _, 
-0.1335 4.05 
Liquidity -0.1347 7.29 
Insider -0.6909 5.81 
insider, 
_, 
0.6769 4.65 
Largest 0.7580 6.16 
1 arg est t_, -0.8110 
7.07 
Constant 0.7014 11.00 
Wald 1 4223[0.00] 
Wald 2 543.3[0.00] 
Wald 3 59.75(0.00] 
Sargan test 40.51 [0.737] 
F Test 1 -3.302[0.001] 
F Test 2 1.172[0.241] 
The regression results from models 1 and 2 show that the misspecifications tests, 
discussed above, are all satisfied in both models. The Wald statistic for the joint 
significance of regressors, is significant, in both models, even at the 1 per cent level. 
Although time dummies are jointly significant at the 1 per cent level, the t statistics 
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for the three years 1997,1998 and 1999 show that it is the year 1998 only that has a 
significant coefficient. The Sargan tests for both models are insignificantly different 
from zero and thus leading us to accept the null hypothesis that the variables used as 
instruments in the GMM estimation are appropriate. As expected the F tests for first 
order autocorrelation in residuals provide evidence of negative first order serial 
correlation. However, the F tests for second order autocorrelation are positive and 
insignificant at any conventional level of significance. 
The GMM estimates show that most of the estimated coefficients have similar signs 
but different magnitudes to the results from the static model. The estimated coefficient 
for the lagged leverage is positive and highly significant in both models. The 
estimated speed of adjustment factor towards the optimal capital structure that is 
defined as (1-4) is higher in model 2 (0.62) than in model 1 (0,56). Thus we find 
evidence of the existence of transaction costs. The estimated speed of adjustment 
costs in model 1 is similar to that of the UK corporate sector as reported by Ozkan 
(2001). However, Miguel and Pindado (2001) report an adjustment factor of 0.79 for 
the Spanish data. Guha-Khasnobis and Bhaduri (2000) report values of 0,62 and 0,23 
for short term and long term leverage respectively. 
A possible explanation for the differences in these factors is probably due to different 
measures of leverage employed in the specific country. For example, in the Spanish 
study leverage is defined as, "the ratio between the market value of long term debt 
and the market value of equity plus the market value of long term debt" Miguel and 
Pindado (2001) p. 85. We now turn to a discussion of the estimates of the exogenous 
variables. 
The coefficient on tangibility is negative and significant in both models and as 
discussed in section 1, above, this is contrary to Williamson's (1988) hypothesis that 
firms with more tangible assets use them as collateral. The coefficient on profitability 
is also negative and statistically significant. Thus we find evidence for pecking order 
financing for both static and dynamic models. The magnitude of the coefficient on the 
tax variable in model 1 is comparable to that of model2. The relationship between tax 
and leverage is negative and significant. Thus we find evidence that corporate tax has 
a negative impact on borrowing decisions, a result contrary to the Modgliani and 
Miller's (1963) prediction. 
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For the dynamic model 1 we find evidence that growth has a positive impact on 
capital structure decisions. This relationship is insignificant in the static model, 
therefore by estimating a dynamic model we have been able to find evidence of the 
impact of growth opportunities on leverage. Stock liquidity has a positive effect on 
borrowing decisions (model 2). However, the lagged stock liquidity coefficient is 
negative such that the overall effect although still positive is reduced from 0,24 to 
0,11. The results show that liquidity in both models has a negative impact on leverage. 
Insider ownership negatively related to leverage while lagged inside ownership is 
positively related to leverage. The overall effect in the dynamic model is -0,01 
compared to -1,06 in the static model. The relationship between largest and leverage 
is negative in model 1 but positive in model 2. However in model 2 the lagged largest 
is negative such that the overall effect is negative (-0.05) which is half of the 
coefficient of reported in modelt (-0.11). 
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5.4 Differences in Financial behaviour of holding and non-holding 
firms in Zimbabwe 
5.4.1. Introduction 
This section examines the financial behaviour of holding and non-holding firms in 
Zimbabwe over the period 1994-99. A common feature of medium and large firms 
around the world is that they own and control one or more other companies and are 
therefore under an obligation to report consolidated financial statements aimed at 
presenting a true and fair view of the financial position and performance of the parent 
company and its subsidiaries. However, in some countries, medium scale firms are 
exempted from the requirement to produce consolidated accounts and it therefore 
implies- that companies which report consolidated accounts (here after holding 
companies) are larger and more diversified than the ones that report individual 
accounts (here after non-holding companies). 
In their study of capital structure, Raj an and Zingales (1995) find that firms that report 
consolidated accounts in Japan and Germany have much higher leverage ratios than 
firms that do not. Furthermore, they report that firms that consolidate are bigger and 
less profitable than companies that do not. This, therefore, suggests that the financial 
behaviour of holding (firms that consolidate) and non-holding (firms that do not 
consolidate) firms is different. In other words, the financial behaviour of firms that we 
observe depends, to a greater extent, on whether a firm is a holding company or not. 
Therefore, econometric investigation of firm behaviour should take these differences 
into account. 
Dividing companies into holding and non-holding, therefore, raises the following 
interesting question: is the financial behaviour (in terms of balance sheet 
characteristics, debt policy, dividend policy, profitability, growth opportunities) of 
holding and non-holding companies the same? 
The business strategy and organisation structure literature tends to suggest that 
holding and non-holding companies behave in different ways. The literature on 
business strategy has suggested theoretical arguments for corporate diversification and 
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merger, namely the market power, resource and agency views (see, Montgomery, 
1994). The first two views are consistent with profit maximisation behaviour while 
the third view suggests that the motive for diversification is management empire 
building. In this case, if diversification has an impact on financial performance and 
reputation of firms, then we would expect capital structure decisions of holding and 
non-holding companies to differ significantly. 
5.4.2. Data 
The main aim of this section is to compare the financial performance and capital 
structure decisions of holding and non-holding firms listed on the Zimbabwe stock 
exchange over the period 1994-99. This period is chosen mainly because it is the 
period after economic liberalisation, where the decision to acquire and dispose 
subsidiaries could easily be implemented. Holding companies listed on the 
Zimbabwe stock exchange are required to report consolidated balance sheets, profit 
and loss accounts and cash flow statements, in addition to the balance sheet of the 
parent company. These holding companies normally have 100 % equity stake in 5-15 
other companies. However, it is the holding company that is listed on the stock market 
and by 1999, no subsidiary company was listed on the stock market. 
From the sample of 51 companies that we have, some firms started as non-holding 
companies in 1994, but acquired other firms after one or two years. On the other hand, 
some started as holding companies but later on disposed the subsidiaries after one or 
two years. All these firms, 4 in total, were deleted from the sample and therefore 
leaving a sample of 47 firms which could consistently be classified as holding or non- 
holding. Out of these 47 firms, 29 companies are classified as holding, while the 
remaining 18 are classified as non-holding. The 29 holding companies were ranked 
according to the number of subsidiaries that they control. We then selected the first 18 
companies with the highest number of subsidiaries. The main reason for selecting the 
first 18 fines is to increase the gap, in terms of size, between the two groups of firms. 
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5.4.3. Descriptive statistics 
Our first objective is to investigate whether holding companies consistently out- 
perform their non-holding counterparts or vice versa. In view of this aim 12 measures 
of accounting performance are calculated: The first group of ratios compare the 
relative profitability of holding and non-holding companies. These are return on 
capital employed (ROCE), operating profit margin (OPM) and turnover of net assets 
(SC). Return on capital employed is the ratio of operating income to net assets. 
Operating profit margin is defined as the ratio of operating income to sales and the 
turnover of net assets ratio is calculated as sales divided by net assets. The turnover of 
asset ratio is complemented by the ratio of sales to shareholders' equity (SFA). 
The second group of ratios measure the relative solvency of holding and non-holding 
companies in terms of total debt, long-term debt and short-term debt divided by total 
shareholders' equity. We have used the debt-to-equity ratio because this is the mainly 
used measure of solvency in Zimbabwe. We also computed the current ratio (CR), 
defined as current assets divided by current liabilities, in order to compare the 
liquidity positions of these firms. Other ratios computed are the tax and investment 
ratios, calculated as ratio of tax paid to operating income and capital expenditure to 
net assets respectively. We also calculated a measure of size, namely the natural 
logarithm of total assets (size). The definitions of these ratios are presented in table 
5.13 below. 
Table 5.13 Definition of firm performance ratios 
1. Net income before interest and tax divided by net assets ROCE 
2. Net income before interest and tax divided by sales OPM 
3. Sales divided by net assets SC 
4. Sales divided by shareholders' funds SFA 
5. Total interest bearing debt divided by shareholders' funds TD 
6. Long term interest bearing debt divided by shareholders' funds LTD 
7. Short term interest bearing debt divided by shareholders' funds STD 
8. Tax divided by net income before interest and tax Tax 
9. Capital expenditure divided by net assets Invest 
10. Current ratio divided by current liabilities CR 
11. Log (total assets) Size1 
12. Log (sales) Size2 
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We first computed weighted averages of each of these ratios for holding and non- 
holding firms in each year and then for the whole period (1994-99). The main aim is 
to compare at aggregate level the financial performance of these two groups of firms. 
We examine whether there is a significant difference between their means and 
medians. 
The results from the univariate analysis are summarised in tables 5.15(a)- (c) and 5.16 
below. Tables 5.15(a), (b) and (c), respectively, show the aggregate financial 
performance of all, holding and non-holding companies in each year and for the 
whole period. 17 
17 These ratios are weighted averages. 
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Table 5.15 presents a comparison of firm characteristics for holding and non-holding 
firms. To measure the significance level of the differences, we use a two tailed t-test 
(t-statistic) and a nonparametric Mann-Whitney test (Z-score). The results show that 
there are several similarities between holding and non-holding firms. Profitability, tax 
paid and tangibility of these firms are very close. 
However, the mean debt-equity ratio, 0.29 for holding firms is significantly different 
from 0,21 for the non-holding firms. This finding is in line with the results of Rajan 
and Zingales (1995) for Japan and Germany. 
Table 5.15 Differences in financial ratios of holding and non-holding firms in Zimbabwe (1994-1999) 
Holding companies 18 Non-holding Companies Significance 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
LEVERAGE 0.2924 0.2868 0.2148 0.2106 2.172 -2.082 
(0.055) (0.037) 
PAYOUT 0.3508 0.3722 0.3768 0.4260 -0.545 -2.882 
(0.598) (0.004) 
SIZE2 16.855 16.7632 15.9093 15.9151 2.257 -1.761 
(0.048) (0.078) 
PROFIT 0.142 0.1318 0.1488 0.1342 -0.286 -0.320 
(0.781) (0.749) 
PRMG 0.1109 0.1093 0.1747 0.1754 -3.847 -2.722 
(0.003) (0.006) 
SC 1.8612 1.8206 1.2224 1.1164 2.839 -2.082 
(0.018) (0.037) 
SFA 2.5431 1.4606 1.4846 1.3263 3.482 -2.242 
(0.006) (0.025) 
CASH 0.007517 0.06977 0.004809 0.04419 3.218 -2.402 
(0.009) (0.016) 
LIQUIDITY 1.4143 1.4071 1.6984 1.7213 -3.776 -2.562 
(0.004) (0.010) 
TANGIBILITY 0.5596 0.567 0.5371 0.5346 0.544 -0.480 
(0.598) (0.631) 
TAX 0.2579 0.2446 0.2777 0.2778 -0.705 -1.281 
(0.497) (0.200) 
INVEST 0.156 0.1484 0.1296 0.1353 2.172 -1.601 
(0.055) (109) 
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The results for the dividend payout ratio are mixed. Using the parametric test, the 
results suggest that the payout ratios of holding firms are not statistically different 
from their non-holding counterparts. The nonparametric test, however, shows that 
non-holding firms have higher payout ratios. 
We also find statistical evidence to support the view that firms that consolidate are 
larger than firms that do not. The results also show that there is a significant 
difference in cash flow between holding and non-holding firms. Holding firms have 
higher mean/median cash flows (0,008/0,07) than non-holding firms (0,005/0,04). 
However, the liquidity position of non-holding firms is better than that of holding 
firms. The mean current ratio of non-holding firms is 1,7, compared with 1,4 for 
holding firms. This difference is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level of 
significance. Finally, the results show that, there is a significant difference in the 
amount spent on investment by the two groups of firms. Capital expenditure for 
holding firms is higher, though the level of significance is statistically weak. The 
mean capital expenditure for holding firms is 0,16 compared to 0,13 for non-holding 
firms. 
5.4.4. Capital structure of holding and non-holding firms 
To further understand the effect of consolidation on corporate financial behaviour, we 
estimate the capital structure model. The major objective is to investigate whether the 
determinants of financial structure of holding firms differ significantly from their non- 
holding counterparts. In this regard, we estimate the following regression model: 
Yjt =a+xiºß+µst 
5.8 
with µ;, _ Ili + X, + v; t 
where y;, is the debt ratio, defined as total debt scaled by book equity, x;, is a vector 
of determinants that vary across firms and over time. These variables are payout, 
tangibility, tax, profitability, growth, liquidity and size. The error term pit, is 
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decomposed into a firm specific component iii, a time specific component, ! and a 
component that varies across firms and over time, o;, and a, ß, are parameters to be 
estimated. 
First we use ordinary least squares to investigate whether coefficient estimates of the 
regressions for the two groups of firms are significantly different. A Wald test, under 
the null hypothesis that parameter estimates in the two regressions are similar, is 
employed to test this hypothesis. The Wald test is valid if the two samples are 
reasonably large and independent. In small samples the Wald test has the undesirable 
property that it too often rejects the null hypothesis. ( see, Greene, 2000). Following 
Greene (2000), suppose OH and 0,, H, are parameter estimates from holding and non- 
holding regressions with covariance matrices VH and VN, _, respectively. 
Then, the null 
hypothesis that the two coefficient vectors have the same expected value implies that 
E[OH - A,, H] =0 and 
E[OH - ONH 
]Z = VH + V, J, i VH+ VNH . Thus the Wald test 
statistic, w=(0H - eNH) 
(VH + V,, ý,. i -' (eH - e, xk , where k is the number of 
parameters estimated. This Wald test statistic for the regression results presented in 
table 5.16 is 51.3664 with a p-value of 0.000. Thus, this statistic rejects the hypothesis 
that the coefficient vectors are the same in the two regressions. 
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Table 5.16 OLS results and Wald test statistics 
Variable All firms Holding 
firms 
Non-holding 
firms 
Wald test 
statistics 
Constant -0.4339 0.2440 -1.0623 12.6655 
(1.24) (0.5139) (2.77) (0.0004) 
Payout 0.0561 0.0018 0.1737 0.0749 
(1.36) (0.0311) (1.99) (0.7844) 
Tangibility -0.5147 -0.7322 -0.3019 7.9615 
(2.49) (3.31) (1.91) (0.0048) 
Tax -0.0143 -0.1368 -0.0076 17.2802 
(3.48) (1.16) (1.00) (0.000) 
Profitability -0.6422 -1.3482 -0.4265 17.3946 
(2.20) (2.45) (1.70) (0.000) 
Growth 0.0245 0.1327 -0.0032 20.3554 
(0.831) (1.32) (0.080) (0.000) 
Liquidity -0.0673 -0.2142 0.0440 9.7355 
(1.49) (3.37) (0.993) (0.0018) 
SIZE I 0.0852 0.0716 0.1012 10.8597 
(4.26) (2.05) (3.80) (0.0010) 
R2 0.20 0.27 0.25 - 
(7) 78.69 25.97 23.19 - 
[0.00] [0.001] [0.002] 
Notes 
In parentheses are absolute t-statistics values 
In square brackets are p-values 
However, as argued above, the regression results in table 5.17 are based on an 
estimator that ignores firm and time specific effects. Therefore the next procedure is 
to test for the significance of these effects, the results of which are presented in table 
5.17. These results show that firm effects are significant while time effects are not. 
We therefore re-estimate the capital structure equations by an estimator that takes into 
account firm effects. In this section we choose the within estimator and the regression 
results for all, holding and non-holding companies are presented in tables 5.18 a, b, 
and c respectively. 
169 
Table 5.17. Tests for the significance of firm and time effects 
Null hypothesis Test statistic Statistic distribution p-value 
Panel A; All companies (n=36) 
Firm and Time effects 11. -0 - 
137.0 2 x40 0.00 
V; =1,... 36 
.. =1,.... 5 
Firm effects Tj, =0 
137.5 2 X35 0.00 
d; =1,... 36 
Time Effects =0 1% t- 
1.994 2 x4 0.737 
dt =1,.... 5 
Panel B; Holding companies 
Firm and Time effects %t =0 34.01 z 0.049 ýi =t x22 
V; =1,.... 18 
.. =1,.... 5 
Firm effects Il. =0 34.80 ý7 0.010 
V; =1...... 18 
Time Effects ). 
t =01.064 0.900 
`d, =1,.... 5 
Panel C; Non-holding companies 
Firm and Time effects 1_ %t =0 183.1 z 0.00 "- x22 
`d; =1,..... 18 
Vt =1,.... 5 
Firm effects 11. _0 176.6 0.00 
d; =1,... 18 
7 
Time Effects 1t _04.571 0.334 
dt =1,.... 5 
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Table 5.18 (a) Regression results from within estimator. (All companies, n= 36) 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
Payout -0.0415 1.53 
Tangibility -0.4414 1.84 
Tax -0.0129 3.29 
Profitability -0.7766 2.83 
Growth 0.0608 2.16 
Liquidity -0.1447 2.96 
SIZE I 0.0422 1.53 
R2 0.17 
% (7) 
39.40 
(0.000) 
Table 5.18 (b) Regression results from within estimator (Holding companies, n= 18) 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
Payout -0.0489 3.47 
Tangibility -0.7829 2.26 
Tax -0.0542 1.47 
Profitability -2.4675 4.71 
Growth 0.2282 4.07 
Liquidity -0.2068 4.70 
SIZE I 0.0761 2.12 
R2 0.28 
xI ý7ý 
87.88 
(0.000) 
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Table 5.18 (c) Regression results from within estimator (non-holding companies, n= 18) 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
Payout 0.017780 0.286 
Tangibility -0.5362 1.50 
Tax -0.0057 2.34 
Profitability -0.3942 1.63 
Growth 0.0196 2.13 
Liquidity -0.0880 1.52 
SIZE I 0.0074 0.209 
R2 0.22 
X2 (7) 240.00 
0.000 
It is evident that there are substantial differences between estimates from holding and 
non-holding companies regressions. The regression results presented in table 5.18 b 
(holding companies) show that 4 out of 7 variables have the expected signs and only 
one variable (tax) is insignificant. In fact the signs of the variables are not different 
from the results reported in the previous two sections. We find that payout, tangibility, 
profitability and liquidity have negative effect on borrowing decisions, while growth 
and size have a positive impact. 
On the other hand, the results in table 5.18 c (non-holding firms) show that 3 out of 7 
variables have the expected signs and 4 variables (payout, tangibility, liquidity and 
size) are insignificant. Profitability and growth are the two variables that are 
significant in both regressions. Although, they have similar signs in both regressions 
of interest, their magnitudes are quite different. The coefficient on profitability in the 
holding equation is -0.9675 compared with -0.3942 in the non-holding equation. The 
coefficient on growth is 0.2282 in the holding equation, in comparison with 0.0196 in 
the non-holding equation. This shows that profitability and growth are sensitive to 
firm type. 
The regression results in table 5.18 c show how regression results can be distorted by 
ignoring differences in firm reporting styles (consolidation or not). For example, in 
the non-holding equation payout and size have very small magnitudes, 0.0178 and 
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0.0074 respectively, that are not significant. However, in the holding regression 
equation payout and size have significant coefficients with magnitudes of -0.0489 and 
0,0761 respectively. Combining the two groups of firms, results in insignificant 
coefficients of -0.0415 and 0.0422. 
5.5. Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter a model of capital structure was estimated. The first empirical issue 
(section 1) was to investigate whether there was a structural change in parameters of 
the capital structure model. Using interactive regime dummies we found empirical 
evidence to suggest that the impact of taxation on corporate capital structures shifted 
in 1980. A possible explanation is that the government, with the aim of redistributing 
income, significantly changed the tax system in 1980. A document, known as `growth 
with equity' was produced in 1980, which resulted in tax rates reaching the highest 
levels in Zimbabwean history. The results also indicate that the effect of liquidity and 
firm size on capital structures during the reform was significantly different from the 
other two regimes. The results from the two way fixed effects estimator show that 
size, tangibility and growth have a significant positive impact on leverage, while 
taxation, liquidity and profitability have an inverse effect. Thus the proposition of 
Modigliani and Miller (1963) that higher tax rates encourage borrowing is not 
supported by the Zimbabwean data. The results, however, support the pecking order 
hypothesis as suggested by Myers (1984). The results also support the prediction of 
Williamson (1988) that firms with tangible assets should be able to support more debt. 
We do not find empirical evidence to support DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1980) 
hypothesis. 
In order to check for robustness of the results from our capital structure model, in the 
second section, we re-estimated the model with more firms (51 firms) but 
concentrating on a shorter period (1995-1999). Using the recent developments in the 
econometric literature, we estimated a static and dynamic model of capital structure. 
For the static model, we experimented with 5 alternative measures of leverage and 
judging from the adjusted R-squared, the results show that the ratio of total liability to 
book equity is a better proxy for leverage in Zimbabwe. This is in line with the 
observation that, this measure is widely used in Zimbabwe. The results from the static 
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model also show that the major determinants of capital structure are tangibility, 
profitability, taxation, non-debt tax shield, stock liquidity, liquidity and insider 
ownership. Only stock liquidity has a positive impact on leverage ratio. Tangibility, 
profitability, taxation, non-debt tax shield, liquidity and insider ownership, on the 
other hand, adversely affect the decision to borrow. Thus the results from the static 
model support the following hypotheses: (i) the pecking order hypothesis that firms 
prefer internal financing to external financing, (ii) the trade-off hypothesis that non- 
debt tax shields reduce the expected gains from leverage, (iii) firms use liquid assets 
to finance investments and (iv) the agency cost hypothesis that increasing managerial 
ownership helps to align the interests of managers and shareholders and therefore 
reduces the role of debt as an agency-conflict mitigating factor. 
On the other hand, the results do not support the two trade-off hypotheses: (i) firms' 
collateralisable assets provide security to lenders in the event of financial distress, and 
(ii) corporate taxation encourages corporations to finance their investments by debt. 
Finally the regression results show that payout ratio, firm growth, firm size and 
blockholders do not have a significant influence on corporate capital structures in 
Zimbabwe. 
The empirical results from the dynamic model seem to suggest that firms in 
Zimbabwe have long-run target leverage ratios and adjust to this ratio at a relatively 
fast rate. The results also provide evidence of a negative relationship between 
leverage and tangibility, a result contrary to the theoretical prediction. The results also 
do not support the expected effect of taxation on capital structures. However, the 
results show that firms prefer internal finance to external finance as predicted by the 
pecking order hypothesis. Capital market conditions captured by the stock liquidity 
variable has a positive impact on leverage, possibly reflecting the view that firms float 
their shares in order to be famous (if their shares perform very well) and thus enabling 
them to borrow more. However, past stock liquidity adversely affects leverage. 
Liquidity has a negative effect on leverage, maybe firms use liquid assets to finance 
investments. Insider ownership adversely affects borrowing decisions and a possible 
explanation is that firm managers dislike debt financing since it increases firm risk. 
However past insider ownership has a positive impact on leverage. 
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In the third section, we have compared the financial performance and capital structure 
decisions of holding and non-holding listed firms in Zimbabwe over the period 1995 
to 1999. The descriptive statistics show that profitability, tax paid and tangibility of 
these firms are very close. However, there are significant differences in leverage, size, 
cash flow, liquidity, and capital expenditure between holding and non-holding firms. 
The results from the Wald test statistics suggest that the determinants of capital 
structure decisions differ significantly between the two groups of firms. The results 
from the within estimator show that 6 out of 7 determinants significantly explain 
variation in leverage ratios across holding firms, while only 3 out of the 7 variables 
are important in explaining capital structure decisions of non-holding firms. This 
implies that the variables suggested in the finance literature as major determinants of 
capital structure are more applicable to larger firms rather than small firms. 
Thus the results discussed above, show that using different estimation period and 
sample size and even disaggregating data does not change the relationship between 
leverage and profitability, tax and liquidity. 
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Chapter 6- Dividend Policy and Behaviour in Zimbabwe 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter extends the empirical literature on corporate dividend policy practices in 
emerging markets by investigating the major determinants of dividend decisions of 
listed firms in Zimbabwe. The firm's liquidity position, cash flow and profitability 
have long been regarded as the key determinants of dividend policy (Linter, 1956, 
Darling, 1957 and Brittain, 1966). These studies have shown that when a firm faces 
financial constraints, managers are most likely to limit the growth of dividends since 
cash dividends can only be paid out of profits rather than out of paid up capital. 
Consistent with this prediction, the recent research in empirical finance has 
documented a strong influence of firm annual loss and cash flow on firms' dividend 
behaviour (see, Charitou, 2000). Annual loss has been shown to have a strong negative 
impact on the level of dividend payment and the decision to pay dividends. 
On the other hand, empirical evidence documents a positive relationship between cash 
flow and dividend payout ratio. Furthermore, the finance literature argues that firms 
constrained from obtaining external finance, because of asymmetric information 
problems, will heavily rely on internal funds to finance investment and dividends and 
will consequently maintain low dividend payout policies (Vogt, 1994). Tax and 
agency factors have also been found to have a great influence on dividend policy (see 
Allen and Michaely, 1995). However, these findings are inconsistent with the Miller 
and Modigliani's (1963) irrelevant theorem. 
Dividend policy literature to date (see Lease, et al, 1999) suggests that dividend policy 
decisions tend to occur at discrete intervals, especially in countries like Zimbabwe, 
where dividends are paid twice per year. Furthermore, there has been little attempt in 
the literature to identify potential determinants of five related decisions: decision to 
pay, omit, increase, maintain or reduce dividends. It is, therefore, possible to gain 
some insights into the dividend policy decision if discrete choice methodology is 
employed to investigate the key determinants of these five decisions. 
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The major objectives of this section are twofold: first, to document the pattern and 
evolution of dividend policy in Zimbabwe over the past 25 years; second, to 
empirically investigate the main determinants of dividend policy of the Zimbabwean 
corporate sector over the past 5 years. The empirical evidence we provide in this 
section is an attempt to answer the following questions: (i) what percentages of firms' 
profits are paid out as dividends and how does this pattern of dividend payout 
compare with evidence from developed countries; (ii) is there a significant change in 
aggregate payout ratios across the three economic regimes; (iii) what determines the 
level of dividends firms pay; (iv) what determines the firm's decision to pay and not 
pay (omit) dividends; (v) what determines the firm's decision to increase maintain and 
reduce dividends. 
The rest of the section is structured as follows. In section 2 we empirically examine 
the patterns of dividend payments. In section 4 we present econometric evidence on 
dividend behaviour and section 5 concludes. 
6.2 Empirical Dividend Patterns of Zimbabwean firms 
6.2.1 Historical payment of dividends 
The main aim of this section is to document the historical pattern and evolution of 
dividends of listed firms in Zimbabwe for the period 1975 to 1999. The data is 
obtained from financial statements (balance sheets, Profit and Loss account and cash 
flow statements) of non-financial firms listed before 1975. All companies that have 
been de-listed or with incomplete data set were excluded resulting in a sample of 32 
companies. This represents about 90 % of non-financial companies listed before 1975 
and whose shares are still traded on the Zimbabwe Stock exchange. 
The first step in the research is to test the universally accepted hypothesis that 
dividend payments are smoother than earnings. In order to test this hypothesis we 
computed standard deviations of dividend payments and after tax profits, dividend per 
share, and earning per share series. These results were supplemented by time series 
plots of dividend per share and earning per share. 
The descriptive statistics reported in table 6.1 indicate that dividends are less volatile 
than earnings. 
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Fable 6.1 Descriptive statistics 
Mean Maximum Minimum Standard dc% iation 
-------- Dividend(1975-99) 315731 --- - 1814911 - -- 14668 462907 
Profit(1975-99) 791449 5913139 19854 1328275 
Dividend per share (1975-99) 21 77 8 16 
Earnings per share( 197 5-99) 47 207 11 43 
Pay out ratio( 1975-99) 40 74 31 13 
Pay out ratio( 1975-79) 56 74 47 7 
Pay out ratio( 1986-90) 36 42 33 10 
Pay out ratio( 1995-99) 38 58 31 11 
The standard deviation is Z$463 thousand for dividends, compared to Z$1328 
thousand for after tax profit. The standard deviation of dividend per share is 16'%,, 
which is smaller than 43% of earnings per share. Dividend yield has a smaller 
standard deviation (2%) than earnings yield (10'%)). 
Fig 6.1 
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Figure 6.1 shows the time series of dividend per share and earnings per share between 
1975 and 1999. It is evident that the dividend per share series is less volatile than the 
earnings per share series especially before 1990. Therefore there is evidence to 
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support the hypothesis that dividends follow a smoother path than earnings in the 
Zimbabwean context. 
The second step in the research is to explore whether the companies in the sample 
follow a stable dividend per share policy, gradually rising dividend policy or constant 
payout policy. In this case we compare the behaviour of the dividend per share and 
payout ratio series. The results in table I show that between 1975 and 1999 the 
standard deviation of the payout ratio (13%) is smaller than that of dividend per share 
(16%). However, these standard deviations are different across the three regimes. The 
standard deviation of payout ratio is 7%, 10% and I I% during the UDI, independence 
and ESAP respectively. The corresponding standard deviations of dividend per share 
are 0.8%, 3% and 18%. This shows that during the UDI, dividend payment was 
smoother than in any other period. 
Fig 6.2 
payout ratio and dividend per share 
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The dividend pattern shown by the descriptive statistics are also confirmed by the 
time series behaviour of dividend per share and payout ratios shown in Figure 6.2. We 
can therefore conclude that between 1975 and 1989 Zimbabwean firms maintained it 
stable dividend per share policy that averaged I0% and 13`%, in thel970s and IDSOs 
respectively. These results are in line with the survey results by Byskes (1974). The 
more erratic behaviour of the dividend per share series in the 1990s is probably 
explained by the removal of dividend payment restrictions (luring this period of 
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economic reforms. The results also suggest that after the financial reform, firms now 
pay more attention to the payout ratio rather than dividend per share. 
The third step is to examine the relationship between changes in income and dividend 
payment. 
Table 6.2 The proportion of firms cutting, omitting, increasing or maintaining dividends 
Account 
year 
Firms 
cutting 
dividends 
Firms 
omitting 
dividends 
Firms 
cutting or 
omitting 
dividends 
Firms 
maintaining 
dividends 
Firms 
increasing 
dividends 
Firms 
maintaining 
or increasing 
dividends 
Firms 
paying 
dividends 
and issuing 
equity 
1976 22 9 31 41 38 79 13 
1977 31 19 50 19 50 69 16 
1978 25 19 44 41 34 75 19 
1979 9 13 22 25 66 91 25 
1980 9 13 22 6 84 90 34 
1981 9 6 15 16 75 91 38 
1982 47 19 66 16 38 54 28 
1983 50 16 66 22 28 50 13 
1984 41 19 60 34 25 59 19 
1985 25 25 50 22 53 75 9 
1986 6 3 9 6 88 94 19 
1987 28 3 31 13 59 72 16 
1988 19 0 19 9 72 81 16 
1989 22 3 25 16 63 79 19 
1990 19 3 22 9 72 81 19 
1991 3 3 6 3 94 97 38 
1992 31 6 37 13 56 69 31 
1993 34 13 47 13 53 66 25 
1994 3 9 12 13 84 97 41 
1995 13 3 16 9 78 87 41 
1996 31 6 37 6 63 69 34 
1997 38 9 47 6 56 62 47 
1998 28 9 37 3 69 72 34 
1999 13 9 22 9 78 87 34 
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Table 6.3 The proportion of firms reporting loss, increase and decrease in profit 
Account year Loss Profit increase Profit decrease 
1976 0 59 38 
1977 9 47 47 
1978 13 44 53 
1979 6 91 9 
1980 3 84 16 
1981 6 78 22 
1982 13 50 50 
1983 19 28 72 
1984 13 50 47 
1985 3 72 25 
1986 3 91 9 
1987 3 75 25 
1988 0 66 34 
1989 3 75 25 
1990 6 81 19 
1991 6 94 6 
1992 3 59 41 
1993 3 53 47 
1994 6 91 9 
1995 9 69 31 
1996 3 59 41 
1997 3 69 31 
1998 3 84 16 
1999 0 91 6 
53% of the companies did not omit dividend payment for the period 1975-99. 
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Table 6.2 shows the proportion of firms cutting, omitting, maintaining, or increasing 
dividend payment and table 6.3 shows the percentage of firms reporting loss, decrease 
or increase in after tax profit from 1975 to 1999. The first observation is that, the 
proportion of firms either maintaining or increasing dividends is quite high and 
comparable to other studies in developed countries. For example, 84% and 63% of 
UK firms maintained or increased dividends in 1988 and 1992 respectively'`. The 
corresponding percentages for Zimbabwean firms are 81%o and 69%. The second 
observation is that an increase in dividends (table 6.2 column 6) is paralleled by an 
increase in profit (table 6.3 column 3) and thus supporting the hypothesis that net 
income is the major determinant of dividend changes (Linter, 1956 and Allen, 1995). 
The third observation is that the proportion of firms simultaneously issuing new 
equity and paying dividends has substantially increased after the reform programme. 
it averaged 36% between 1991 and 1999, compared to 16`Vo between 1983 and 1990. 
A possible explanation is that the financial reform has made it easy for firms to access 
capital markets and most firms can therefore afford to pay dividends and issue new 
equity at the same time. Another explanation is related to the tax argument. -1he 
capital gains tax rate applicable to gains arising from the disposal of securities listed 
on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange was reduced from 30 %, in 1990 to 1O ";, and thus 
reducing the gap between capital gains and dividend tax rates. 
Fig 6.3 
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The fourth step is to examine the behaviour of the payout ratio between 1975 and 
1999. Figure 6.3 shows that the highest ratio was paid in 1978 (74 `%, ) while the 
lowest was paid in 1999 (31 %). The average payout ratio for the whole period is 40 
% compared to 56 %, 36 % and 38 % during UDI, Independence and ESAP 
respectively. 
Furthermore, the frequency distribution of firms over different payout classes across 
the three regimes (figure 6.4) shows that during the UDI period, approximately 381%, 
of the firms in the sample paid dividends ranging from 51 % to 60 '% of their after tax 
earnings. 
Figure 6.4 
distribution of payout ratios across the three regimes 
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This is in contrast to 3% paid out in the period 1980 to 1999.1 lowevcr, 41 % and 34 
% of firms, during the independence and ESAP period respectively, paid dividends 
ranging from 31 % to 40 % of their incomes. The corresponding proportion during the 
UDI period is 3 %. This suggests that the payout ratio has declined since 1980. We 
used the Friedman t test statistic to 
investigate whether the dividend payout ratio is the 
same across the three regimes. The data set was divided into three equal sample sizes 
corresponding to the last five years of each regime; 1975-1979,1986-1990 and 1995- 
1999. The results from the Friedman t test indicate that significant differences in the 
level of dividend payout across the three regimes do not exist (p<O. 18). 
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6.2.2 Loss and dividend payment 
Another issue that we document is the impact of loss on dividend behaviour. 
However, the empirical literature that has examined this issue is based on a large 
sample, for example; the sample sizes of DeAngelo et al (1992), Charitou, (2000), and 
Ho and Wu, (2001), studies are 607,529 and 354 respectively. In order to increase our 
sample size, we therefore use unbalanced data (51 firms) for the period 1995-99. 
Dividend omission (reduction) is defined as the event that a firm omits (reduces) cash 
dividend in at least one accounting year during the period 1995-99. On the other hand 
paying (increasing) dividends is defined as the event that the firm pays (increases) 
dividends in each accounting year during the period 1995-99. We also seek to 
document inter industry payout ratios. 
T able 6.4 a Proportion of firms paying, reducing, omitting and increasing dividends 
Total Paying Reduction Omission Increasing 
Loss firms 20% 20% 20% 80% 0% 
Non loss firms 80% 78% 51% 22% 27% 
Total 100% 67% 45% 33% 22% 
Table 6.4 b 
Total Loss firms Non loss firms Omission Reduction Increasing 
Agricultural input 8% 0% 100 % 25 % 50 % 25 % 
Agricultural Processing 18 % 11 % 89 % 22 % 56 % 22 % 
Conglomerate 16 % 25 % 75 % 25 % 25 % 38 % 
Construction 12% 17% 83% 33% 67% 17% 
Consumer goods 8% 0% 100 % 0% 75 % 25 % 
Mining 10% 40% 60% 60% 60% 0% 
Retail 10% 20% 80% 40% 20% 20% 
Other 20% 30% 70% 50% 30% 20% 
Total 100% 20% 80% 33% 45% 22% 
Table 6.4 shows that for the period 1995-99, about 20 % of the firms in the sample 
reported at least one annual loss and 80 % of these loss-making firms omitted paying 
dividends in the same period. However, 67 % of the firms in the sample never omitted 
paying dividends, but 45 % reduced the level of dividends while 22 % continued to 
184 
increase the level of dividends year after year. Nonetheless, 51 % and 22 % of non- 
loss firms have respectively reduced and omitted dividend payment. 
Table 6.5 shows payout ratios across the major industrial sectors. On average 
multinationals have the highest payout ratios (46 %) and the agricultural input sector 
has the least (26 %). Using the Friedman t test we find that there is a significant 
difference in payout ratios across the industrial sectors (p<0.054). 
Table 6.5 Pay out ratios across industrial sectors 
Year All 
Firms 
Agricultural 
Input 
Agricultural 
Processing 
Conglomerate Construction Consumer 
goods 
Mining Retail Other 
1995- 0.37 0.26 0.30 0.46 0.36 0.31 0.45 0.36 0.31 
99 
1995 0.52 0.43 0.35 0.86 0.35 0.34 0.51 0.40 0.50 
1996 0.55 0.16 0.42 0.85 0.33 0.42 0.47 0.37 0.55 
1997 0.41 0.34 0.36 0.41 0.38 0.53 0.45 0.57 0.32 
1998 0.33 0.20 0.29 0.44 0.35 0.24 0.35 0.45 0.31 
1999 0.29 0.29 0.24 0.32 0.37 0.26 0.45 0.26 0.23 
6.2.3 Summary 
In summary, we have found that net income and losses have a significant impact on 
dividend changes. The percentage of firms issuing new equity and paying dividends in 
the same accounting year has substantially increased after financial reform. The 
aggregate payout ratio was very high in the 1970s and has drastically gone down. 
During the period 1995-99, all firms that have reported at least one annual loss have 
either reduced or omitted paying dividends. Therefore, the above observations give us 
an indication that annual loss, net income and the financial reform program have a 
significant impact on firms' decisions to change dividend policy. However, the 
finance literature suggests that other firm characteristics like firm size and growth are 
possible determinants of company dividend behaviour. We explore this issue in the 
next section. 
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6.3 Econometric Evidence on the Determinants of Dividend policy 
6.3.1 Introduction 
Recent research on company dividend behaviour is primarily based on data derived 
from companies operating in the US, UK and other developed countries (see Allen, 
1995, Lease et al, 1999 for a review). The finance literature suggests that differential 
tax treatment between dividends and capital gains influences dividend behaviour and 
more recent models suggest that dividend payment has a signalling effect and can also 
mitigate the agency problems. However, the institutional characteristics in developed 
countries, on which these models are based, are different from those of developing 
countries. In particular, the tax structures, the degrees of information imperfection and 
transaction costs in developing countries are quite different from their developed 
counterparts. Therefore, the universally accepted dividend behaviour hypotheses 
initiated by Linter (1956) may be rejected by data derived from companies operating 
in developing countries. For instance, Glen's et al (1995) study of dividend behaviour 
in emerging markets reports that dividend and capital gains taxes have no impact on 
dividend policy decisions in developing countries. They also find that dividend payout 
ratios in emerging markets are lower than in developed countries. 
The main aim of this section is to empirically examine the key determinants of 
dividend policy and the empirical procedure is divided into four sections. In the first 
part we test the Lintner model of corporate dividend behaviour. The second part 
investigates the determinants of the payout ratio using the fixed effects model. The 
third part examines the decision to pay or not pay using the binary choice model, 
while the fourth part makes use of the multinomial logit model to investigate the 
major determinants of the decision to change dividends (increase, maintain and reduce 
decisions). 
6.3.2The Lintner Model 
In this section we examine the dividend payment practices of Zimbabwean 
corporations by testing Lintner's(1956) stable dividend hypothesis. This hypothesis is 
based on two empirical observations; (1) corporate managers have a target payout 
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ratio which is a proportion of earnings and (2) dividend payment slowly adjusts 
towards the desired payout ratio. 
As shown in chapter two, Lintner's econometric specification of corporate dividend 
behaviour hypothesises the change in dividends to be mainly explained by the current 
earnings and the lagged dividends. The literature reviewed in chapter two, suggests 
that the Lintner model describes well the dividend behaviour of firms operating in 
developed countries. However, it is not clear whether the lintner model is applicable 
to firms in emerging markets, therefore in this section we examine how well the 
Lintner's model describes dividend practices of firms in emerging markets. 
6.3.2.1 Estimation procedure 
The Lintner dividend model takes the form 
Di, = ßo +ß1E1, +ß2D, -1 +µiº 
6.1 
with µ;, = Il; + X, +U it 
where D1 is dividend per share, E;, is earnings per share. The error term µ;, , 
is 
decomposed into a firm specific component 'q i, a time specific component, X, and a 
component that varies across firms and over time, u;, , 
ßo and (3, , are parameters to 
be estimated. The parameter estimates from the above equation are expected to be 
positive, from which the adjustment factor S and payout ratio p can be recovered 
as S =1- P2 and p= 
S' 
. As 
discussed in detail in chapter 3, there are several 
ways of estimating equation 6.1. In this section, we consider 4 alternative methods of 
estimating the Lintner model. These are OLS, Fixed effects, and two instrumental 
variables techniques (Anderson and Hsiao and GMM). The OLS method ignores firm 
and time specific effects. However, as discussed in the methodology chapter, this may 
seriously bias the results if these specific effects are significant. The fixed effects 
estimator, by including firm and time dummies, has been proved to mitigate this 
problem in regressions with exogenous right hand side variables. Thus once the 
lagged dependent variable is included in the vector of explanatory variables the 
regression results become inconsistent (Nickel, 1981). Bond (2002) argues that 
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parameter estimates from OLS and within estimators are biased upwards and 
downwards respectively. Instrumental methods have been suggested to mitigate these 
problems. In this section we consider two instrumental variable estimators, Anderson 
and Hsiao and the GMM of Arrellano and Bond (1991) (see Chapter 3). 
We use data from a sample of 32 firms to estimate equation 6.1 as has been 
highlighted in the previous chapter we need to consider the possibility of structural 
shift in the parameters of the regression equations caused by changes in regimes. In 
this case we estimate two models. For model 1, we pool data across the regimes 
(1975-99), while for model 2, we estimate 3 separate equations for each regime. 
Model 1, which is of great interest, is estimated by 4 different estimators; OLS, Fixed 
effects, Anderson and Hsiao (AH) and GMM (1St and 2"d step). The regression 
equations for each regime are estimated by GMM. 
Table 6.6 presents results from OLS, fixed effects, AH and GMM estimators. The 
results show that both firm and time effects are significant such that a method that 
takes into consideration these effects is more preferable. 
To check for the potential misspecification of the dynamic model, we report 6 test 
statistics. The first Wald statistic (Wald! ) tests for the joint significance on all 
regressors (DPS, _, , 
EPS) except the dummy variables, under the null of no 
relationship between the dependent and the explanatory variables. The Wald test 2 
statistic tests for the significance of all dummies (constant and time dummies). The 
Wald test 3 statistic tests for the significance of the time dummies. The fourth test 
statistic is the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, which tests for the validity 
of the instruments. The null hypothesis is that there is no correlation between 
instruments and error term, which means the instruments used are valid. Finally we 
report two F test statistics for autocorrelation. The first F statistic tests for first order 
autocorrelation under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. The second F 
statistic tests for second order autocorrelation of residuals under the null hypothesis of 
no second order serial correlation. 
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Table 6.6(a) Empirical results for the Lintner model (32 firms) 
Variable Model Model AH GMM GMM Model Model 3 Model 
1 2 1975-99 1975- combined 3 Independence 3 
(1975- (1975- 99 1975-99 UDI (1980-91) Reform 
99) 99) (ist (2"d step) (1975- (1992- 
OLS Fixed Step) 79) 99) 
Effects 
Constant -1.257 5.5323 0.3742 0.1737 11.76 0.56 0.11 0.65 
(1.46) (1.29) (0.107) (0.338) (1.24) (0.78) (0.19) (0.98) 
DPS5_1 0.3312 0.2457 0.1513 0.3106 0.3343 0.4138 0.2649 0.200 
(7.14) (9.62) (2.05) (5.79) (14.7) (2.89) (3.85) (8.31) 
EPS5 0.3060 0.3290 0.3735 0.3383 0.2642 0.2681 0.2672 0.3453 
(6.89) (33.6) (24.4) (6.83) (9.36) (4.27) (7.92) (8.25) 
Target 0.4575 0.4362 0.4401 0.4907 0.3969 0.46 0.36 0.44 
Payout 
(P=ß-ý 
Adj. Factor 0.6688 0.7543 0.8487 0.6894 0.6657 0.59 0.74 0.80 
8 =1-ß2 
R2 0.83 0.85 
Waldl joint 561.1 2408 682.9 1216 1460 148.7 81.41 128.9 
(DPS, EPS) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Wald2 2.139 126.3 63.61 130.5 463.3 9.291 26.54 20.61 
Dummies [0.144] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.054] [0.003] [0.008] 
Wald3 - 43.26 - 128.0 268.4 5.745 26.53 10.48 
Time [0.006] [0.000] [0.000] [0.125] [0.002] [0.163] 
Effects 
Sargant test --- 620.8 3.205 30.03 14.78 20.46 
[0.000] [0.996] [0.223] [0.214] [0.221] 
F-Test Auto 0.8261 1.729 -9.463 -1.756 -1.719 -2.235 -1.773 -1.408 
[0.409] [0.084] [0.000] [0.079] [0.086] [0.025] [0.076] [0.159] 
F-Test Auto --0.7008 0.5117 0.6266 -1.281 -0.8509 0.6216 
[0.4483] [0.609] [0.531] [0.200] [0.395] [0.534] 
Notes 
In parentheses are absolute t-statistics values 
In square brackets are p-values 
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The Wald statistic for the joint significance of regressors, is significant at the 1 per 
cent level, in all equations. Although time effects are significant in most of the 
equations, they are not significantly different from zero in the UDI and Reform 
periods. A possible explanation is that these two periods have the shortest estimation 
periods, 5 and 8 years respectively. The Sargan tests for all equations are 
insignificantly different from zero and thus leading us to accept the null hypothesis 
that the variables used as instruments in the GMM estimation are appropriate. As 
expected the F tests for first order autocorrelation in residuals provide evidence of 
negative first order serial correlation. However, the F tests for second order 
autocorrelation are positive and insignificant at any conventional level of significance. 
6.3.2.2 Empirical results 
The regression results show that the constant in each of the models is insignificantly 
different from zero. Thus the hypothesis that corporate managers are reluctant to 
reduce dividends is rejected at the 10 per cent level. The coefficients on DPS and EPS 
have the expected positive signs and are significantly different from zero. The 
statistical significance of the D,, variable is an indication that dividend payment 
does not follow a random walk. It shows that current dividend payment, to some 
extent, depends on dividend payment in the previous year. We also computed, for 
each model, target payout ratio and adjustment factor. The adjustment factor ranges 
from 0.67 (GMM and OLS) to 0.85 (AH). These adjustment factors are close to 1 than 
zero. Thus the results show that firms in Zimbabwe do not smooth dividend 
payments. This is supported by the trend of changes in dividends and earnings shown 
in figure 6.5 below. 
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Figure 6.5 
dividend and income growth 
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The estimated payout ratios range from 0.40 (GMM) to 0.46 (()1.5) and this is 
consistent with the observed weighted dividend payout ratio , )('0.4() over this sample 
period. We also examined dividend stability across the regimes. For this reason, we 
estimated three separate regressions using data from each regime (UI)I, Independence 
and Reform periods). The results are reported in table 6.6 (a) (('olumns 6-s) ahoxe. 
The results show that the coefficients of the variables of interest are positive and 
significant in each regime. The Lintner adjustment factors are respectively 0.59,0.74 
and 0.80 in the UDI, Independence and Reform periods. Thus, these results show that 
dividend instability was more pronounced in the reform regime as already shorn by 
the results from the descriptive statistics. 
On the other hand, the payout ratios of the UDI, Independent and Rclorm regimes are 
respectively 0.46,0.36 and 0.44 compared to their respective weighted averages of 
0.56,0.36 and 0.38. 
We also estimated the lintner model for 51 firms in the ReForm regime using the 
GMM estimator and obtained the following results. 
lß)1 
Table 6.6 (b) Empirical results for the Lintner model (51 firms; 1995-1999) 
Variable Constant DPS, 1 EPS, 
Coefficient 
T-statistics 
-1.7818 
-0.673 
0.5087 
1.94 
0.1794 
2.55 
ß 
Target Payout (p 
0.36 
=i) 
Adj. Factor S =1- (32 0.492 
Waldl joint (DPS, EPS) 326.9 [0.00] 
Wald2 Dummies 6.604 [0.158] 
Wald3 Time Effects 6.527 [0.089] 
Sargant test 2.325 [0.508] 
F-Test Auto 1.632 [0.103] 
F-Test Auto 0.7018 [0.483] 
Notes 
In parentheses are absolute t-statistics values 
In square brackets are p-values 
The regression results presented above show that the misspecifications tests, discussed 
above, are all satisfied. The Wald statistic for the joint significance of regressors 
(DPSL_,, EPS) is significant at the 1 per cent level. The time effects are significant at 
the 10 per cent level. Thus the results show that although the estimation is short, 
increasing the sample size alter some of the conclusions reached earlier. The Sargan 
test is insignificantly different from zero and thus leading us to accept the null 
hypothesis that the variables used as instruments in the GMM estimation are 
appropriate. As expected the F test for first order autocorrelation in residuals provide 
evidence of negative first order serial correlation. However, the F test for second order 
autocorrelation is positive and insignificant at any conventional level of significance. 
The regression results show that current earnings and past levels of dividends, 
individually, have a significant effect on corporate dividend behaviour as proposed by 
Lintner. However, the constant is negative and insignificantly different from zero. 
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Thus the estimation results support the simulation results of Fama and Babiak (1968). 
It should be noted that these results do not contradict Lintner's hypothesis concerning 
the constant. Lintner argued that the constant may be significant for some firms, but 
not all. Therefore in the Zimbabwean context, firms are not reluctant to cut dividends. 
Both the adjustment factor and the long run payout ratio may be calculated from the 
above results. The resulting estimates of 0.492 and 0.36 for adjustment factor and 
payout ratio respectively, differ from the previous findings using a sample of 32 firms. 
6.3.3 The Determinants of Dividend payout ratio 
In this section we investigate the major determinants of the payout ratio. The 
determinants of dividend policy that we employ in this study are mainly drawn from 
the previous empirical literature. Although both the empirical and theoretical literature 
has suggested many determinants of dividend policy, we concentrate on 9 variables 
because of data availability. These variables are leverage, size, growth, profitability, 
investment, firm loss, insider, institutional and largest ownership and we briefly 
discuss the rationale of each variable. 
Leverage 
Kalay (1982) suggests that debt service and covenants, to some extent, can limit 
dividend payouts. The agency theory (Jensen, 1986) also suggests that leverage is a 
substitute for dividend payout in reducing agency costs. Thus, leverage is expected to 
exert a negative effect on the payout ratio. However, on the contrary, Easterbrook 
(1984) theorise a positive relationship. The empirical study by Dutta (1999) supports a 
positive relationship, while Jensen et al (1992) report a negative relationship. Dalton 
and Pointon (1995), however, find no significant relationship. We employ the debt- 
equity ratio as a proxy for leverage and we let the empirical results determine the 
relationship. 
Size 
Chang and Rhee (1990) argue that large and mature firms can afford to pay higher 
dividends than their smaller counterparts because they can easily access capital 
markets when the need arises. In this case, we expect a positive relationship between 
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firm size and dividend payout ratio. We employ the natural logarithm of sales as a 
proxy for firm size. 
Growth 
A fast growing firm needs to retain a higher proportion of its earnings than a mature 
one. Therefore, we expect such firms to have low payouts in order to avoid 
transaction costs associated with raising external finance (Chang and Rhee, 1990). 
Market-to-book ratio and earnings per share are the proxies for growth opportunities. 
Profitability 
Profitable firms are expected to have higher pay out ratios than firms with marginal 
profits. Therefore, profitability is expected to exert a positive impact on dividend 
payout. The proxy for profitability is the return on capital employed. 
Investment 
Cash dividends and expenditure on investments are the major alternative uses of 
corporate profits and thus investment expenditure negatively affects dividend payout 
levels. Capital expenditure scaled by total assets is used as a proxy for investment. 
Firm Loss 
Annual company loss is expected to have an adverse effect on dividend policy, since 
cash dividend is legally paid out of profits (current or retained) rather than capital. 
This implies that firms persistently reporting negative after tax earnings cannot 
continue to pay dividends. As we have found in section 2 above, for the period 1995- 
99 loss making firms have either cut or omitted dividends. We therefore expect loss- 
making firms to pay low dividends or omit paying. We use a dummy variable Firm 
Loss equal to 1 if a firm reports negative after tax earnings and 0 otherwise 
Agency factors 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) hypothesise that the higher the percentage of shares held 
by managers the lower the agency costs. Firms with closely held shares are also 
expected to have lower agency problems than firms with less concentrated ownership. 
Therefore, we hypothesise that firms with high managerial ownership, institutional 
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ownership and ownership concentration have lower agency costs. In addition, the 
asymmetric information models of dividend behaviour suggest that higher dividends 
signal higher firm value. Therefore firms with high insider holdings, which is a signal 
of higher firm value, are expected to have low payout ratios. In this study the proxies 
for agency costs variables are percentage of shares held by insiders (managers and 
directors), largest shareholder and financial institution. These three variables are 
expected to have a negative effect on dividend payout ratio. 
6.3.3.1 The Model 
The model identifies nine possible factors influencing the dividend behaviour of firms 
and the empirical model to determine these factors is written as follows. 
Div i, = ßa +ß, Debt ; +ß2Size 4 +(33Growth ;, +ß, 
Profit ;, +(3sInv 
+ß6 Insider ;, +I , Inst ;, +1BL arg est ;, + in + 
X, + uh 
where Div;, is the dividend payout ratio of the firm i at time t, 
Debt; t 
is the debt-equity ratio of firm i in year t 
Size;, is the size of firm i in year t 
Growth;, represents growth opportunities of firm i in year t 
Pr ofit; t profitability of 
firm i in year t 
Inv; t 
is the investment expenditure of firm i in year t 
6.2 
Insider;, percentage of shares held by managers and directors of firm i in year t 
Inst;, percentage of shares held by financial institutions of firm i in year t 
L arg est; t percentage of shares 
held by largest shareholder of firm i in year t 
The definition of each of the variables and the expected signs are presented in table 
6.7 
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Table 6.7 
Definition of variables 
Variable Definition Reference Expected 
sign 
Debt-Equity (Total borrowing)/(shareholders funds) 
Size Ln (sales) Smith and Watts Positive 
(1992) 
MKTBKAS [Book assets - total common equity + Shares outstanding Gul (1999) Negative 
* share price]/ book assets 
Profitability (Net Profit)/(Capital employed) Positive 
Insider Percentage of shares held by managers and directors Jensen, Solberg and Negative 
Ownership Zorn (1992) 
Largest Percentage of shares held by largest shareholder Negative 
shareholder 
Institutional Percentage of shares held by financial institutions Negative 
ownership 
Investment (Capital expenditure)/total assets 
Firm loss Dummy variable that takes a value of I if firm reports 
negative after tax profit and zero otherwise. 
Table 6.8 below summarises the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this 
chapter. 
Table 6.8 Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Maximum Minimum 
Dividend ratio 30.5549 18.8026 94.0800 0.0000 
Debt-equity 30.7529 31.1436 179.5400 0.2300 
Size 13.2169 1.0866 16.3000 9.9700 
Growth 28.9954 64.6711 126.3600 -243.020 
Profitability 23.7501 14.4954 75.2400 0.0000 
Current ratio 1.5955 0.6079 5.0000 0.4000 
Insider Ownership 6.2377 14.3049 72.9800 0.0000 
Largest shareholder 43.7638 18.4128 85.0000 6.7600 
Institutional ownership 28.6858 18.1881 78.0400 0.8300 
Investment 12.0866 19.8677 174.9700 0.24000 
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6.3.3.2 Empirical Results 
As discussed in chapter 3, there are several ways of estimating equation 6.2 above. 
However, since we have a panel of 51 firms, it is most likely that unobservable firm 
and time specific factors may significantly influence the dividend behaviour. It is 
therefore, imperative to first of all test for the significance of the firm and time effects. 
The results of the tests are presented in table 6.9 below. These results show that only 
firm specific factors are significantly different from zero. Thus the unobserved time 
effects do not significantly alter corporate dividend decisions. 
Table 6.9 Tests of significance of firm and time effects 
Null Hypothesis Test Statistic Statistic Distribution P-Value 
Firm and Time effects Ili = a, t =0 
122.2 iss 0.00 
V; =1,... 51 
.. =1,.... 5 
Firm effects li .=0 
116.7 xso 0.00 
d; =1,... 51 
Time Effects xt =O4.946 xä 0.293 
`d 
t =1..... 
5 
The next logical procedure is to test whether these firm effects are correlated with the 
other explanatory variables. If there is sufficient evidence to suggest that firm effects 
are uncorrelated with the other explanatory variables then the random effects 
estimator is more efficient than the within estimator. In the case were firm effects are 
found to be correlated with the explanatory variables the random effects model 
becomes inefficient and we have to estimate the above equation by the within 
estimator, which is efficient and consistent whether firm effects and other regressors 
are correlated or not. 
Table 6.10 below shows the regression results from 5 different estimators namely 
OLS, between, OLS in differences, within and random effects. 
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Table 6.10 Regression Results: General model 
Dependent Variable dividend payout ratio 
Variable OLS Between OLS-Diff Within (fixed 
effects) 
Random 
effects 
Constant 35.5249 18.3180 -4.9017 - 52.0654 
(2.2215) (0.8271) (1.81) (2.7038) 
Debt-equity -0.1084 -0.1362 -0.1269 -0.1267 -0.1021 
(2.8001) (2.1420) (1.97) (2.1855) (2.4563) 
Size -0.5833 0.4927 9.7152 -5.7188 -1.5868 
(0.4963) (0.2956) (1.38) (2.2492) (1.1239) 
Growth -0.0595 -0.0646 -0.0326 -0.0363 -0.0532 
(3.2238) (1.9067) (1.40) (1.5744) (2.7878) 
Profitability -0.1115 0.0669 -0.3122 -0.2148 -0.1790 
(1.3603) (0.5017) (2.20) (1.6565) (1.9902) 
Insider Ownership 0.0952 0.1970 -0.2045 -0.5677 0.0022 
(1.0629) (1.5891) (0.716) (2.2361) (0.0203) 
Largest shareholder 0.1025 0.1406 -0.1850 -0.0823 0.0700 
(1.4729) (1.5063) (0.843) (0.4647) (0.8153) 
Institutional 0.1815 0.1712 0.1479 0.1313 0.1609 
ownership (2.487) (1.8766) (0.339) (0.4021) (1.7592) 
Investment -0.1147 -0.2804 0.0213 -0.0265 -0.0788 
(1.9231) (2.4806) (0.295) (0.3768) (1.3138) 
Specification Tests 
Adjusted R-squared 0.11 0.30 0.29 0.09 
LM het. Test 0.9811 [0.322] 0.5341 [0.465] 0.9360[0.333] 0.1241 [0.725] 
Durbin-Watson 1.17 1.82 1.12 
statistic 
F-test 1 2.2477[0.000] 
z 22.676[0.007] Hauseman test x8 
Notes 
In parentheses are absolute t-statistics values 
In square brackets are p-values 
The computed F test, directly below the results from the within estimator, is a test for 
a common constant term for the panel of firms. In this case the null hypothesis is that 
the constant term does not differ significantly across the firms against the alternative 
that each firm has a different constant term. Thus heterogeneity of firms is captured 
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by estimating a dividend equation that assumes different constant terms for each firm 
but assuming a common vector of slope parameters. Since the reported F statistic is 
significant at the 1 per cent level, this provides further support that we should choose 
the within estimator rather than the OLS, because the OLS assumes a common 
intercept and slope vector for all firms. The computed Hausman test statistic is 22.676 
with a p-value of 0.007 and thus suggests that the explanatory variables are correlated 
with the unobservable firm effects. In this case the random effects estimator is 
inconsistent and we therefore base our discussion of the determinants of payout ratio 
on results from the within estimator. 
The regression results based on the within estimator show that largest, institution and 
investment variables have no significant influence on dividend policy decisions. 
Therefore in order to increase the significance of other variables, the variables largest, 
institution and investment were dropped from the equation one by one and an F test 
statistic for the joint significance of these variables was computed. The computed F 
statistic is insignificant and thus shows that these variables jointly do not have 
explanation power. Therefore, equation 6.2 was re-estimated without these variables, 
the results of which are presented in table 6.11 
The first part of table 6.11 (Panel A) shows the influence of leverage, size, growth, 
profitability and insider on dividend payout ratio while the second part (panel B) 
includes an additional variable, firm loss dummy. The idea is to assess the importance 
of firm loss on payment of cash dividends. The diagnostics favour the choice of the 
within estimator since the Hausman test is significant at the 5 percent level for the 
results presented in both panels. For the model without the loss dummy variable 
,, 
leverage, size, profitability and insider ownership are statistically significant at the 10 
percent or lower level of significance. Adding the loss variable, however, significantly 
improves the adjusted R2 but adversely affects the significance of the debt ratio. 
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Table 6.11 Regression Results: Specific model 
Dependent variable: Dividend payout ratio 
Variable Coefficient T-statistic 
Panel A 
Debt-equity -0.1341 2.0846 
Size -6.0519 2.3885 
Growth -0.0352 1.9125 
Profitability -0.2091 1.2687 
Insider Ownership -0.5830 1.8387 
X2 (3) exclusion 0.6194[0.9609] 
Adjusted R-squared 0.31 
LM het. Test statistic 1.12[0.290] 
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.82 
F-test [50,188] 2.5966[0.00] 
Hausman test X2 (5) 12.576[0.0135] 
Panel B 
Debt-equity -0.0548 0.7665 
Size -4.8940 2.1742 
Growth -0.0328 1.9147 
Profitability -0.3267 2.1402 
Insider Ownership -0.6268 2.0399 
Loss dummy -26.2307 3.3323 
Adjusted R-squared 0.39 
LM het. Test statistic 
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.9594 
F-test [50,187] 2.7673[0.000] 
Hausman test x6 10.538[0.0613] 
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We now turn to a discussion of the regression results. 
Leverage 
The results from the regression (Panel A) indicate that firm leverage negatively and 
significantly affects dividend payout ratio. Thus, supporting Kalay's (1982) 
proposition that debt service and loan covenant adversely affect a firm's payout ratio. 
These results are also in line with the argument that dividend payments and firm 
borrowings are alternative forms of corporate control. However, the negative 
relationship between debt-equity ratio and dividend payout ratio does not support 
Easterbrook's (1984) view. The regression results reported in Panel B, however 
suggests that leverage has no significant impact on dividend payout once we control 
for firm loss. 
Size 
The coefficient of firm size is negative and statistically significant, indicating that 
larger firms have lower payouts than their smaller counterparts. This relationship is 
contrary to the hypothesis of Chang and Rhee (1990) and the empirical work by 
Holder et al (1998) and Adedeji (1998), among others. This result, however, supports 
the empirical work by Ang et al (1997) who suggest that the variable is a proxy for 
growth opportunities. There are two possible explanations for the Zimbabwean case. 
First, small firms signal their firm value by paying higher dividends. Second, capital 
markets imperfections, in terms of transaction costs and information asymmetry, are 
so severe such that even large firms find it difficult to raise external finance. 
Therefore they resort to internal financing which contributes 25% of total sources of 
finance, while the stock markets contributes 8%. If we take the view that holding 
firms are larger than non-holding firms, then the results are consistent with earlier 
findings that holding firms have higher capital expenditures but lower payout ratios 
than non-holding firms. 
Growth 
The market-to book variable representing the growth opportunities of a firm is 
statistically significant and has the hypothesised sign. This indicates that firms with 
high growth opportunities have lower payout ratios. These firms tend to have high 
retentions in order to avoid high transaction costs when sourcing external finance. 
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This relationship supports both theoretical work and empirical studies by Chang and 
Rhee (1990) and Hansen et al (1994), among others. However, Smith and Watts 
(1992) report a positive relationship between growth opportunities and payout ratio 
while Gaver and Gaver (1993), Gul (1999) and D'Sounza (1999) do not find a 
significant influence of growth opportunities on payout ratio. 
Profitability 
The coefficient of profitability, in Panel A results, is negative and statistically 
insignificant. However, the results reported in Panel B show that the coefficient of 
profitability is negative and significant at 5 percent level. This indicates that profitable 
firms have low dividend payout ratios, a result contrary to the theoretical prediction 
and the empirical findings by Chang and Rhee (1990) for US firms. However, Gul 
(1999) finds a significant negative relationship between profitability and payout for 
Japanese firms. 
Insider ownership 
Insider ownership is found to be negative and statistically significant. This result 
supports the view that managerial ownership aligns the interests of managers and 
shareholders and thus reducing the agency costs. The results also support the 
hypothesis that firms with higher insider ownership do not signal firm value by 
paying higher dividends. In other words insider ownership is a substitute for higher 
payout ratios in signalling firm value, a result that is consistent with the theoretical 
work of Ross (1977) and Jensen (1986) and the empirical findings by Hansen et al 
(1994), Holder et al (1998) and Saxen (1999), among others. 
Firm Loss 
As expected we find statistical evidence to support the view that company annual loss 
adversely affects the level of dividend payment. Thus the results could also mean that 
loss -making firms omit or cut 
dividends. These results are consistent with the 
findings of DeAngelo et al (1992) that loss is a necessary condition for omitting 
dividends. In the Zimbabwean case, the econometrics results are consistent with the 
results reported in the section on historical patterns of dividends, which shows that the 
aggregate dividend payout has been very low during periods of drought when most 
firms make losses. 
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6.3.4 Pay or not Pay Decision 
The Model 
In this section we empirically examine one of the most crucial choices that every firm 
should make; the choice between paying dividend (PD) and not paying dividend 
(NPD). The choice between these two alternative decisions (paying and not paying) 
can be modelled by considering utility functions. The starting point is to represent the 
total utility (U; D) associated to paying 
dividend for firm i as 
UID 
-I: XiPDkPk 
+viPD 6.3 
k 
where ßk° are parameters to be estimated and XIPDk are the characteristics of firm i that 
are most likely to have a significant impact on the decision to pay dividends. 
We can assume that the dependent variable takes the value of one if firm i decides to 
pay dividends and a value of zero otherwise. More formerly 
1 if firm i pays dividend 
y' 
fo 
if firm i omits paying dividend 
In this case the probability of paying dividends is assigned the logistic form 
( PD 
exp lýx iPDk ßk6.4 
PiPD = PI 
(Yi = lý _ 
l+expXI ßkDI PDk k JJ k 
The maximum likelihood estimation procedure can be used to estimate the parameters 
of equation 6.4 
In this section, we consider 7 firm characteristics as potential determinants of the 
decision to pay. These are leverage, firm loss dummy, growth, lagged payout, size, 
cash flow and profit. Following Cramer (2001), we first assess the effect of 
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introducing each of the explanatory variables on the estimated slope coefficients and 
log likelihood. 
Empirical results 
The results reported in table 6.12 show the effect of introducing each of the 
explanatory variables on the estimated slope coefficients and log likelihood and it can 
be seen that leverage on its own has no significant influence on the decision to pay 
dividends. However, all other variables have a significant influence on the decision to 
pay. 
Table 6.12: Effect of adding regressor variables on log likelihood of binary dividend decision model 
Log L Constant Debt Loss Growth Dividend,, Size Cash Profit x 
-78.43 
-78.21 -0.209 0.001 0.445 
(7.727) (0.689) [0.504] 
-69.91 -0.208 -0.001 0.251 17.05 
(7.424) (0.894) (4.102) [0.00] 
-61.91 -0.323 -0.001 0.222 0.002 33.04 
(5.661) (1.275) (3.513) (3.104) [0.00] 
-53.35 -0.144 -0.002 0.286 0.002 -0.0053 50.17 
(2.136) (2.039) (3.541) (2.505) (3.726) [0.00] 
-52.85 0.116 -0.002 0.269 0.002 -0.005 -0.021 51.16 
(0.436) (1.788) (3.290) (2.639) (3.747) (0.998) [0.00] 
-50.52 0.312 -0.002 
0.226 0.002 -0.006 -0.028 -0.009 55.831 
(1.025) (2.197) (2.640) (2.370) (3.949) (1.197) (1.88) [0.00] 
-48.26 0.471 -0.003 0.264 0.003 -0.006 -0.047 -0.013 0.004 60.35 
(1.491) (2.454) (2.999) (2.687) (3.961) (1.875) (2.418) (2.116) [0.00] 
Derivatives of probabilities at sample frequencies (mean) 
Notes 
In parentheses are absolute t-statistics values 
In square brackets are p-values 
204 
The logit regression results are reported in table 6.13 and we now turn to a discussion 
of these results. 
The coefficient of the debt ratio has a positive sign and is statistically significant at the 
5% level, indicating that borrowing increases the probability that the firm pays 
dividends. This finding is in line with the observation that some loss firms with high 
capital expenditures have been paying dividends. The loss dummy variable has the 
expected significantly negative sign. This means that firms reporting an annual loss 
are less likely to pay dividends. This is consistent with the findings of DeAngelo et al 
(1992) and Charitou (2000) for US and Japanese firms. This finding, however, 
contradicts the proposition that dividends are sticky. A significantly negative 
coefficient is found on the growth opportunity variable. In other words firms with 
high growth opportunities have lower payout ratios and are most likely to omit 
dividends. Thus the results confirm the pecking order and transaction cost view that 
firms resort to internal finance in order to avoid the costs of external finance. Our 
results are also in line with the results reported by Fama and French (2001) for US 
firms. 
Table 6.13 Regression results from binary model: yi=O not pay, yi=1 pay 
Variable Coefficient t-value 
Constant -5.3148 
Debt 
Loss 
Growth 
Dividend t-1 
Size 
Cash 
0.0287 
-2.9751 
-0.0302 
0.0700 
0.5344 
1.49 
2.45 
3.00 
2.69 
3.96 
1.88 
0.1422 2.42 
Profit -0.045 2.12 
As expected, the coefficient of past dividend level has a positive sign and is highly 
significant. This shows that a firm that pays dividend in the previous year is also most 
likely to pay dividend in the current year. The estimate for firm size has the expected 
sign and is statistically significant and thus suggesting that the variable, size, increases 
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the probability that larger firms are most likely to pay dividends. Cash flow has the 
expected positive sign and is statistically significant at the 5% level, indicating that 
the existence of free cash flow makes it most likely that the firm pays dividend. The 
coefficient of the profitability variable is negative and statistically significant at the 5 
% level. This suggests that profitable firms are less likely to pay dividends, a result 
contrary to expectations. 
6.3.4 Decision to increase, maintain and reduce dividends 
In this section, we extend the model of the previous section to model the 3 important 
dividend choices that each firm faces; namely the decision to increase, maintain or 
reduce dividends. The estimation issue that we have to consider is whether these 
decisions are ordered or not. In this study we assume that the three decisions are 
unordered and therefore can be represented by a multinomial logit model. The 
multinomial model is derived from the utility functions (Cramer, 2001). First, we 
assume that firm i (=1,2 , 3............ 51) can make any of 
J possible decisions at time t. 
In this study J=3: decision to increase (j=0), maintain 6=1) and reduce (j = 2) 
dividend per share. The `utility' of taking decision j (j = 0,1,2) in time period t>0 is, 
therefore, specified as 
U(i, j, t) = x;, ßi + u; t 6.5, 
Where x; t is a vector of explanatory variables suggested 
in the finance literature. 
Normalising the parameters of the first state to zero, then the probability that firm i 
selects alternative j at time t>O given characteristics xit is described by the following 
multinomial logit model; 
exp(x j3 + uit 
) 
PDecision=j 
3 
Yexp(XitF'; +vit 
j=O 
6.6 
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The explanatory variables that enter the above equation are leverage, growth, 
dividend, 
-,, size, profitability, cash 
flow and investment. We hypothesise that not all 
of these factors are significant determinants of each of the three decisions. The idea is 
to include as many potential determinants as possible and then exclude some of the 
variables that are not statistically significant. The definitions of these variables and the 
expected signs have been presented in section 4.2 above. 
The results reported in table 6.14 show the effect of adding regressor variables on the 
log likelihood of the multinomial dividend decisions. 
Table 6.14 Effect of adding regressor variables on log likelihood of multinomial dividend decision 
model 
Regressions Log L22 
x, L 
Constant only -225.6232 - - 
Constant, debt -217.0975 17.051 17.051 
[0.000] [0.000] 
Constant, debt, growth -214.9179 21.411 4.359 
[0.000] [0.1131] 
Constant, debt, growth, size -210.6872 29.872 8.4614 
[0.000] [0.0145] 
Constant, debt, growth, size, dividendt_t -201.2486 48.749 18.8772 
[0.000] [0.000] 
Constant, debt, growth, size, dividend t- , profit -194.0347 63.177 14.4278 
[0.000] [0.0007] 
Constant, debt, growth, size, dividend t_i, profit, cash flow -188.0434 75.16 11.9826 
[0.000] [0.0025] 
Constant, debt, growth, size, dividend t_i, profit, cash flow, -183.6986 83.849 8.6896 
investment [0.000] [0.0130] 
p-values in square brackets 
The first x2 value 
(XI 
reported in table 6.14 (column 3) are defined as 2(L J- Lo 
where Lo is the value of log likelihood function when the only explanatory variable is 
the constant term and L, is the value of the log likelihood function when j 
0: 5.7)explanatory variables are included. The degrees of freedom equal the number 
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of slope coefficients estimated. The second x2 values (X222 )reported in table 3 (column 
4) are defined as 2(L, +, - 
LJ and thus measure the joint impact of each additional 
explanatory variable on the decision to change dividends (increase, maintain and 
reduce). In the following discussion, we shall refer to this statistic as the chi-square 
statistic. In addition, we verify the impact of each variable on the probability that firm 
i will choose alternative j, by computing marginal effects as 
8 Pr ob(yDecision = J) 
= ProbryDecision=j t' 
(ýj 
-I Prob(yDecision=j )3j 6.7 ` oxj 
t 
Table 6.15 Multinomial model qausi-elasticities 
Variable Increase Maintain Reduce 
Constant -0.9031 0.5449 0.3581 
(1.8237) (1.6528) (0.8500) 
Debt -0.1106 0.0214 0.0892 
(2.6410) (0.8671) (2.6170) 
Growth -0.0168 0.0158 0.0009 
(0.8832) (1.0396) (0.0569) 
Dividend t-1 -0.0472 0.1218 0.1690 
(0.7190) (2.5496) (2.9929) 
Size 1.041 0.5908 0.45015 
(2.1683) (1.7536) (1.0988) 
Cash 0.2072 -0.0657 0.1415 
(3.0105) (1.3562) (2.1742) 
Profit 0.1748 -0.1239 0.1624 
(2.5717) (0.2589) (2.6136) 
Investment -0.0135 0.0343 -0.0208 
(0.4022) (2.5061) (0.6154) 
Notes 
In parentheses are absolute t-statistics values 
We now turn to the interpretation of results. 
Leverage 
The results presented in table 6.14 show that the chi-square statistic of 17.051 is well 
beyond the critical value at the 1% level, indicating the significant joint impact of 
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leverage on the decision to change dividends. However, the results shown in table 
6.15(marginal effects) indicate that the marginal effect of leverage is statistically 
significant for two decisions; increase and reduce. This is in line with the results from 
the multinomial logit (table 6.16) which indicate that the coefficient on leverage is 
significant for the decision to increase dividends but insignificant for the decision to 
maintain payment of dividends. The negative sign of leverage (-0.0177 for decision to 
reduce) indicates that as the firm's leverage ratio increases firms are most likely to 
reduce dividends rather than increase. This finding is consistent with the theoretical 
predictions of Kalay (1982) and Jensen (1986). 
Table 6.16 Estimated coefficients of full multinomial dividend decision model 
State Constant Debt Growth Size Dividend, 
-, 
Profit Cash Investment 
Flow 
Reference 
state 
REDUCE 
Increase -2.9353 -0.018 -0.001 0.2675 -0.0240 0.0398 0.0929 0.0052 
(1.23) (2.74) (0.346) (1.54) (2.43) (2.76) (2.57) (0.330) 
Maintain 2.3425 -0.007 0.0037 -0.173 -0.0482 0.0242 0.0119 0.0268 
(0.765) (0.962) (0.755) (0.733) (3.47) (1.23) (0.242) (1.77) 
Reference 
state 
MAINTAIN 
Increase -5.2778 -0.011 -0.005 0.4406 0.0242 0.0157 0.0810 -0.0216 
(1.87) (1.51) (1.09) (2.04) (1.92) (0.936) (2.00) (2.20) 
Notes 
In parentheses are absolute t-statistics values 
Growth 
The chi-square statistic shows that, at the 5 per cent level, firm growth has no impact 
on the firms' decision to change dividends. The marginal effects reported in table 6.15 
as well as the estimation results in table 6.16 also indicate that the growth variable has 
no significant effect on the three decisions. 
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Size 
The variable size appears to be important in explaining dividend decisions, as shown 
by the significant chi-square statistic of 8.46. Although the joint impact of size is 
significant at the 5 per cent level, the marginal effects show that the size variable has a 
significant impact on the decision to increase and maintain dividends. With reference 
to the decision to reduce dividends, the estimated coefficients on the size variable, for 
the decisions to increase and maintain dividends, are insignificantly different from 
zero. However, firm size increases the probability of increasing dividends relative to 
the probability of maintaining dividend payment. 
Dividendt_i 
The variable Dividend -i, which measures the payout ratio 
in the previous period, has 
a significant chi-square for the joint effects (18.88). The marginal effects show that 
past payout ratio has a significant impact on the decisions to maintain and reduce 
dividends. The results from the estimated multinomial logit show that all individual 
coefficients for Dividendr_j are significantly different from zero at the 10 per cent 
level or lower. With reference to the decision to reduce dividends, the sign of the 
coefficient is negative for the decisions to increase (-0.024) and maintain (-0.0482). 
The negative sign for the decision to increase and maintain indicates that the firm with 
high past levels of dividends is less likely to increase or maintain in preference to 
reducing dividends. However, the results reported in table 6.16b show that, with 
reference to the decision to maintain dividends, Dividendt_1i has a positive sign, which 
is significant at the 10 per cent level. This indicates that high past levels of dividends 
makes it most likely that the firm will increase dividends rather than maintain them. 
Profitability 
The variable profitability has a significant joint impact on dividend decisions. This 
significant effect of profitability is reported on the decision to increase and reduce 
dividends. Thus the estimated coefficients of profitability show that profitable firms 
are most likely to increase rather than reduce dividends. Profitability, however, does 
not discriminate between increasing and maintaining decisions. 
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Cash Flow 
The chi-square statistic, for the cash flow variable, is significant and thus suggesting 
that cash flow is important for the decision to change dividends. However, the 
marginal effects show that cash flow has greater explanatory power for the decisions 
to increase and reduce dividends. With reference to the decision to reduce dividends, 
cash flow increases the probability that firms will increase dividend payments. 
However, cash flow does not discriminate between the decision to reduce and 
maintain, but makes it most likely that firms will increase dividends in preference to 
maintaining them. 
Investment 
The last variable, investment, also has a significant joint effect on the dividend 
decision. Despite the significant joint effect, however, the results shown in table 6.15 
indicate that only the marginal effects of the decision to maintain are significant. The 
results shown in table 6.16a suggest that higher capital expenditure increases the 
probability that the firm will maintain rather than reduce dividends. However, the 
results reported in table 6.16b indicate that capital expenditure makes it less likely that 
the firm will increase payment of dividends relative to maintaining them. 
6.4 Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter we have aimed to achieve two goals: First, to document the pattern and 
evolution of the dividend policy of the Zimbabwean corporate sector over the past 25 
years. Second, to provide econometric evidence on the major determinants of 
dividend changes over the past 5 years. We have found that net income and losses 
have a significant impact on dividend changes. The percentage of firms issuing new 
equity and paying dividends in the same accounting year has substantially increased 
after financial reform. A possible explanation is that the reform programme has 
altered the institutional environment. For example easy access to capital markets for 
firms and the reduction of capital gains tax from 30 % to 10 % for all shares, which 
are traded on the stock market. Although, the aggregate payout ratios during UDI 
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independence and Reform were respectively 56,36 and 38, the data, however, does 
not reject the hypothesis that these respective payout ratios are statistically the same. 
During the period 1995-99, all firms that have reported at least one annual loss have 
either reduced or omitted paying dividends. In particular, about 80 % of all firms, 
which reported at least one annual loss, have omitted paying dividends. However, 67 
% of the firms in the sample never omitted paying dividends. The descriptive statistics 
results also suggest that the payout ratio significantly vary across industries and in this 
case, the highest payout ratio is reported for the multinational companies (46) and the 
lowest (26) is in the agricultural input sector. 
The above observations, from descriptive statistics, give us an indication that annual 
loss, net income and the financial reform program have a significant impact on firms' 
decisions to change dividend policy and therefore, in the second section of the chapter 
we econometrically investigated the major determinants of dividend policy. 
Using the recent developments in panel data estimation (dynamic model) we 
empirically estimated the dividend stability model first proposed by Lintner (1956). 
The results are consistent with Lintner's prediction that past levels of dividends and 
current earnings are the major determinants of corporate dividend behaviour. The 
results also support the conclusion of Fama and Babiak (1968) that the constant is 
zero in the Lintner model. Thus the Lintner model describes very well corporate 
dividend behaviour in emerging markets. 
The econometric evidence based on the within estimates suggests that the payout ratio 
is negatively related to debt ratio, firm size, growth, profitability, firm loss and 
managerial stock ownership. However, although block shareholders, institutional 
ownership and investment have been suggested as potential determinants of payout 
ratio, in the previous studies, our regression results suggest that these variables do not 
significantly influence dividend policies of the Zimbabwean corporate sector. 
Logit regression results suggest that debt ratio, past levels of dividend, cash flow and 
institutional investors on one hand increase the likelihood that the firm will pay 
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dividend. On the other hand profit loss and growth opportunities negatively affect the 
decision to pay. 
The results from the multinomial logit suggest that profitability and cash flow 
increase the probability of increasing dividends relative to the probability of reducing 
dividend payment. In addition, investment increases. On the other hand leverage and 
past dividends reduce the probability that a firm will increase dividends in preference 
to reducing them. The results also show that past levels of dividends and investment 
have a significant impact on the choice of reducing and maintaining dividends. The 
lagged dividend variable reduces the probability of choosing alternative `maintain' 
relative to alternative 'reduce, while investment increases the probability that the 
given firm will maintain dividends in preference to reducing them. The major 
determinants of the decision to increase or maintain dividends are past levels of 
dividends, size, cash flow and investment. Size, past levels of dividends, and cash 
flow make it most likely that a given firm will increase dividends rather than maintain 
them, but investment makes it less likely that the firm will increase dividends. 
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Chapter 7 
The Interaction Between Financing and Dividend Policy 
Decisions. 
7.1 Introduction 
Although Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Miller and Modigliani (1961) have 
demonstrated respectively that, under certain assumptions, investment decisions are 
independent of financing and dividend policy decisions, the recent finance literature 
tends to suggest that there is some degree of interdependence among financial policy 
decisions (see, for example, Jensen et al, 1992 and Noronha et al, 1996). The 
empirical implication of interdependence among financial policies is that estimation 
of the individual equations without taking into consideration the information provided 
by other equations in the system is likely to yield biased and inconsistent parameter 
estimates. Therefore, a few studies have empirically examined the determinants of 
financial policies in a system of simultaneous equation framework and the results 
suggest that financial policies are indeed interdependent. 19 However, most of the 
recent empirical studies are based on US and other developed countries data. 
The main objective of this chapter is to examine the extent to which financing and 
dividend policy decisions are interrelated in emerging markets. By using firm level 
data from companies listed on the Zimbabwe stock exchange, this paper seeks 
answers to the following question; Are financial policies interdependent and if they 
are what are the key determinants of dividend and financing decisions in a 
simultaneous equation framework? 
The focus of the present study is on the interrelationship between capital structure and 
dividend policy decisions. The study employs the fixed effects three stage least 
squares estimator but differs from Haan (1997) in three respects. First, our study is 
based on data from an emerging market with institutional characteristics that are 
different from those of developed countries. Second, consistent with Jensen et al 
19 See Haan (1997), for a recent review of the literature. 
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(1992) and Noronha et al, (1996), we employ a stock measure of debt. Third, 
consistent with Noronha et al, (1996), we estimate a two equation simultaneous 
model. 
7.2 Model specification, data and estimation 
In this section we specify the capital structure and dividend equations. Using panel 
data on firms listed on the Zimbabwe stock exchange, the capital structure equation is 
specified as follows: 
Yit = Xitp+Ili +v;, (7.1) 
i=1,2 ............... 51, t =1995, .........., 1999 
where y1, is the debt-equity ratio, x contains variables which have been suggested 
in the literature to have an influence on the financing decision of firms. The mare the 
unobservable firm effects that may be correlated with x;, , and u; t is the disturbance 
term assumed to have a mean zero and a constant variance. 
Similarly, the dividend equation is specified as 
wie =Zeiß+lli +u; t 
(7.2) 
i=1,2 ............... 51, t= 1995 , .........., 1999 
where wi, is the debt-equity ratio, z;, contains variables which have been suggested 
in the literature to have an influence on dividend payout of firms. The rj; are the 
unobservable firm effects that may be correlated with z;,, and u;, is the disturbance 
term assumed to have a mean zero and a constant variance. 
The data is obtained from financial statements (balance sheets, Profit and Loss 
account and cash flow statements) of non-financial firms listed before 1998. All 
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companies that have been de-listed or with incomplete data set were excluded 
resulting in a sample of 51 companies. The possible simultaneity problem and 
correlation of firm effects with the explanatory variables are two econometrics issues 
that need to be addressed when estimating equations (7.1) and (7.2) above. As 
mentioned above, the previous studies have mainly addressed the simultaneity 
problem20. However, if the unobserved firm effects are correlated with explanatory 
variables OLS and simultaneous equation estimators like 2SLS, 3SLS and FIML will 
produce estimates that are biased and inconsistent. The firm specific effects can, 
however, be eliminated by expressing each equation in deviation from the individual 
mean form as follows: 
(Yit -YJ= R(Xit -Xt. )+(u, -ot. ) 
Wit -*J =ß(zi, -it. 
)+(ui, 
-uc. 
) (7.4) 
(7.3) 
The simultaneity problem can then be accounted for by applying simultaneous 
equation estimators like 2SLS or 3SLS to (7.3) and (7.4). In this paper we use the 
within 3SLS estimators to estimate the above two simultaneous equation system. 
The endogenous variables in this two simultaneous equation system are debt-equity 
ratio and dividend payout ratio, while the exogenous variables are, profitability, 
growth opportunities, tangibility, tax, insider ownership, loss dummy, institutional 
ownership and blockholder. In order for the equations to be identified we exclude the 
growth and institutional ownership in the debt equation. We also exclude blockholder 
variable from the debt equation. The definitions and the expected signs of the 
variables are given in table 7.2. We briefly discuss the rationale of each variable. 
20 Haan(1997) is an exception. 
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Table 7.1 a Definition of variables 
Dependent Variable Definition Expected sign 
Debt-Equity (Total borrowing)/(shareholders funds) 
Independent variables 
Dividend payout Dividends/distributable earnings Negative 
Profitability (Net Profit)/(Total assets) Positive 
Tangibility Fixed assets/ Total assets Positive 
Insider Ownership Percentage of shares held by managers and directors Negative 
Tax Taxation/Income before tax and interest Positive 
Blockholder (Largest shareholder) Percentage of shares held by largest shareholder Negative 
Table 7. lb Definition of variables 
Dependent Variable Definition Expected 
sign 
Dividend payout Dividends/distributable earnings 
Independent 
variables 
Debt-Equity (Total borrowing)/(shareholders funds) Negative 
Growth Opportunities [Book assets - total common equity + Shares outstanding * share Negative 
price]/ book assets 
Profitability (Net Profit)/(Total assets) Positive 
Insider Ownership Percentage of shares held by managers and directors Negative 
Institutional ownership Percentage of shares held by financial institutions Negative 
Dloss 1 if loss and 0 otherwise Negative 
7.2. lThe determinants of financing policy 
Corporate tax rate 
Modogliani and Miller (1963) have shown that interest tax deductions reduce the 
corporate tax bill. For this reason, the corporate tax rate is positively related to debt 
ratio. The empirical results are however, inconclusive. Homaifar et al (1994) find 
supportive evidence of Modigliani and Miller (1963) proposition that the corporate 
tax has a positive impact on debt usage. On the other hand, the findings of Krisma and 
Moyer (1996) Lowe et al (1998) and Booth, et al (2001) suggest that the corporate tax 
rate has an adverse effect on debt usage. In this study, the ratio of tax paid to 
217 
operating income is used as a proxy for the effective tax rate and we expect to find a 
positive relationship between the tax rate and debt equity ratio. 
Profitability 
The trade-off hypothesis suggests that firms with high current cash flow should have 
easy access to credit markets (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Therefore, profitability is 
hypothesised to be positively related to debt usage. However, the pecking order 
hypothesis proposed by Myers (1984), Myers and Majluf (1984) predicts that firms 
prefer internal finance as their main source of finance, followed by debt finance and 
then equity finance as a last resort. In this case profitability is inversely related to the 
debt ratio. 
Titman and Wissels (1988), Jensen et al (1992), and Wiwattanakang (1999) find 
strong evidence that profitability adversely affect the amount of debt levels in the 
capital structure. In other words, profitable firms use less debt. However, this is 
contrary to the prediction of the optimal capital structure theory, which suggests that 
profitability greatly reduces the probability of bankruptcy/financial distress and thus 
predicting a positive relationship between leverage and profitability. Our measure for 
profitability is the return on total assets and we expect a negative relationship 
between debt equity ratio and profitability. 
Tangibility 
Before a loan is advanced to a firm, the lender first assesses the nature of the 
investment project, in particular the firm's business, risk and its expected future cash 
flows. The terms and conditions of a loan, together with the interest rate charged all 
depend on these factors. But once a loan has been advanced, managers may 
substitute riskier investments for less risk ones (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This 
asset substitution problem is harmful to lenders if the project fails and in order for 
lenders to protect their interests, they ask for loan covenants and provisions. In turn, 
loan covenants and provisions limit managerial discretion and therefore affect 
company performance. 
However, the asset substitution together with the loan covenants and provisions 
problems can be greatly reduced if assets could be used as collaterals. For this 
reason, firms with collateralisable (tangible) assets enjoy favourable debt terms than 
those with less collateralisable assets. To this end, the variable proxying asset 
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tangibility is positively related to firm leverage, while the proxy for intangible assets 
is negatively related to firm leverage. Friend and Long (1988), and Jensen et al 
(1992) report results, which are consistent with the notion that tangible assets 
enhance the borrowing capabilities of a firm. The proxy for tangibility is the ratio of 
fixed assets to total assets. 
Agency factors 
The agency cost models emphasise the conflicts of interests between managers, equity 
holders and debt holders as the major determinants of firm performance and argues 
that debt financing, to some extent, can mitigate this problem. However, debt policy is 
not the only agency-cost reducing mechanism available. Managerial and block-holder 
ownership have been considered to be the major substitutes for debt policy. If this is 
true, then there is a strong negative relationship between debt policy and managerial 
and institutional stock ownership. 
7.2.2The determinants of dividend policy 
Debt ratio 
Kalay (1982) suggests that debt service and covenants, to some extent, can limit 
dividend payouts. The agency theory (Jensen, 1986) also suggests that leverage is a 
substitute for dividend payout in reducing agency costs. Thus, leverage is expected to 
exert a negative effect on the payout ratio. However, on the contrary, Easterbrook 
(1984) theorise a positive relationship. The empirical study by Dutta (1999) supports a 
positive relationship, while Jensen et al (1992) report a negative relationship. Dalton 
and Pointon (1995), however, find no significant relationship. We employ the debt- 
equity ratio as a proxy for leverage and we let the empirical results determine the 
relationship. 
Firm growth 
A fast growing firm needs to retain a higher proportion of its earnings than a mature 
one. Therefore, we expect such firms to have low payouts in order to avoid 
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transaction costs associated with raising external finance (Chang and Rhee, 1990). 
Market-to-book ratio and earnings per share are the proxies for growth opportunities. 
Profitability 
Profitable firms are expected to have higher pay out ratios than firms with marginal 
profits. Therefore, profitability is expected to exert a positive impact on dividend 
payout. The proxy for profitability is the return on capital employed. 
Agency factors 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) hypothesise that the higher the percentage of shares held 
by managers the lower the agency costs. Firms with closely held shares are also 
expected to have lower agency problems than firms with less concentrated ownership. 
Therefore, we hypothesise that firms with high managerial ownership, institutional 
ownership and ownership concentration have lower agency costs. In this study the 
proxies for agency costs variables are percentage of shares held by insiders (managers 
and directors) and financial institution. These two variables are expected to have a 
negative effect on dividend payout ratio. 
7.3 Empirical Results 
7.3.1 Interdependence between dividend and debt policies 
Tables 7.2 and 7.3 present a summary of the within 3SLS estimation results for the 
simultaneous system of debt and dividend equations of (7.3) and (7.4) respectively. In 
each table we report point estimates for the equation parameters, the associated t 
values and standard errors. We also report the F test statistic for heteroscedasticity 
under the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity. The results show that F test statistic is 
1.2192 with a p-value of 0.1419. Thus the null hypothesis of a constant variance 
cannot be rejected at any conventional critical level. We also report results from the 
within and within-2SLS estimators, but our discussion is based on the within-3SLS 
results. 
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Our primary interest is in the significance and signs of the regression coefficients of 
the endogenous variables in each of the equations. The coefficient of the payout ratio 
in the debt equation is negative and significant at the 1% level. Similarly, the 
coefficient of the debt ratio in the dividend equation is negative and significant at the 
1% level. Therefore, the results strongly reject the Modigliani and Miller's 
(1958,1961) separation principle that financing and dividend decisions are 
independent. The results also reject the proposition that firms may borrow in order to 
pay higher levels of dividends. The negative interaction of debt and dividend payout 
confirms that firms pay dividends out of internal finance as required by the 
Zimbabwean company law. 
The second possible explanation for the negative relationship between financing and 
dividend payment is based on Kalay's(1982) argument that debt service and 
covenants may limit the amount of cash paid out as dividends. Thus firms that are 
highly leveraged have an incentive to reduce their dividend levels in order to meet 
their debt obligations (interest and loan repayment). This is in line with the 
observation that very high interest rates in Zimbabwe discourage corporate borrowing. 
For example in December 1999, bank (commercial and discount houses) lending rates 
fluctuated between 65 % and 98 %, while hire purchase rates ranged from 63 % to 82 
%. Therefore, the burden on debt repayment forces firms to reduce or even omit 
payment of dividends. This explains why firms are reluctant to borrow from banks. 
For example, in chapter four we reported that for the period 1990-99 bank loans 
contribute 1.2 % of total finance. These explanations are consistent with the 
prediction of the pecking order hypothesis. 
The third possible explanation for the significant negative relationship is based on the 
agency cost hypothesis that debt financing and dividend payments are alternative 
mechanisms for controlling the management and shareholder conflict. We can, 
therefore conclude that in Zimbabwe, financing and dividend payment decisions are 
interrelated and should be determined in a simultaneous equation framework. This 
finding is consistent with previous studies based on data from developed countries 
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7.3.2 Impact of firm-specific factors 
In this section, we discuss the impact of firm characteristics on financing and dividend 
decisions. Comparable results are found in studies that have used either single 
equation estimators, neglecting simultaneity bias or system estimators but neglecting 
fixed effects bias. We discuss the results equation by equation and compare with 
results from previous studies. 
7.3.2.1 Debt equation 
The within 3SLS estimation results presented in table 7.3 show that the coefficient of 
profitability is negative and significantly correlated with debt ratio. This finding 
supports the pecking order hypothesis but contradicts the prediction of the trade-off 
hypothesis that firms with high current cash flows are most likely to have easy access 
to credit markets. These results are also in line with the conclusions of Singh and 
Hammid (1992) and Singh (1995) that firms operating in developing countries rely 
heavily on internal financing. 
i 
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Table 7.2 Regression results; (51 firms 1995-1999) Debt equation 
Variable Within Within Within 
2SLS 3SLS 
Constant - - - 
Dividend -0.1828 -0.6784 -0.7635 
(2.12) (3.25) (4.24) 
Profitability -0.3881 -0.5139 -0.5223 
(2.59) (3.38) (3.62) 
Tangibility -0.4226 -0.3191 -0.2594 
(2.60) (1.98) (1.99) 
Tax -0.3095 -0.1941 -0.2228 
(2.74) (1.65) (2.31) 
Insider -1.4515 -1.6363 -1.6497 
(4.95) (5.63) (5.84) 
Blockholder 0.5020 0.3837 0.2693 
(2.38) (1.85) (1.77) 
Sigma 19.2886 18.5472 19.0782 
AIC 10.8937 10.8712 
Hetero F 1.2983 1.2192 
0.090 0.1419 
Over- - 9.352 9.6365 
identification [0.0529] 
[0.1409] 
2 
Restriction x(4) 
Notes 
In parentheses are absolute t-statistics values 
In square brackets are p-values 
The coefficient of the asset tangibility is negative and statistically significant. This 
suggests that firms with more fixed assets tend to borrow less, which is, however, not 
consistent with the prediction of the corporate strategy theory as suggested by 
Williamson (1988). A possible explanation is that the variable is probably a proxy for 
non-debt tax shields for Zimbabwean firms rather than a measure of asset specificity. 
In Zimbabwe, a wide range of fixed assets qualify for a Special Initial Allowance 
which allows 100 % first year depreciation of fixed assets for corporate tax purposes. 
Companies that acquired fixed assets enjoy a substantial tax shelter, which in turn 
would reduce the taxable income that could be shielded by debt. Thus, purchases of 
fixed assets may tend to dominate the tangibility ratio and also the tax shields enjoyed 
by Zimbabwean firms. 
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The tax rate, is also significant at the 1% level, althought the coefficient has counter- 
theoretical signs. The negative relation between the tax rate and the debt ratio is still 
consistent with the findings of Krishnan & Moyer (1996), Lowe et al (1998) and 
Booth, et al (2001), among others. In Zimbabwe, the relationship could be 
attributeable to an expectational effect induced by government tax policy. The 
corporate tax rate was reduced every year from 1995 to 1999. Companies would 
therefore have had an incentive to bring forward tax shelters as much as possible to 
maximise their tax benefits prior to the next cut. Thus, successive tax cuts would be 
associated with increases in debt ratios as firms expected further tax cuts in the future. 
The proxy for the influence of management on capital structure decisions enters the 
debt equation with a negative sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level. This 
suggests that managers dislike high debt levels in capital structures of firms they 
control. Thus supporting the hypothesis that the presence of high debt levels in the 
firm's capital structure is against the interest of management since it increases the 
firm's financial risk (Friend and Lang, 1988). This, also, indicates that managerial 
ownership is a substitute of debt as suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
The proxy for the influence of blockholders is found to be positive and significantly 
correlated with the debt ratio. This suggests that firms with high ownership 
concentration are highly leveraged and thus block shareholding complements debt in 
controlling managers. 
7.3.2.2 Dividend equation 
The coefficient of the market to book variable is negative and but not statistically 
significant at the 10 % level. However, the negative sign suggests that firms with high 
growth opportunities are likely to have low payout ratios. This is in line with Jensen's 
(1986) proposition that firms with high growth opportunities are most likely to pay 
low dividends since they have free cash flow problems. This is also consistent with 
the suggestions of Rozeff (1982) and Easterbrook (1984) that firms with high growth 
options tend to rely more on internal financing which is less costly than external 
financing. 
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Table 7.3 Regression results; (51 firms 1995-1999) Dividend equation 
Variable Within Within 2SLS Within 3SLS 
Debt -0.0788 -0.3674 -0.4317 
(1.42) (2.16) (2.56) 
Profitability -0.4309 -0.4449 -0.4682 
(3.92) (4.22) (4.47) 
Growth -0.0388 -0.0343 -0.0164 
(1.80) (1.66) (1.14) 
Dummy -28.4289 -18.8804 -18.0996 
(5.46) (3.03) (3.05) 
Insider Own. -0.6506 -1.0006 -1.0733 
(2.72) (3.27) (3.51) 
Institutional Own. 0.3981 0.4001 0.1461 
(1.34) (1.42) (0.759) 
Sigma 15.0268 14.2934 14.7655 
AIC 10.8937 10.8712 
Hetero F 1.2983 1.2191 
0.0900 0.1419 
Over-identification - 9.352 3.838 
2 [0.0529] 
[0.4284] 
Restriction % X 
(4) 
Notes 
In parentheses are absolute t-statistics values 
In square brackets are p-values 
The coefficient of profitability is negative and statistically significant. This indicates 
that profitable firms have low dividend payout ratios, a result contrary to the 
theoretical prediction. 
There is a negative and statistically significant relationship between insider ownership 
and dividend payments. This indicates that firms with high managerial ownership are 
likely to have low payouts. This is in line with the agency argument of Rozeff (1982) 
and previous empirical evidence by Holder et al (1998) and Jensen (1992). The 
percentage shareholding of financial institutions is another variable capturing the 
effects of agency costs on dividend payment decisions. The coefficient of this variable 
is positively correlated with dividend payout ratio, but insignificant at any 
conventional critical level. 
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Dloss is a variable that takes a value of 1(0) when a firm reports loss (profit). The 
expectation is that loss-making firms either cut or omit dividends. The regression 
results show that the Dloss variable is negative and statistically significant at the 1% 
and thus indicating that loss-making has a negative impact on dividend payment, as 
expected. 
7.4 Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have empirically examined the extent to which financing and 
dividend policy decisions are interdependent. The empirical model account for 
endogeneity arising from the simultaneity and firm effects problems. Using company 
accounts data, our major conclusion from this examination is that there is strong 
evidence of interrelationship between financing (debt) and cash distribution 
(dividend) decisions. The empirical results strongly support the pecking order 
hypothesis. The results also suggest that firms with high percentage of insider 
ownership choose lower levels of both debt and dividend policies. The other result 
that is consistent with the theory is a negative and significant relationship between 
growth and dividend payout. Firms with high ownership concentration have higher 
payouts. However, contrary to the theory, our results show that tangibility and tax 
variables have a negative influence on financing decisions. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
Now all has been heard; here is the conclusion of 
the matter: Fear God and keep his 
commandments, for this is the whole duty of man. 
Ecclesiastes 12: 13 
8.1 Introduction 
The main purpose of this study has been threefold. First, to explore firm 
characteristics across the regimes. Second, to explore the financing and dividend 
policy patterns of listed non-financial firms in Zimbabwe. Third, to investigate the 
major determinants of corporate financial policy in Zimbabwe. In this chapter we 
summarise the main findings and suggest further research in corporate financial 
policy. 
8.2 Firm characteristics 
Most of the listed firms in Zimbabwe are owned by domestic corporate bodies (44 %), 
followed by financial institutions, (40 %). The government, by holding 3.1 % of 
outstanding shares, does not play a major role in controlling listed firms. Using a data 
set from 32 firms over the period 1975 to 1999, we compared firm performance, 
payout and debt ratios across the regimes. The results showed that there was a 
significant increase in long term debt, new equity, internal finance and investment 
after the implementation of the economic reform programme. The results also showed 
that firm profitability during Independence period was not significantly different from 
the UDI and a possible explanation is that both periods were repressive regimes. 
However, the profitability of firms significantly improved after the implementation of 
the reform programme. Liquidity, on the other hand, increased significantly from UDI 
to Independence and from independence to the reform period. Growth and firm size 
also significantly increased over time. 
We also disaggregated the data into holding and non-holding firms and compared the 
financial performance of holding and non-holding listed firms in Zimbabwe over the 
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period 1995 to 1999. The descriptive statistics showed that profitability, tax paid and 
tangibility of these firms are very close. However, there are significant differences in 
leverage, size, cash flow, liquidity, and capital expenditure between holding and non- 
holding firms. 
Disaggregating the payout ratio by regimes showed that the average payout ratios 
during the UDI, Independence and Reform were 56,36 and 38 respectively. However, 
the descriptive statistics as shown by the Friedman t test showed that the payout ratio 
did not significantly change across the regimes. Disaggregating the data by industrial 
sector, however suggests that the payout ratios significantly vary across industrial 
sectors. The highest payout ratio was reported for conglomerates and the least in the 
agricultural input sector. 
8.3 Corporate financial pattern. 
8.3.1 Financing pattern 
Using unbalanced data from 51 firms over the period 1990-1999, the results of the 
analysis show that the Zimbabwean corporate sector mainly depends on internal 
finance, which was found to be 25 % total financing. Equity finance over the same 
period contributed 8% of total external financing, while bank loans contributed only 1 
%. However, disaggregating the data by industrial sectors, sizes, rate of growth and 
ownership structure reveal the following patterns. First, the agricultural input sector 
relies more heavily on internal financing (49 %) than any other sector. Second, larger 
firms use more internal finance, equity finance and foreign loans than smaller firms. 
However, trade credit is more important to small firms than to larger firms. Third, the 
results seem to suggest that firms with high growth rates use more internal, foreign 
loans and equity finance than low growth firms. Fourth, foreign controlled firms use 
more internal finance and trade credit than any other firms. 
8.3.2 Dividend pattern 
The empirical analysis of the dividend patterns shows that the percentage of firms 
issuing new equity and paying dividends in the same accounting year has substantially 
increased after financial reform. A possible explanation is that the reform programme 
has altered the institutional environment. For example easy access to capital markets 
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for firms and the reduction of capital gains tax from 30 % to 10 % for all shares, 
which are traded on the stock market. 
8.4 The determinants of corporate financial policy 
8.4.1 Determinants of capital structures 
Using balanced data from 32 firms over the period 1975 to 1999, a model of capital 
structure was estimated. The first empirical issue was to investigate whether there was 
a structural change in parameters of the capital structure model. Using interactive 
regime dummies we found empirical evidence to suggest that the impact of taxation 
on corporate capital structures shifted in 1980. A possible explanation is that the 
government, with the aim of redistributing income, significantly changed the tax 
system in 1980. A document, known as `growth with equity' was produced in 1980, 
which resulted in tax rates reaching the highest levels in Zimbabwean history. The 
results also indicate that the effect of liquidity and firm size on capital structures 
during the reform was significantly different from the other two regimes. 
In order to check for robustness of the results the capital structure model, was re- 
estimated with more firms (51 firms) and explanatory variables, but concentrating on 
a shorter period (1995-1999). Using the recent developments in the econometric 
literature, we estimated a static and dynamic model of capital structure. For the static 
model, we experimented with 5 alternative measures of leverage and judging from the 
adjusted R-squared, the results show that the ratio of total liability to book equity is a 
better proxy for leverage in Zimbabwe. This is in line with the observation that, this 
measure is widely used in Zimbabwe. The data was then disaggregated into holding 
and non-holding firms and we then compared the capital structures of holding and 
non-holding firms over the period 1995 to 1999, and the results from the Wald test 
statistics suggests that the determinants of capital structure decisions differ 
significantly between the two groups of firms. The results from the within estimator 
show that 6 out of 7 determinants significantly explain variation in leverage ratios 
across holding firms, while only 3 out of the 7 variables are important in explaining 
capital structure decisions of non-holding firms. This implies that the variables 
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suggested in the finance literature as major determinants of capital structure are more 
applicable to larger firms rather than small firms. 
Overall, the results suggest that the major determinants of capital structure in 
Zimbabwe are size, tangibility, growth, taxation, profitability, non-debt tax, capital 
market conditions (stock liquidity), liquidity, managerial ownership and payout ratio. 
The results showed that firm size, growth and capital market conditions have a 
positive impact on leverage ratio while taxation, liquidity, profitability, non-debt tax, 
managerial ownership and payout ratio have a negative effect. Thus the results 
support the following hypotheses. (i) the pecking order hypothesis that firms prefer 
internal financing to external financing, (ii) the trade-off hypothesis that non-debt tax 
shields reduce the expected gains from leverage, (iii) firms use liquid assets to finance 
investments, (iv) the agency cost hypothesis that increasing managerial ownership 
helps to align the interests of managers and shareholders and therefore reduces the 
role of debt as an agency-conflict mitigating factor, (v) large firms have lower 
bankruptcy costs and therefore can support more debt than smaller firms, (vi) debt 
service limits the amount of cash paid out as dividends, and (vii) high growth firms 
rely on external finance more than low growth firms. On the other hand, the results do 
not support the two trade-off hypotheses: (i) firms' collateralisable assets provide 
security to lenders in the event of financial distress, and (ii) corporate taxation 
encourages corporations to finance their investments by debt. 
8.4.2 Determinants of dividend policy 
Using the recent developments in panel data estimation (dynamic model) we 
empirically estimated the dividend stability model first proposed by Lintner (1956). 
The results are consistent with Lintner's prediction that past levels of dividends and 
current earnings are the major determinants of corporate dividend behaviour. The 
results also support the conclusion of Fama and Babiak (1968) that the constant is 
zero in the Lintner model. Thus the Lintner model describes very well corporate 
dividend behaviour in emerging markets. 
The econometric evidence based on the within estimates suggests that the payout ratio 
is negatively related to debt ratio, firm size, growth, profitability, firm loss and 
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managerial stock ownership. However, although block shareholders, institutional 
ownership and investment have been suggested as potential determinants of payout 
ratio, in the previous studies, our regression results suggest that these variables do not 
significantly influence dividend policies of the Zimbabwean corporate sector. 
Logit regression results suggest that debt ratio, past levels of dividend, cash flow and 
institutional investors on one hand increase the likelihood that the firm will pay 
dividend. On the other hand profit, loss and growth opportunities negatively affect the 
decision to pay. 
The results from the multinomial logit suggest that profitability and cash flow 
increase the probability of increasing dividends relative to the probability of reducing 
dividend payment. In addition, investment increases the probability that the given firm 
will maintain dividends in preference to reducing them. On the other hand leverage 
and past dividends reduce the probability that a firm will increase dividends in 
preference to reducing them. The results also show that past levels of dividends and 
investment have a significant impact on the choice of reducing and maintaining 
dividends. The lagged dividend variable reduces the probability of choosing 
alternative `maintain' relative to alternative 'reduce, while investment increases the 
probability that the given firm will maintain dividends in preference to reducing them. 
The major determinants of the decision to increase or maintain dividends are past 
levels of dividends, size, cash flow and investment. Size, past levels of dividends, and 
cash flow make it most likely that a given firm will increase dividends rather than 
maintain them, but investment makes it less likely that the firm will increase 
dividends. 
Finally, we empirically examined the extent to which financing and dividend policy 
decisions are interdependent. The empirical model account for endogeneity arising 
from the simultaneity and firm effects problems. Using company accounts data, our 
major conclusion from this examination is that there is strong evidence of 
interrelationship between financing (debt) and cash distribution (dividend) decisions. 
The empirical results strongly support the pecking order hypothesis. The results also 
suggest that firms with high percentage of insider ownership choose lower levels of 
both debt and dividend policies. The other result that is consistent with the theory is a 
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negative and significant relationship between growth and dividend payout. Firms with 
high ownership concentration have higher payouts. However, contrary to the theory, 
our results show that tangibility and tax variables have a negative influence on 
financing decisions. 
8.5 Shortcomings and Suggestions for further research 
Several lines for further research can be suggested. Firstly, there is a need to 
investigate the importance of macroeconomic variables in determining corporate 
financial policies. Secondly, the discrete models used in this study ignore firm and 
time specific effects, therefore a discrete model that with error component may 
produce better estimates. Thirdly, the present study has been confined to the period 
1975 to 1999. Extending the study to 2002 may produce interesting results since the 
period 2000 to 2002 is characterised by political instability/economic crises. Thus, it 
is an opportunity to assess the impact of political instability on the financial behaviour 
of firms. 
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